416 commits
Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Lorenz Bauer
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59aa82b7e8 |
net: export inet_lookup_reuseport and inet6_lookup_reuseport
[ Upstream commit ce796e60b3b196b61fcc565df195443cbb846ef0 ] Rename the existing reuseport helpers for IPv4 and IPv6 so that they can be invoked in the follow up commit. Export them so that building DCCP and IPv6 as a module works. No change in functionality. Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@isovalent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230720-so-reuseport-v6-3-7021b683cdae@isovalent.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Stable-dep-of: 50aee97d1511 ("udp: Avoid call to compute_score on multiple sites") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Igor Artemiev
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d5cef1bbe2 |
wifi: cfg80211: fix the order of arguments for trace events of the tx_rx_evt class
[ Upstream commit 9ef369973cd2c97cce3388d2c0c7e3c056656e8a ] The declarations of the tx_rx_evt class and the rdev_set_antenna event use the wrong order of arguments in the TP_ARGS macro. Fix the order of arguments in the TP_ARGS macro. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Signed-off-by: Igor Artemiev <Igor.A.Artemiev@mcst.ru> Link: https://msgid.link/20240405152431.270267-1-Igor.A.Artemiev@mcst.ru Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Paolo Abeni
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6637ffc8cb |
mptcp: ensure snd_nxt is properly initialized on connect
commit fb7a0d334894206ae35f023a82cad5a290fd7386 upstream. Christoph reported a splat hinting at a corrupted snd_una: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 38 at net/mptcp/protocol.c:1005 __mptcp_clean_una+0x4b3/0x620 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1005 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 38 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc1-gbbeac67456c9 #59 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events mptcp_worker RIP: 0010:__mptcp_clean_una+0x4b3/0x620 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1005 Code: be 06 01 00 00 bf 06 01 00 00 e8 a8 12 e7 fe e9 00 fe ff ff e8 8e 1a e7 fe 0f b7 ab 3e 02 00 00 e9 d3 fd ff ff e8 7d 1a e7 fe <0f> 0b 4c 8b bb e0 05 00 00 e9 74 fc ff ff e8 6a 1a e7 fe 0f 0b e9 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000013fd48 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881029bd280 RCX: ffffffff82382fe4 RDX: ffff8881003cbd00 RSI: ffffffff823833c3 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff888138ba8000 R13: 0000000000000106 R14: ffff8881029bd908 R15: ffff888126560000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f604a5dae38 CR3: 0000000101dac002 CR4: 0000000000170ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> __mptcp_clean_una_wakeup net/mptcp/protocol.c:1055 [inline] mptcp_clean_una_wakeup net/mptcp/protocol.c:1062 [inline] __mptcp_retrans+0x7f/0x7e0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2615 mptcp_worker+0x434/0x740 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2767 process_one_work+0x1e0/0x560 kernel/workqueue.c:3254 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3335 [inline] worker_thread+0x3c7/0x640 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x121/0x170 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243 </TASK> When fallback to TCP happens early on a client socket, snd_nxt is not yet initialized and any incoming ack will copy such value into snd_una. If the mptcp worker (dumbly) tries mptcp-level re-injection after such ack, that would unconditionally trigger a send buffer cleanup using 'bad' snd_una values. We could easily disable re-injection for fallback sockets, but such dumb behavior already helped catching a few subtle issues and a very low to zero impact in practice. Instead address the issue always initializing snd_nxt (and write_seq, for consistency) at connect time. Fixes: 8fd738049ac3 ("mptcp: fallback in case of simultaneous connect") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com> Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/485 Tested-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240429-upstream-net-20240429-mptcp-snd_nxt-init-connect-v1-1-59ceac0a7dcb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> [ snd_nxt field is not available in v5.10.y: before, only write_seq was used, see commit eaa2ffabfc35 ("mptcp: introduce MPTCP snd_nxt") for more details about that. ] Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Eric Dumazet
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ec507bd269 |
netlink: annotate lockless accesses to nlk->max_recvmsg_len
commit a1865f2e7d10dde00d35a2122b38d2e469ae67ed upstream. syzbot reported a data-race in data-race in netlink_recvmsg() [1] Indeed, netlink_recvmsg() can be run concurrently, and netlink_dump() also needs protection. [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in netlink_recvmsg / netlink_recvmsg read to 0xffff888141840b38 of 8 bytes by task 23057 on cpu 0: netlink_recvmsg+0xea/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1988 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1038 [inline] __sys_recvfrom+0x1ee/0x2e0 net/socket.c:2194 __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2212 [inline] __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2208 [inline] __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x78/0x90 net/socket.c:2208 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd write to 0xffff888141840b38 of 8 bytes by task 23037 on cpu 1: netlink_recvmsg+0x114/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1989 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1038 [inline] ____sys_recvmsg+0x156/0x310 net/socket.c:2720 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2762 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x2e5/0x710 net/socket.c:2856 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2935 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2958 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2951 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:2951 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000001000 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 23037 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc4-syzkaller-00195-g5a57b48fdfcb #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/02/2023 Fixes: 9063e21fb026 ("netlink: autosize skb lengthes") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230403214643.768555-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: yenchia.chen <yenchia.chen@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
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bc6eaae798 |
net: fix out-of-bounds access in ops_init
commit a26ff37e624d12e28077e5b24d2b264f62764ad6 upstream. net_alloc_generic is called by net_alloc, which is called without any locking. It reads max_gen_ptrs, which is changed under pernet_ops_rwsem. It is read twice, first to allocate an array, then to set s.len, which is later used to limit the bounds of the array access. It is possible that the array is allocated and another thread is registering a new pernet ops, increments max_gen_ptrs, which is then used to set s.len with a larger than allocated length for the variable array. Fix it by reading max_gen_ptrs only once in net_alloc_generic. If max_gen_ptrs is later incremented, it will be caught in net_assign_generic. Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com> Fixes: 073862ba5d24 ("netns: fix net_alloc_generic()") Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502132006.3430840-1-cascardo@igalia.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Paolo Abeni
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44155ccb42 |
tipc: fix UAF in error path
commit 080cbb890286cd794f1ee788bbc5463e2deb7c2b upstream. Sam Page (sam4k) working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative reported a UAF in the tipc_buf_append() error path: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88804d2a7c80 by task poc/8034 CPU: 1 PID: 8034 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.8.2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-5 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack linux/lib/dump_stack.c:88 dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 linux/lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description linux/mm/kasan/report.c:377 print_report+0xc4/0x620 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:601 kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183 skb_release_data+0x5af/0x880 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1026 skb_release_all linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1094 __kfree_skb linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1108 kfree_skb_reason+0x12d/0x210 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1144 kfree_skb linux/./include/linux/skbuff.h:1244 tipc_buf_append+0x425/0xb50 linux/net/tipc/msg.c:186 tipc_link_input+0x224/0x7c0 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1324 tipc_link_rcv+0x76e/0x2d70 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1824 tipc_rcv+0x45f/0x10f0 linux/net/tipc/node.c:2159 tipc_udp_recv+0x73b/0x8f0 linux/net/tipc/udp_media.c:390 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0xad2/0x1850 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2108 udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x131/0xb00 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2186 udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x165/0x3b0 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2346 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x2594/0x3400 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2422 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x30c/0x4e0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2e4/0x520 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308 ip_local_deliver+0x18e/0x1f0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254 dst_input linux/./include/net/dst.h:461 ip_rcv_finish linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308 ip_rcv+0x2c5/0x5d0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x199/0x1e0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5534 __netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x1c0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5648 process_backlog+0x101/0x6b0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5976 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xba/0x550 linux/net/core/dev.c:6576 napi_poll linux/net/core/dev.c:6645 net_rx_action+0x95a/0xe90 linux/net/core/dev.c:6781 __do_softirq+0x21f/0x8e7 linux/kernel/softirq.c:553 do_softirq linux/kernel/softirq.c:454 do_softirq+0xb2/0xf0 linux/kernel/softirq.c:441 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x100/0x120 linux/kernel/softirq.c:381 local_bh_enable linux/./include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 rcu_read_unlock_bh linux/./include/linux/rcupdate.h:851 __dev_queue_xmit+0x871/0x3ee0 linux/net/core/dev.c:4378 dev_queue_xmit linux/./include/linux/netdevice.h:3169 neigh_hh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:526 neigh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:540 ip_finish_output2+0x169f/0x2550 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235 __ip_finish_output linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:313 __ip_finish_output+0x49e/0x950 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:295 ip_finish_output+0x31/0x310 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323 NF_HOOK_COND linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:303 ip_output+0x13b/0x2a0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433 dst_output linux/./include/net/dst.h:451 ip_local_out linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 ip_send_skb+0x3e5/0x560 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 udp_send_skb+0x73f/0x1530 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:963 udp_sendmsg+0x1a36/0x2b40 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:1250 inet_sendmsg+0x105/0x140 linux/net/ipv4/af_inet.c:850 sock_sendmsg_nosec linux/net/socket.c:730 __sock_sendmsg linux/net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x42c/0x4e0 linux/net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2203 __se_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2199 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 linux/net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x270 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120 RIP: 0033:0x7f3434974f29 Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 37 8f 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff9154f2b8 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3434974f29 RDX: 00000000000032c8 RSI: 00007fff9154f300 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fff915532e0 R08: 00007fff91553360 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 000055ed86d261d0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> In the critical scenario, either the relevant skb is freed or its ownership is transferred into a frag_lists. In both cases, the cleanup code must not free it again: we need to clear the skb reference earlier. Fixes: 1149557d64c9 ("tipc: eliminate unnecessary linearization of incoming buffers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-23852 Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/752f1ccf762223d109845365d07f55414058e5a3.1714484273.git.pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Eric Dumazet
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d360c6cf66 |
ipv6: fib6_rules: avoid possible NULL dereference in fib6_rule_action()
[ Upstream commit d101291b2681e5ab938554e3e323f7a7ee33e3aa ] syzbot is able to trigger the following crash [1], caused by unsafe ip6_dst_idev() use. Indeed ip6_dst_idev() can return NULL, and must always be checked. [1] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 0 PID: 31648 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-next-20240417-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 RIP: 0010:__fib6_rule_action net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:237 [inline] RIP: 0010:fib6_rule_action+0x241/0x7b0 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:267 Code: 02 00 00 49 8d 9f d8 00 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 f9 32 bf f7 48 8b 1b 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 e0 32 bf f7 4c 8b 03 48 89 ef 4c RSP: 0018:ffffc9000fc1f2f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 1a772f98c8186700 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: ffffffff8bcac4e0 RDI: ffffffff8c1f9760 RBP: ffff8880673fb980 R08: ffffffff8fac15ef R09: 1ffffffff1f582bd R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1f582be R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: 0000000000000080 R14: ffff888076509000 R15: ffff88807a029a00 FS: 00007f55e82ca6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b31d23000 CR3: 0000000022b66000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> fib_rules_lookup+0x62c/0xdb0 net/core/fib_rules.c:317 fib6_rule_lookup+0x1fd/0x790 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:108 ip6_route_output_flags_noref net/ipv6/route.c:2637 [inline] ip6_route_output_flags+0x38e/0x610 net/ipv6/route.c:2649 ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:93 [inline] ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0x189/0x11a0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1120 ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0xb9/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1250 sctp_v6_get_dst+0x792/0x1e20 net/sctp/ipv6.c:326 sctp_transport_route+0x12c/0x2e0 net/sctp/transport.c:455 sctp_assoc_add_peer+0x614/0x15c0 net/sctp/associola.c:662 sctp_connect_new_asoc+0x31d/0x6c0 net/sctp/socket.c:1099 __sctp_connect+0x66d/0xe30 net/sctp/socket.c:1197 sctp_connect net/sctp/socket.c:4819 [inline] sctp_inet_connect+0x149/0x1f0 net/sctp/socket.c:4834 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2048 [inline] __sys_connect+0x2df/0x310 net/socket.c:2065 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2075 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2072 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:2072 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: 5e5f3f0f8013 ("[IPV6] ADDRCONF: Convert ipv6_get_saddr() to ipv6_dev_get_saddr().") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507163145.835254-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
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90b69f2e08 |
kcov: Remove kcov include from sched.h and move it to its users.
[ Upstream commit 183f47fcaa54a5ffe671d990186d330ac8c63b10 ] The recent addition of in_serving_softirq() to kconv.h results in compile failure on PREEMPT_RT because it requires task_struct::softirq_disable_cnt. This is not available if kconv.h is included from sched.h. It is not needed to include kconv.h from sched.h. All but the net/ user already include the kconv header file. Move the include of the kconv.h header from sched.h it its users. Additionally include sched.h from kconv.h to ensure that everything task_struct related is available. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210218173124.iy5iyqv3a4oia4vv@linutronix.de Stable-dep-of: 19e35f24750d ("nfc: nci: Fix kcov check in nci_rx_work()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Eric Dumazet
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cf134676e5 |
phonet: fix rtm_phonet_notify() skb allocation
[ Upstream commit d8cac8568618dcb8a51af3db1103e8d4cc4aeea7 ] fill_route() stores three components in the skb: - struct rtmsg - RTA_DST (u8) - RTA_OIF (u32) Therefore, rtm_phonet_notify() should use NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct rtmsg)) + nla_total_size(1) + nla_total_size(4) Fixes: f062f41d0657 ("Phonet: routing table Netlink interface") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Rémi Denis-Courmont <courmisch@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502161700.1804476-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Roded Zats
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b99c97d0fa |
rtnetlink: Correct nested IFLA_VF_VLAN_LIST attribute validation
[ Upstream commit 1aec77b2bb2ed1db0f5efc61c4c1ca3813307489 ] Each attribute inside a nested IFLA_VF_VLAN_LIST is assumed to be a struct ifla_vf_vlan_info so the size of such attribute needs to be at least of sizeof(struct ifla_vf_vlan_info) which is 14 bytes. The current size validation in do_setvfinfo is against NLA_HDRLEN (4 bytes) which is less than sizeof(struct ifla_vf_vlan_info) so this validation is not enough and a too small attribute might be cast to a struct ifla_vf_vlan_info, this might result in an out of bands read access when accessing the saved (casted) entry in ivvl. Fixes: 79aab093a0b5 ("net: Update API for VF vlan protocol 802.1ad support") Signed-off-by: Roded Zats <rzats@paloaltonetworks.com> Reviewed-by: Donald Hunter <donald.hunter@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502155751.75705-1-rzats@paloaltonetworks.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Duoming Zhou
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cf9f5fb712 |
Bluetooth: l2cap: fix null-ptr-deref in l2cap_chan_timeout
[ Upstream commit adf0398cee86643b8eacde95f17d073d022f782c ] There is a race condition between l2cap_chan_timeout() and l2cap_chan_del(). When we use l2cap_chan_del() to delete the channel, the chan->conn will be set to null. But the conn could be dereferenced again in the mutex_lock() of l2cap_chan_timeout(). As a result the null pointer dereference bug will happen. The KASAN report triggered by POC is shown below: [ 472.074580] ================================================================== [ 472.075284] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0 [ 472.075308] Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000000158 by task kworker/0:0/7 [ 472.075308] [ 472.075308] CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-00356-g78c0094a146b #36 [ 472.075308] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu4 [ 472.075308] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout [ 472.075308] Call Trace: [ 472.075308] <TASK> [ 472.075308] dump_stack_lvl+0x137/0x1a0 [ 472.075308] print_report+0x101/0x250 [ 472.075308] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x77/0x160 [ 472.075308] ? mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0 [ 472.075308] kasan_report+0x139/0x170 [ 472.075308] ? mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0 [ 472.075308] kasan_check_range+0x2c3/0x2e0 [ 472.075308] mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0 [ 472.075308] l2cap_chan_timeout+0x181/0x300 [ 472.075308] process_one_work+0x5d2/0xe00 [ 472.075308] worker_thread+0xe1d/0x1660 [ 472.075308] ? pr_cont_work+0x5e0/0x5e0 [ 472.075308] kthread+0x2b7/0x350 [ 472.075308] ? pr_cont_work+0x5e0/0x5e0 [ 472.075308] ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0 [ 472.075308] ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 [ 472.075308] ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0 [ 472.075308] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 472.075308] </TASK> [ 472.075308] ================================================================== [ 472.094860] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 472.096136] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000158 [ 472.096136] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 472.096136] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 472.096136] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 472.096136] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 472.096136] CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:0 Tainted: G B 6.9.0-rc5-00356-g78c0094a146b #36 [ 472.096136] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu4 [ 472.096136] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout [ 472.096136] RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x88/0xc0 [ 472.096136] Code: be 08 00 00 00 e8 f8 23 1f fd 4c 89 f7 be 08 00 00 00 e8 eb 23 1f fd 42 80 3c 23 00 74 08 48 88 [ 472.096136] RSP: 0018:ffff88800744fc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ 472.096136] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff11000e89f8f RCX: ffffffff8457c865 [ 472.096136] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88800744fc78 [ 472.096136] RBP: 0000000000000158 R08: ffff88800744fc7f R09: 1ffff11000e89f8f [ 472.096136] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed1000e89f90 R12: dffffc0000000000 [ 472.096136] R13: 0000000000000158 R14: ffff88800744fc78 R15: ffff888007405a00 [ 472.096136] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88806d200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 472.096136] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 472.096136] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 000000000da32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 472.096136] Call Trace: [ 472.096136] <TASK> [ 472.096136] ? __die_body+0x8d/0xe0 [ 472.096136] ? page_fault_oops+0x6b8/0x9a0 [ 472.096136] ? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x20c/0x2a0 [ 472.096136] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1027/0x1340 [ 472.096136] ? _printk+0x7a/0xa0 [ 472.096136] ? mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0 [ 472.096136] ? add_taint+0x42/0xd0 [ 472.096136] ? exc_page_fault+0x6a/0x1b0 [ 472.096136] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 [ 472.096136] ? mutex_lock+0x75/0xc0 [ 472.096136] ? mutex_lock+0x88/0xc0 [ 472.096136] ? mutex_lock+0x75/0xc0 [ 472.096136] l2cap_chan_timeout+0x181/0x300 [ 472.096136] process_one_work+0x5d2/0xe00 [ 472.096136] worker_thread+0xe1d/0x1660 [ 472.096136] ? pr_cont_work+0x5e0/0x5e0 [ 472.096136] kthread+0x2b7/0x350 [ 472.096136] ? pr_cont_work+0x5e0/0x5e0 [ 472.096136] ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0 [ 472.096136] ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 [ 472.096136] ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0 [ 472.096136] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 472.096136] </TASK> [ 472.096136] Modules linked in: [ 472.096136] CR2: 0000000000000158 [ 472.096136] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 472.096136] RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x88/0xc0 [ 472.096136] Code: be 08 00 00 00 e8 f8 23 1f fd 4c 89 f7 be 08 00 00 00 e8 eb 23 1f fd 42 80 3c 23 00 74 08 48 88 [ 472.096136] RSP: 0018:ffff88800744fc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ 472.096136] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff11000e89f8f RCX: ffffffff8457c865 [ 472.096136] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88800744fc78 [ 472.096136] RBP: 0000000000000158 R08: ffff88800744fc7f R09: 1ffff11000e89f8f [ 472.132932] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed1000e89f90 R12: dffffc0000000000 [ 472.132932] R13: 0000000000000158 R14: ffff88800744fc78 R15: ffff888007405a00 [ 472.132932] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88806d200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 472.132932] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 472.132932] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 000000000da32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 472.132932] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 472.132932] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 472.132932] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- Add a check to judge whether the conn is null in l2cap_chan_timeout() in order to mitigate the bug. Fixes: 3df91ea20e74 ("Bluetooth: Revert to mutexes from RCU list") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming@zju.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Duoming Zhou
|
fc98ab94e9 |
Bluetooth: Fix use-after-free bugs caused by sco_sock_timeout
[ Upstream commit 483bc08181827fc475643272ffb69c533007e546 ] When the sco connection is established and then, the sco socket is releasing, timeout_work will be scheduled to judge whether the sco disconnection is timeout. The sock will be deallocated later, but it is dereferenced again in sco_sock_timeout. As a result, the use-after-free bugs will happen. The root cause is shown below: Cleanup Thread | Worker Thread sco_sock_release | sco_sock_close | __sco_sock_close | sco_sock_set_timer | schedule_delayed_work | sco_sock_kill | (wait a time) sock_put(sk) //FREE | sco_sock_timeout | sock_hold(sk) //USE The KASAN report triggered by POC is shown below: [ 95.890016] ================================================================== [ 95.890496] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_sock_timeout+0x5e/0x1c0 [ 95.890755] Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800c388080 by task kworker/0:0/7 ... [ 95.890755] Workqueue: events sco_sock_timeout [ 95.890755] Call Trace: [ 95.890755] <TASK> [ 95.890755] dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x110 [ 95.890755] print_address_description+0x78/0x390 [ 95.890755] print_report+0x11b/0x250 [ 95.890755] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xbe/0xf0 [ 95.890755] ? sco_sock_timeout+0x5e/0x1c0 [ 95.890755] kasan_report+0x139/0x170 [ 95.890755] ? update_load_avg+0xe5/0x9f0 [ 95.890755] ? sco_sock_timeout+0x5e/0x1c0 [ 95.890755] kasan_check_range+0x2c3/0x2e0 [ 95.890755] sco_sock_timeout+0x5e/0x1c0 [ 95.890755] process_one_work+0x561/0xc50 [ 95.890755] worker_thread+0xab2/0x13c0 [ 95.890755] ? pr_cont_work+0x490/0x490 [ 95.890755] kthread+0x279/0x300 [ 95.890755] ? pr_cont_work+0x490/0x490 [ 95.890755] ? kthread_blkcg+0xa0/0xa0 [ 95.890755] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60 [ 95.890755] ? kthread_blkcg+0xa0/0xa0 [ 95.890755] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 95.890755] </TASK> [ 95.890755] [ 95.890755] Allocated by task 506: [ 95.890755] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x70 [ 95.890755] __kasan_kmalloc+0x86/0x90 [ 95.890755] __kmalloc+0x17f/0x360 [ 95.890755] sk_prot_alloc+0xe1/0x1a0 [ 95.890755] sk_alloc+0x31/0x4e0 [ 95.890755] bt_sock_alloc+0x2b/0x2a0 [ 95.890755] sco_sock_create+0xad/0x320 [ 95.890755] bt_sock_create+0x145/0x320 [ 95.890755] __sock_create+0x2e1/0x650 [ 95.890755] __sys_socket+0xd0/0x280 [ 95.890755] __x64_sys_socket+0x75/0x80 [ 95.890755] do_syscall_64+0xc4/0x1b0 [ 95.890755] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f [ 95.890755] [ 95.890755] Freed by task 506: [ 95.890755] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x70 [ 95.890755] kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 [ 95.890755] poison_slab_object+0x118/0x180 [ 95.890755] __kasan_slab_free+0x12/0x30 [ 95.890755] kfree+0xb2/0x240 [ 95.890755] __sk_destruct+0x317/0x410 [ 95.890755] sco_sock_release+0x232/0x280 [ 95.890755] sock_close+0xb2/0x210 [ 95.890755] __fput+0x37f/0x770 [ 95.890755] task_work_run+0x1ae/0x210 [ 95.890755] get_signal+0xe17/0xf70 [ 95.890755] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x3f/0x520 [ 95.890755] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x55/0x120 [ 95.890755] do_syscall_64+0xd1/0x1b0 [ 95.890755] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f [ 95.890755] [ 95.890755] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800c388000 [ 95.890755] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 [ 95.890755] The buggy address is located 128 bytes inside of [ 95.890755] freed 1024-byte region [ffff88800c388000, ffff88800c388400) [ 95.890755] [ 95.890755] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 95.890755] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88800c38a800 pfn:0xc388 [ 95.890755] head: order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 [ 95.890755] anon flags: 0x100000000000840(slab|head|node=0|zone=1) [ 95.890755] page_type: 0xffffffff() [ 95.890755] raw: 0100000000000840 ffff888006842dc0 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 [ 95.890755] raw: ffff88800c38a800 000000000010000a 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 95.890755] head: 0100000000000840 ffff888006842dc0 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 [ 95.890755] head: ffff88800c38a800 000000000010000a 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 95.890755] head: 0100000000000003 ffffea000030e201 ffffea000030e248 00000000ffffffff [ 95.890755] head: 0000000800000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 95.890755] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 95.890755] [ 95.890755] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 95.890755] ffff88800c387f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 95.890755] ffff88800c388000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 95.890755] >ffff88800c388080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 95.890755] ^ [ 95.890755] ffff88800c388100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 95.890755] ffff88800c388180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 95.890755] ================================================================== Fix this problem by adding a check protected by sco_conn_lock to judget whether the conn->hcon is null. Because the conn->hcon will be set to null, when the sock is releasing. Fixes: ba316be1b6a0 ("Bluetooth: schedule SCO timeouts with delayed_work") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming@zju.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Kuniyuki Iwashima
|
cf91d03faf |
tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().
[ Upstream commit f2db7230f73a80dbb179deab78f88a7947f0ab7e ] Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique() with nice analysis. Since commit ec94c2696f0b ("tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation for timewait hashdance"), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket's sk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock. Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try to reuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique() for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt. If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwritten and sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-free somewhere else. To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false. [0]: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8 RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0 RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0 R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84 R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0 FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80 RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885d RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0 R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK> Fixes: ec94c2696f0b ("tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation for timewait hashdance") Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/37a477a6-d39e-486b-9577-3463f655a6b7@allelesecurity.com/ Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501213145.62261-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Eric Dumazet
|
2785cbe7c9 |
tcp: defer shutdown(SEND_SHUTDOWN) for TCP_SYN_RECV sockets
[ Upstream commit 94062790aedb505bdda209b10bea47b294d6394f ] TCP_SYN_RECV state is really special, it is only used by cross-syn connections, mostly used by fuzzers. In the following crash [1], syzbot managed to trigger a divide by zero in tcp_rcv_space_adjust() A socket makes the following state transitions, without ever calling tcp_init_transfer(), meaning tcp_init_buffer_space() is also not called. TCP_CLOSE connect() TCP_SYN_SENT TCP_SYN_RECV shutdown() -> tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN) TCP_FIN_WAIT1 To fix this issue, change tcp_shutdown() to not perform a TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 transition, which makes no sense anyway. When tcp_rcv_state_process() later changes socket state from TCP_SYN_RECV to TCP_ESTABLISH, then look at sk->sk_shutdown to finally enter TCP_FIN_WAIT1 state, and send a FIN packet from a sane socket state. This means tcp_send_fin() can now be called from BH context, and must use GFP_ATOMIC allocations. [1] divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 5084 Comm: syz-executor358 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-syzkaller-00022-g98369dccd2f8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 RIP: 0010:tcp_rcv_space_adjust+0x2df/0x890 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:767 Code: e3 04 4c 01 eb 48 8b 44 24 38 0f b6 04 10 84 c0 49 89 d5 0f 85 a5 03 00 00 41 8b 8e c8 09 00 00 89 e8 29 c8 48 0f af c3 31 d2 <48> f7 f1 48 8d 1c 43 49 8d 96 76 08 00 00 48 89 d0 48 c1 e8 03 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc900031ef3f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0c677a10441f8f42 RBX: 000000004fb95e7e RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000027d4b11f R08: ffffffff89e535a4 R09: 1ffffffff25e6ab7 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8135e920 R12: ffff88802a9f8d30 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88802a9f8d00 R15: 1ffff1100553f2da FS: 00005555775c0380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1155bf2304 CR3: 000000002b9f2000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x106d/0x25a0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2513 tcp_recvmsg+0x25d/0x920 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2578 inet6_recvmsg+0x16a/0x730 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:680 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x109/0x280 net/socket.c:1068 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1db/0x470 net/socket.c:2803 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7faeb6363db9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 c1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffcc1997168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007faeb6363db9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000bc0 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000001c R10: 0000000000000122 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501125448.896529-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Paul Davey
|
29d463ccea |
xfrm: Preserve vlan tags for transport mode software GRO
[ Upstream commit 58fbfecab965014b6e3cc956a76b4a96265a1add ] The software GRO path for esp transport mode uses skb_mac_header_rebuild prior to re-injecting the packet via the xfrm_napi_dev. This only copies skb->mac_len bytes of header which may not be sufficient if the packet contains 802.1Q tags or other VLAN tags. Worse copying only the initial header will leave a packet marked as being VLAN tagged but without the corresponding tag leading to mangling when it is later untagged. The VLAN tags are important when receiving the decrypted esp transport mode packet after GRO processing to ensure it is received on the correct interface. Therefore record the full mac header length in xfrm*_transport_input for later use in corresponding xfrm*_transport_finish to copy the entire mac header when rebuilding the mac header for GRO. The skb->data pointer is left pointing skb->mac_header bytes after the start of the mac header as is expected by the network stack and network and transport header offsets reset to this location. Fixes: 7785bba299a8 ("esp: Add a software GRO codepath") Signed-off-by: Paul Davey <paul.davey@alliedtelesis.co.nz> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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linke li
|
cc048a6781 |
net: mark racy access on sk->sk_rcvbuf
[ Upstream commit c2deb2e971f5d9aca941ef13ee05566979e337a4 ] sk->sk_rcvbuf in __sock_queue_rcv_skb() and __sk_receive_skb() can be changed by other threads. Mark this as benign using READ_ONCE(). This patch is aimed at reducing the number of benign races reported by KCSAN in order to focus future debugging effort on harmful races. Signed-off-by: linke li <lilinke99@qq.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Igor Artemiev
|
7f3ebb7627 |
wifi: cfg80211: fix rdev_dump_mpp() arguments order
[ Upstream commit ec50f3114e55406a1aad24b7dfaa1c3f4336d8eb ] Fix the order of arguments in the TP_ARGS macro for the rdev_dump_mpp tracepoint event. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Signed-off-by: Igor Artemiev <Igor.A.Artemiev@mcst.ru> Link: https://msgid.link/20240311164519.118398-1-Igor.A.Artemiev@mcst.ru Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Jeff Johnson
|
e3f10358c0 |
wifi: mac80211: fix ieee80211_bss_*_flags kernel-doc
[ Upstream commit 774f8841f55d7ac4044c79812691649da203584a ] Running kernel-doc on ieee80211_i.h flagged the following: net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h:145: warning: expecting prototype for enum ieee80211_corrupt_data_flags. Prototype was for enum ieee80211_bss_corrupt_data_flags instead net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h:162: warning: expecting prototype for enum ieee80211_valid_data_flags. Prototype was for enum ieee80211_bss_valid_data_flags instead Fix these warnings. Signed-off-by: Jeff Johnson <quic_jjohnson@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://msgid.link/20240314-kdoc-ieee80211_i-v1-1-72b91b55b257@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Richard Gobert
|
3d0698b86c |
net: gro: add flush check in udp_gro_receive_segment
[ Upstream commit 5babae777c61aa8a8679d59d3cdc54165ad96d42 ] GRO-GSO path is supposed to be transparent and as such L3 flush checks are relevant to all UDP flows merging in GRO. This patch uses the same logic and code from tcp_gro_receive, terminating merge if flush is non zero. Fixes: e20cf8d3f1f7 ("udp: implement GRO for plain UDP sockets.") Signed-off-by: Richard Gobert <richardbgobert@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Xin Long
|
ef3fe087d8 |
tipc: fix a possible memleak in tipc_buf_append
[ Upstream commit 97bf6f81b29a8efaf5d0983251a7450e5794370d ] __skb_linearize() doesn't free the skb when it fails, so move '*buf = NULL' after __skb_linearize(), so that the skb can be freed on the err path. Fixes: b7df21cf1b79 ("tipc: skb_linearize the head skb when reassembling msgs") Reported-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.q.nguyen@dektech.com.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/90710748c29a1521efac4f75ea01b3b7e61414cf.1714485818.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Felix Fietkau
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2a58e94c3f |
net: core: reject skb_copy(_expand) for fraglist GSO skbs
[ Upstream commit d091e579b864fa790dd6a0cd537a22c383126681 ] SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs must not be linearized, otherwise they become invalid. Return NULL if such an skb is passed to skb_copy or skb_copy_expand, in order to prevent a crash on a potential later call to skb_gso_segment. Fixes: 3a1296a38d0c ("net: Support GRO/GSO fraglist chaining.") Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Felix Fietkau
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b26ca2113a |
net: bridge: fix multicast-to-unicast with fraglist GSO
[ Upstream commit 59c878cbcdd80ed39315573b3511d0acfd3501b5 ] Calling skb_copy on a SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skb is not valid, since it returns an invalid linearized skb. This code only needs to change the ethernet header, so pskb_copy is the right function to call here. Fixes: 6db6f0eae605 ("bridge: multicast to unicast") Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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David Bauer
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94ef599d29 |
net l2tp: drop flow hash on forward
[ Upstream commit 42f853b42899d9b445763b55c3c8adc72be0f0e1 ] Drop the flow-hash of the skb when forwarding to the L2TP netdev. This avoids the L2TP qdisc from using the flow-hash from the outer packet, which is identical for every flow within the tunnel. This does not affect every platform but is specific for the ethernet driver. It depends on the platform including L4 information in the flow-hash. One such example is the Mediatek Filogic MT798x family of networking processors. Fixes: d9e31d17ceba ("l2tp: Add L2TP ethernet pseudowire support") Acked-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424171110.13701-1-mail@david-bauer.net Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Kuniyuki Iwashima
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566ad563af |
nsh: Restore skb->{protocol,data,mac_header} for outer header in nsh_gso_segment().
[ Upstream commit 4b911a9690d72641879ea6d13cce1de31d346d79 ] syzbot triggered various splats (see [0] and links) by a crafted GSO packet of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP layering the following protocols: ETH_P_8021AD + ETH_P_NSH + ETH_P_IPV6 + IPPROTO_UDP NSH can encapsulate IPv4, IPv6, Ethernet, NSH, and MPLS. As the inner protocol can be Ethernet, NSH GSO handler, nsh_gso_segment(), calls skb_mac_gso_segment() to invoke inner protocol GSO handlers. nsh_gso_segment() does the following for the original skb before calling skb_mac_gso_segment() 1. reset skb->network_header 2. save the original skb->{mac_heaeder,mac_len} in a local variable 3. pull the NSH header 4. resets skb->mac_header 5. set up skb->mac_len and skb->protocol for the inner protocol. and does the following for the segmented skb 6. set ntohs(ETH_P_NSH) to skb->protocol 7. push the NSH header 8. restore skb->mac_header 9. set skb->mac_header + mac_len to skb->network_header 10. restore skb->mac_len There are two problems in 6-7 and 8-9. (a) After 6 & 7, skb->data points to the NSH header, so the outer header (ETH_P_8021AD in this case) is stripped when skb is sent out of netdev. Also, if NSH is encapsulated by NSH + Ethernet (so NSH-Ethernet-NSH), skb_pull() in the first nsh_gso_segment() will make skb->data point to the middle of the outer NSH or Ethernet header because the Ethernet header is not pulled by the second nsh_gso_segment(). (b) While restoring skb->{mac_header,network_header} in 8 & 9, nsh_gso_segment() does not assume that the data in the linear buffer is shifted. However, udp6_ufo_fragment() could shift the data and change skb->mac_header accordingly as demonstrated by syzbot. If this happens, even the restored skb->mac_header points to the middle of the outer header. It seems nsh_gso_segment() has never worked with outer headers so far. At the end of nsh_gso_segment(), the outer header must be restored for the segmented skb, instead of the NSH header. To do that, let's calculate the outer header position relatively from the inner header and set skb->{data,mac_header,protocol} properly. [0]: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:524 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xf44/0x16b0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:668 ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:524 [inline] ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xf44/0x16b0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:668 ipvlan_start_xmit+0x5c/0x1a0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:222 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4989 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5003 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3547 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x244/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3563 __dev_queue_xmit+0x33ed/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4351 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline] packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3819 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3980 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x705/0x1000 mm/slub.c:4001 kmalloc_reserve+0x249/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:582 __alloc_skb+0x352/0x790 net/core/skbuff.c:651 skb_segment+0x20aa/0x7080 net/core/skbuff.c:4647 udp6_ufo_fragment+0xcab/0x1150 net/ipv6/udp_offload.c:109 ipv6_gso_segment+0x14be/0x2ca0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:152 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3e8/0x760 net/core/gso.c:53 nsh_gso_segment+0x6f4/0xf70 net/nsh/nsh.c:108 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3e8/0x760 net/core/gso.c:53 __skb_gso_segment+0x4b0/0x730 net/core/gso.c:124 skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x107f/0x1930 net/core/dev.c:3628 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f28/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4343 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline] packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b CPU: 1 PID: 5101 Comm: syz-executor421 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc5-syzkaller-00297-gf2e367d6ad3b #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024 Fixes: c411ed854584 ("nsh: add GSO support") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+42a0dc856239de4de60e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=42a0dc856239de4de60e Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+c298c9f0e46a3c86332b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c298c9f0e46a3c86332b Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240415222041.18537-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424023549.21862-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Josef Bacik
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fe2b47def5 |
sunrpc: add a struct rpc_stats arg to rpc_create_args
[ Upstream commit 2057a48d0dd00c6a2a94ded7df2bf1d3f2a4a0da ] We want to be able to have our rpc stats handled in a per network namespace manner, so add an option to rpc_create_args to specify a different rpc_stats struct instead of using the one on the rpc_program. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Stable-dep-of: 24457f1be29f ("nfs: Handle error of rpc_proc_register() in nfs_net_init().") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Johannes Berg
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6b670bd8c5 |
wifi: nl80211: don't free NULL coalescing rule
[ Upstream commit 801ea33ae82d6a9d954074fbcf8ea9d18f1543a7 ] If the parsing fails, we can dereference a NULL pointer here. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: be29b99a9b51 ("cfg80211/nl80211: Add packet coalesce support") Reviewed-by: Miriam Rachel Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com> Link: https://msgid.link/20240418105220.b328f80406e7.Id75d961050deb05b3e4e354e024866f350c68103@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Yick Xie
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8669ab8ece |
udp: preserve the connected status if only UDP cmsg
commit 680d11f6e5427b6af1321932286722d24a8b16c1 upstream. If "udp_cmsg_send()" returned 0 (i.e. only UDP cmsg), "connected" should not be set to 0. Otherwise it stops the connected socket from using the cached route. Fixes: 2e8de8576343 ("udp: add gso segment cmsg") Signed-off-by: Yick Xie <yick.xie@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240418170610.867084-1-yick.xie@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yick Xie <yick.xie@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Eric Dumazet
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e57df368c6 |
tcp: Fix NEW_SYN_RECV handling in inet_twsk_purge()
commit 1c4e97dd2d3c9a3e84f7e26346aa39bc426d3249 upstream. inet_twsk_purge() uses rcu to find TIME_WAIT and NEW_SYN_RECV objects to purge. These objects use SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU semantic and need special care. We need to use refcount_inc_not_zero(&sk->sk_refcnt). Reuse the existing correct logic I wrote for TIME_WAIT, because both structures have common locations for sk_state, sk_family, and netns pointer. If after the refcount_inc_not_zero() the object fields longer match the keys, use sock_gen_put(sk) to release the refcount. Then we can call inet_twsk_deschedule_put() for TIME_WAIT, inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put() for NEW_SYN_RECV sockets, with BH disabled. Then we need to restart the loop because we had drop rcu_read_lock(). Fixes: 740ea3c4a0b2 ("tcp: Clean up kernel listener's reqsk in inet_twsk_purge()") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89iLvFuuihCtt9PME2uS1WJATnf5fKjDToa1WzVnRzHnPfg@mail.gmail.com/T/#u Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240308200122.64357-2-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> [shaozhengchao: resolved conflicts in 5.10] Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Kuniyuki Iwashima
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e635f6d4c2 |
tcp: Clean up kernel listener's reqsk in inet_twsk_purge()
commit 740ea3c4a0b2e326b23d7cdf05472a0e92aa39bc upstream. Eric Dumazet reported a use-after-free related to the per-netns ehash series. [0] When we create a TCP socket from userspace, the socket always holds a refcnt of the netns. This guarantees that a reqsk timer is always fired before netns dismantle. Each reqsk has a refcnt of its listener, so the listener is not freed before the reqsk, and the net is not freed before the listener as well. OTOH, when in-kernel users create a TCP socket, it might not hold a refcnt of its netns. Thus, a reqsk timer can be fired after the netns dismantle and access freed per-netns ehash. To avoid the use-after-free, we need to clean up TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV sockets in inet_twsk_purge() if the netns uses a per-netns ehash. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89iLXMup0dRD_Ov79Xt8N9FM0XdhCHEN05sf3eLwxKweM6w@mail.gmail.com/ BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_or_dccp_get_hashinfo include/net/inet_hashtables.h:181 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in reqsk_queue_unlink+0x320/0x350 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:913 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807545bd80 by task syz-executor.2/8301 CPU: 1 PID: 8301 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.0.0-syzkaller-02757-gaf7d23f9d96a #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/22/2022 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:317 [inline] print_report.cold+0x2ba/0x719 mm/kasan/report.c:433 kasan_report+0xb1/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:495 tcp_or_dccp_get_hashinfo include/net/inet_hashtables.h:181 [inline] reqsk_queue_unlink+0x320/0x350 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:913 inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:927 [inline] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:939 [inline] reqsk_timer_handler+0x724/0x1160 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1053 call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x6b0 kernel/time/timer.c:1474 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1519 [inline] __run_timers.part.0+0x674/0xa80 kernel/time/timer.c:1790 __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1768 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0xb3/0x1d0 kernel/time/timer.c:1803 __do_softirq+0x1d0/0x9c8 kernel/softirq.c:571 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:445 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu+0x123/0x180 kernel/softirq.c:650 irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:662 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x93/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1107 </IRQ> Fixes: d1e5e6408b30 ("tcp: Introduce optional per-netns ehash.") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221012145036.74960-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> [shaozhengchao: resolved conflicts in 5.10] Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Rahul Rameshbabu
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16bc5adfde |
ethernet: Add helper for assigning packet type when dest address does not match device address
commit 6e159fd653d7ebf6290358e0330a0cb8a75cf73b upstream. Enable reuse of logic in eth_type_trans for determining packet type. Suggested-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rahul Rameshbabu <rrameshbabu@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423181319.115860-3-rrameshbabu@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Nathan Chancellor
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b9f81c065e |
Bluetooth: Fix type of len in {l2cap,sco}_sock_getsockopt_old()
commit 9bf4e919ccad613b3596eebf1ff37b05b6405307 upstream. After an innocuous optimization change in LLVM main (19.0.0), x86_64 allmodconfig (which enables CONFIG_KCSAN / -fsanitize=thread) fails to build due to the checks in check_copy_size(): In file included from net/bluetooth/sco.c:27: In file included from include/linux/module.h:13: In file included from include/linux/stat.h:19: In file included from include/linux/time.h:60: In file included from include/linux/time32.h:13: In file included from include/linux/timex.h:67: In file included from arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h:6: In file included from arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h:10: In file included from arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h:15: In file included from include/linux/percpu.h:7: In file included from include/linux/smp.h:118: include/linux/thread_info.h:244:4: error: call to '__bad_copy_from' declared with 'error' attribute: copy source size is too small 244 | __bad_copy_from(); | ^ The same exact error occurs in l2cap_sock.c. The copy_to_user() statements that are failing come from l2cap_sock_getsockopt_old() and sco_sock_getsockopt_old(). This does not occur with GCC with or without KCSAN or Clang without KCSAN enabled. len is defined as an 'int' because it is assigned from '__user int *optlen'. However, it is clamped against the result of sizeof(), which has a type of 'size_t' ('unsigned long' for 64-bit platforms). This is done with min_t() because min() requires compatible types, which results in both len and the result of sizeof() being casted to 'unsigned int', meaning len changes signs and the result of sizeof() is truncated. From there, len is passed to copy_to_user(), which has a third parameter type of 'unsigned long', so it is widened and changes signs again. This excessive casting in combination with the KCSAN instrumentation causes LLVM to fail to eliminate the __bad_copy_from() call, failing the build. The official recommendation from LLVM developers is to consistently use long types for all size variables to avoid the unnecessary casting in the first place. Change the type of len to size_t in both l2cap_sock_getsockopt_old() and sco_sock_getsockopt_old(). This clears up the error while allowing min_t() to be replaced with min(), resulting in simpler code with no casts and fewer implicit conversions. While len is a different type than optlen now, it should result in no functional change because the result of sizeof() will clamp all values of optlen in the same manner as before. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Closes: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/2007 Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/85647 Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Kuniyuki Iwashima
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3beb8327d3 |
af_unix: Suppress false-positive lockdep splat for spin_lock() in __unix_gc().
[ Upstream commit 1971d13ffa84a551d29a81fdf5b5ec5be166ac83 ] syzbot reported a lockdep splat regarding unix_gc_lock and unix_state_lock(). One is called from recvmsg() for a connected socket, and another is called from GC for TCP_LISTEN socket. So, the splat is false-positive. Let's add a dedicated lock class for the latter to suppress the splat. Note that this change is not necessary for net-next.git as the issue is only applied to the old GC impl. [0]: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- kworker/u8:1/11 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] unix_notinflight+0x13d/0x390 net/unix/garbage.c:140 unix_detach_fds net/unix/af_unix.c:1819 [inline] unix_destruct_scm+0x221/0x350 net/unix/af_unix.c:1876 skb_release_head_state+0x100/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:1188 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1200 [inline] __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1216 [inline] kfree_skb_reason+0x16d/0x3b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1252 kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1262 [inline] manage_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2672 [inline] unix_stream_read_generic+0x1125/0x2700 net/unix/af_unix.c:2749 unix_stream_splice_read+0x239/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2981 do_splice_read fs/splice.c:985 [inline] splice_file_to_pipe+0x299/0x500 fs/splice.c:1295 do_splice+0xf2d/0x1880 fs/splice.c:1379 __do_splice fs/splice.c:1436 [inline] __do_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1652 [inline] __se_sys_splice+0x331/0x4a0 fs/splice.c:1634 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(unix_gc_lock); lock(&u->lock); lock(unix_gc_lock); lock(&u->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kworker/u8:1/11: #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline] #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> Fixes: 47d8ac011fe1 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+fa379358c28cc87cc307@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa379358c28cc87cc307 Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424170443.9832-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Pablo Neira Ayuso
|
6ad3233951 |
netfilter: nf_tables: honor table dormant flag from netdev release event path
[ Upstream commit 8e30abc9ace4f0add4cd761dfdbfaebae5632dd2 ] Check for table dormant flag otherwise netdev release event path tries to unregister an already unregistered hook. [524854.857999] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [524854.858010] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3386599 at net/netfilter/core.c:501 __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260 [...] [524854.858848] CPU: 0 PID: 3386599 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc3+ #365 [524854.858869] Workqueue: netns cleanup_net [524854.858886] RIP: 0010:__nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260 [524854.858903] Code: 24 e8 aa 73 83 ff 48 63 43 1c 83 f8 01 0f 85 3d ff ff ff e8 98 d1 f0 ff 48 8b 3c 24 e8 8f 73 83 ff 48 63 43 1c e9 26 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 18 48 c7 c7 00 68 e9 82 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 [524854.858914] RSP: 0018:ffff8881e36d79e0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [524854.858926] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881339ae790 RCX: ffffffff81ba524a [524854.858936] RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff8881c8a16438 [524854.858945] RBP: ffff8881c8a16438 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed103c6daf34 [524854.858954] R10: ffff8881e36d79a7 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005 [524854.858962] R13: ffff8881c8a16000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881351b5a00 [524854.858971] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888390800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [524854.858982] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [524854.858991] CR2: 00007fc9be0f16f4 CR3: 00000001437cc004 CR4: 00000000001706f0 [524854.859000] Call Trace: [524854.859006] <TASK> [524854.859013] ? __warn+0x9f/0x1a0 [524854.859027] ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260 [524854.859044] ? report_bug+0x1b1/0x1e0 [524854.859060] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 [524854.859071] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x40 [524854.859083] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [524854.859100] ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x6a/0x260 [524854.859116] ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260 [524854.859135] nf_tables_netdev_event+0x337/0x390 [nf_tables] [524854.859304] ? __pfx_nf_tables_netdev_event+0x10/0x10 [nf_tables] [524854.859461] ? packet_notifier+0xb3/0x360 [524854.859476] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40 [524854.859489] ? dcbnl_netdevice_event+0x35/0x140 [524854.859507] ? __pfx_nf_tables_netdev_event+0x10/0x10 [nf_tables] [524854.859661] notifier_call_chain+0x7d/0x140 [524854.859677] unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x5e1/0xae0 Fixes: d54725cd11a5 ("netfilter: nf_tables: support for multiple devices per netdev hook") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Hyunwoo Kim
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0804f9bc42 |
net: openvswitch: Fix Use-After-Free in ovs_ct_exit
[ Upstream commit 5ea7b72d4fac2fdbc0425cd8f2ea33abe95235b2 ] Since kfree_rcu, which is called in the hlist_for_each_entry_rcu traversal of ovs_ct_limit_exit, is not part of the RCU read critical section, it is possible that the RCU grace period will pass during the traversal and the key will be free. To prevent this, it should be changed to hlist_for_each_entry_safe. Fixes: 11efd5cb04a1 ("openvswitch: Support conntrack zone limit") Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZiYvzQN/Ry5oeFQW@v4bel-B760M-AORUS-ELITE-AX Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Ismael Luceno
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fbc8ca47ea |
ipvs: Fix checksumming on GSO of SCTP packets
[ Upstream commit e10d3ba4d434ed172914617ed8d74bd411421193 ] It was observed in the wild that pairs of consecutive packets would leave the IPVS with the same wrong checksum, and the issue only went away when disabling GSO. IPVS needs to avoid computing the SCTP checksum when using GSO. Fixes: 90017accff61 ("sctp: Add GSO support") Co-developed-by: Firo Yang <firo.yang@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Ismael Luceno <iluceno@suse.de> Tested-by: Andreas Taschner <andreas.taschner@suse.com> Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Eric Dumazet
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8cba7f0514 |
ipv4: check for NULL idev in ip_route_use_hint()
[ Upstream commit 58a4c9b1e5a3e53c9148e80b90e1e43897ce77d1 ] syzbot was able to trigger a NULL deref in fib_validate_source() in an old tree [1]. It appears the bug exists in latest trees. All calls to __in_dev_get_rcu() must be checked for a NULL result. [1] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 2 PID: 3257 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.10.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:fib_validate_source+0xbf/0x15a0 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:425 Code: 18 f2 f2 f2 f2 42 c7 44 20 23 f3 f3 f3 f3 48 89 44 24 78 42 c6 44 20 27 f3 e8 5d 88 48 fc 4c 89 e8 48 c1 e8 03 48 89 44 24 18 <42> 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 ef e8 d2 15 98 fc 48 89 5c 24 10 41 bf RSP: 0018:ffffc900015fee40 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88800f7a4000 RCX: ffff88800f4f90c0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000004001eac RDI: ffff8880160c64c0 RBP: ffffc900015ff060 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88800f7a4000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff88800f4f90c0 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88800f7a4000 FS: 00007f938acfe6c0(0000) GS:ffff888058c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f938acddd58 CR3: 000000001248e000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ip_route_use_hint+0x410/0x9b0 net/ipv4/route.c:2231 ip_rcv_finish_core+0x2c4/0x1a30 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:327 ip_list_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:612 [inline] ip_sublist_rcv+0x3ed/0xe50 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:638 ip_list_rcv+0x422/0x470 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:673 __netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5572 [inline] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x6b1/0x890 net/core/dev.c:5620 __netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:5672 [inline] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x9f9/0xdc0 net/core/dev.c:5764 netif_receive_skb_list+0x55/0x3e0 net/core/dev.c:5816 xdp_recv_frames net/bpf/test_run.c:257 [inline] xdp_test_run_batch net/bpf/test_run.c:335 [inline] bpf_test_run_xdp_live+0x1818/0x1d00 net/bpf/test_run.c:363 bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x81f/0x1170 net/bpf/test_run.c:1376 bpf_prog_test_run+0x349/0x3c0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3736 __sys_bpf+0x45c/0x710 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5115 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5201 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5199 [inline] __x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5199 Fixes: 02b24941619f ("ipv4: use dst hint for ipv4 list receive") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240421184326.1704930-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Florian Westphal
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96d39a4be5 |
netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: do not free live element
[ Upstream commit 3cfc9ec039af60dbd8965ae085b2c2ccdcfbe1cc ] Pablo reports a crash with large batches of elements with a back-to-back add/remove pattern. Quoting Pablo: add_elem("00000000") timeout 100 ms ... add_elem("0000000X") timeout 100 ms del_elem("0000000X") <---------------- delete one that was just added ... add_elem("00005000") timeout 100 ms 1) nft_pipapo_remove() removes element 0000000X Then, KASAN shows a splat. Looking at the remove function there is a chance that we will drop a rule that maps to a non-deactivated element. Removal happens in two steps, first we do a lookup for key k and return the to-be-removed element and mark it as inactive in the next generation. Then, in a second step, the element gets removed from the set/map. The _remove function does not work correctly if we have more than one element that share the same key. This can happen if we insert an element into a set when the set already holds an element with same key, but the element mapping to the existing key has timed out or is not active in the next generation. In such case its possible that removal will unmap the wrong element. If this happens, we will leak the non-deactivated element, it becomes unreachable. The element that got deactivated (and will be freed later) will remain reachable in the set data structure, this can result in a crash when such an element is retrieved during lookup (stale pointer). Add a check that the fully matching key does in fact map to the element that we have marked as inactive in the deactivation step. If not, we need to continue searching. Add a bug/warn trap at the end of the function as well, the remove function must not ever be called with an invisible/unreachable/non-existent element. v2: avoid uneeded temporary variable (Stefano) Fixes: 3c4287f62044 ("nf_tables: Add set type for arbitrary concatenation of ranges") Reported-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Ziyang Xuan
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1cb129360a |
netfilter: nf_tables: Fix potential data-race in __nft_expr_type_get()
[ Upstream commit f969eb84ce482331a991079ab7a5c4dc3b7f89bf ] nft_unregister_expr() can concurrent with __nft_expr_type_get(), and there is not any protection when iterate over nf_tables_expressions list in __nft_expr_type_get(). Therefore, there is potential data-race of nf_tables_expressions list entry. Use list_for_each_entry_rcu() to iterate over nf_tables_expressions list in __nft_expr_type_get(), and use rcu_read_lock() in the caller nft_expr_type_get() to protect the entire type query process. Fixes: ef1f7df9170d ("netfilter: nf_tables: expression ops overloading") Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Michal Luczaj
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b9777d505d |
af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()
[ Upstream commit 47d8ac011fe1c9251070e1bd64cb10b48193ec51 ] Garbage collector does not take into account the risk of embryo getting enqueued during the garbage collection. If such embryo has a peer that carries SCM_RIGHTS, two consecutive passes of scan_children() may see a different set of children. Leading to an incorrectly elevated inflight count, and then a dangling pointer within the gc_inflight_list. sockets are AF_UNIX/SOCK_STREAM S is an unconnected socket L is a listening in-flight socket bound to addr, not in fdtable V's fd will be passed via sendmsg(), gets inflight count bumped connect(S, addr) sendmsg(S, [V]); close(V) __unix_gc() ---------------- ------------------------- ----------- NS = unix_create1() skb1 = sock_wmalloc(NS) L = unix_find_other(addr) unix_state_lock(L) unix_peer(S) = NS // V count=1 inflight=0 NS = unix_peer(S) skb2 = sock_alloc() skb_queue_tail(NS, skb2[V]) // V became in-flight // V count=2 inflight=1 close(V) // V count=1 inflight=1 // GC candidate condition met for u in gc_inflight_list: if (total_refs == inflight_refs) add u to gc_candidates // gc_candidates={L, V} for u in gc_candidates: scan_children(u, dec_inflight) // embryo (skb1) was not // reachable from L yet, so V's // inflight remains unchanged __skb_queue_tail(L, skb1) unix_state_unlock(L) for u in gc_candidates: if (u.inflight) scan_children(u, inc_inflight_move_tail) // V count=1 inflight=2 (!) If there is a GC-candidate listening socket, lock/unlock its state. This makes GC wait until the end of any ongoing connect() to that socket. After flipping the lock, a possibly SCM-laden embryo is already enqueued. And if there is another embryo coming, it can not possibly carry SCM_RIGHTS. At this point, unix_inflight() can not happen because unix_gc_lock is already taken. Inflight graph remains unaffected. Fixes: 1fd05ba5a2f2 ("[AF_UNIX]: Rewrite garbage collector, fixes race.") Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240409201047.1032217-1-mhal@rbox.co Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Kuniyuki Iwashima
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625a8bb556 |
af_unix: Do not use atomic ops for unix_sk(sk)->inflight.
[ Upstream commit 97af84a6bba2ab2b9c704c08e67de3b5ea551bb2 ] When touching unix_sk(sk)->inflight, we are always under spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock). Let's convert unix_sk(sk)->inflight to the normal unsigned long. Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123170856.41348-3-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Stable-dep-of: 47d8ac011fe1 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Eric Dumazet
|
98c95141ff |
netfilter: complete validation of user input
[ Upstream commit 65acf6e0501ac8880a4f73980d01b5d27648b956 ] In my recent commit, I missed that do_replace() handlers use copy_from_sockptr() (which I fixed), followed by unsafe copy_from_sockptr_offset() calls. In all functions, we can perform the @optlen validation before even calling xt_alloc_table_info() with the following check: if ((u64)optlen < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp)) return -EINVAL; Fixes: 0c83842df40f ("netfilter: validate user input for expected length") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240409120741.3538135-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Luiz Augusto von Dentz
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ed3ce62784 |
Bluetooth: SCO: Fix not validating setsockopt user input
[ Upstream commit 51eda36d33e43201e7a4fd35232e069b2c850b01 ] syzbot reported sco_sock_setsockopt() is copying data without checking user input length. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sco_sock_setsockopt+0xc0b/0xf90 net/bluetooth/sco.c:893 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88805f7b15a3 by task syz-executor.5/12578 Fixes: ad10b1a48754 ("Bluetooth: Add Bluetooth socket voice option") Fixes: b96e9c671b05 ("Bluetooth: Add BT_DEFER_SETUP option to sco socket") Fixes: 00398e1d5183 ("Bluetooth: Add support for BT_PKT_STATUS CMSG data for SCO connections") Fixes: f6873401a608 ("Bluetooth: Allow setting of codec for HFP offload use case") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Jiri Benc
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4b6fb836c2 |
ipv6: fix race condition between ipv6_get_ifaddr and ipv6_del_addr
[ Upstream commit 7633c4da919ad51164acbf1aa322cc1a3ead6129 ] Although ipv6_get_ifaddr walks inet6_addr_lst under the RCU lock, it still means hlist_for_each_entry_rcu can return an item that got removed from the list. The memory itself of such item is not freed thanks to RCU but nothing guarantees the actual content of the memory is sane. In particular, the reference count can be zero. This can happen if ipv6_del_addr is called in parallel. ipv6_del_addr removes the entry from inet6_addr_lst (hlist_del_init_rcu(&ifp->addr_lst)) and drops all references (__in6_ifa_put(ifp) + in6_ifa_put(ifp)). With bad enough timing, this can happen: 1. In ipv6_get_ifaddr, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu returns an entry. 2. Then, the whole ipv6_del_addr is executed for the given entry. The reference count drops to zero and kfree_rcu is scheduled. 3. ipv6_get_ifaddr continues and tries to increments the reference count (in6_ifa_hold). 4. The rcu is unlocked and the entry is freed. 5. The freed entry is returned. Prevent increasing of the reference count in such case. The name in6_ifa_hold_safe is chosen to mimic the existing fib6_info_hold_safe. [ 41.506330] refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. [ 41.506760] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 595 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130 [ 41.507413] Modules linked in: veth bridge stp llc [ 41.507821] CPU: 0 PID: 595 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2.main-00208-g49563be82afa #14 [ 41.508479] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) [ 41.509163] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130 [ 41.509586] Code: ad ff 90 0f 0b 90 90 c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d c0 30 ad 01 00 75 a0 c6 05 b7 30 ad 01 01 90 48 c7 c7 38 cc 7a 8c e8 cc 18 ad ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d 98 30 ad 01 00 0f 85 75 ff ff ff [ 41.510956] RSP: 0018:ffffbda3c026baf0 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 41.511368] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e9c46914800 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 41.511910] RDX: ffff9e9c7ec29c00 RSI: ffff9e9c7ec1c900 RDI: ffff9e9c7ec1c900 [ 41.512445] RBP: ffff9e9c43660c9c R08: 0000000000009ffb R09: 00000000ffffdfff [ 41.512998] R10: 00000000ffffdfff R11: ffffffff8ca58a40 R12: ffff9e9c4339a000 [ 41.513534] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff9e9c438a0000 R15: ffffbda3c026bb48 [ 41.514086] FS: 00007fbc4cda1740(0000) GS:ffff9e9c7ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 41.514726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 41.515176] CR2: 000056233b337d88 CR3: 000000000376e006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [ 41.515713] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 41.516252] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 41.516799] Call Trace: [ 41.517037] <TASK> [ 41.517249] ? __warn+0x7b/0x120 [ 41.517535] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130 [ 41.517923] ? report_bug+0x164/0x190 [ 41.518240] ? handle_bug+0x3d/0x70 [ 41.518541] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 [ 41.520972] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 41.521325] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130 [ 41.521708] ipv6_get_ifaddr+0xda/0xe0 [ 41.522035] inet6_rtm_getaddr+0x342/0x3f0 [ 41.522376] ? __pfx_inet6_rtm_getaddr+0x10/0x10 [ 41.522758] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x334/0x3d0 [ 41.523102] ? netlink_unicast+0x30f/0x390 [ 41.523445] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [ 41.523832] netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100 [ 41.524157] netlink_unicast+0x23b/0x390 [ 41.524484] netlink_sendmsg+0x1f2/0x440 [ 41.524826] __sys_sendto+0x1d8/0x1f0 [ 41.525145] __x64_sys_sendto+0x1f/0x30 [ 41.525467] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x1b0 [ 41.525794] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a [ 41.526213] RIP: 0033:0x7fbc4cfcea9a [ 41.526528] Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 7e c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 30 44 89 [ 41.527942] RSP: 002b:00007ffcf54012a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 41.528593] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffcf5401368 RCX: 00007fbc4cfcea9a [ 41.529173] RDX: 000000000000002c RSI: 00007fbc4b9d9bd0 RDI: 0000000000000005 [ 41.529786] RBP: 00007fbc4bafb040 R08: 00007ffcf54013e0 R09: 000000000000000c [ 41.530375] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 41.530977] R13: ffffffffc4653600 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007fbc4ca85d1b [ 41.531573] </TASK> Fixes: 5c578aedcb21d ("IPv6: convert addrconf hash list to RCU") Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8ab821e36073a4a406c50ec83c9e8dc586c539e4.1712585809.git.jbenc@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Arnd Bergmann
|
8f639a9c06 |
ipv4/route: avoid unused-but-set-variable warning
[ Upstream commit cf1b7201df59fb936f40f4a807433fe3f2ce310a ] The log_martians variable is only used in an #ifdef, causing a 'make W=1' warning with gcc: net/ipv4/route.c: In function 'ip_rt_send_redirect': net/ipv4/route.c:880:13: error: variable 'log_martians' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable] Change the #ifdef to an equivalent IS_ENABLED() to let the compiler see where the variable is used. Fixes: 30038fc61adf ("net: ip_rt_send_redirect() optimization") Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240408074219.3030256-2-arnd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Arnd Bergmann
|
7d04625a9b |
ipv6: fib: hide unused 'pn' variable
[ Upstream commit 74043489fcb5e5ca4074133582b5b8011b67f9e7 ] When CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is disabled, the only user is hidden, causing a 'make W=1' warning: net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c: In function 'fib6_add': net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1388:32: error: variable 'pn' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable] Add another #ifdef around the variable declaration, matching the other uses in this file. Fixes: 66729e18df08 ("[IPV6] ROUTE: Make sure we have fn->leaf when adding a node on subtree.") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240322131746.904943-1-arnd@kernel.org/ Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240408074219.3030256-1-arnd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Eric Dumazet
|
f25ea75490 |
xsk: validate user input for XDP_{UMEM|COMPLETION}_FILL_RING
[ Upstream commit 237f3cf13b20db183d3706d997eedc3c49eacd44 ] syzbot reported an illegal copy in xsk_setsockopt() [1] Make sure to validate setsockopt() @optlen parameter. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888028c6cde3 by task syz-executor.0/7549 CPU: 0 PID: 7549 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420 do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 RIP: 0033:0x7fb40587de69 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb40665a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb4059abf80 RCX: 00007fb40587de69 RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 000000000000011b RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00007fb4058ca47a R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000020001980 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fb4059abf80 R15: 00007fff57ee4d08 </TASK> Allocated by task 7549: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3966 [inline] __kmalloc+0x233/0x4a0 mm/slub.c:3979 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:632 [inline] __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd2f/0x1040 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869 do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888028c6cde0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 1 bytes to the right of allocated 2-byte region [ffff888028c6cde0, ffff888028c6cde2) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea0000a31b00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888028c6c9c0 pfn:0x28c6c anon flags: 0xfff00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 00fff00000000800 ffff888014c41280 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 raw: ffff888028c6c9c0 0000000080800057 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x112cc0(GFP_USER|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 6648, tgid 6644 (syz-executor.0), ts 133906047828, free_ts 133859922223 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1ea/0x210 mm/page_alloc.c:1533 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1540 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x33ea/0x3580 mm/page_alloc.c:3311 __alloc_pages+0x256/0x680 mm/page_alloc.c:4569 __alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline] alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline] alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x160 mm/slub.c:2175 allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2338 [inline] new_slab+0x84/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:2391 ___slab_alloc+0xc73/0x1260 mm/slub.c:3525 __slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3610 [inline] __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3663 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3835 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3965 [inline] __kmalloc_node+0x2db/0x4e0 mm/slub.c:3973 kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:648 [inline] __vmalloc_area_node mm/vmalloc.c:3197 [inline] __vmalloc_node_range+0x5f9/0x14a0 mm/vmalloc.c:3392 __vmalloc_node mm/vmalloc.c:3457 [inline] vzalloc+0x79/0x90 mm/vmalloc.c:3530 bpf_check+0x260/0x19010 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:21162 bpf_prog_load+0x1667/0x20f0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2895 __sys_bpf+0x4ee/0x810 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5631 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5738 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736 [inline] __x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 page last free pid 6650 tgid 6647 stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline] free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1140 [inline] free_unref_page_prepare+0x95d/0xa80 mm/page_alloc.c:2346 free_unref_page_list+0x5a3/0x850 mm/page_alloc.c:2532 release_pages+0x2117/0x2400 mm/swap.c:1042 tlb_batch_pages_flush mm/mmu_gather.c:98 [inline] tlb_flush_mmu_free mm/mmu_gather.c:293 [inline] tlb_flush_mmu+0x34d/0x4e0 mm/mmu_gather.c:300 tlb_finish_mmu+0xd4/0x200 mm/mmu_gather.c:392 exit_mmap+0x4b6/0xd40 mm/mmap.c:3300 __mmput+0x115/0x3c0 kernel/fork.c:1345 exit_mm+0x220/0x310 kernel/exit.c:569 do_exit+0x99e/0x27e0 kernel/exit.c:865 do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1027 get_signal+0x176e/0x1850 kernel/signal.c:2907 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x96/0x860 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:310 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:105 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:328 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:201 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xc9/0x360 kernel/entry/common.c:212 do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888028c6cc80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc ffff888028c6cd00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc 06 fc fc fc >ffff888028c6cd80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 02 fc fc fc ^ ffff888028c6ce00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc ffff888028c6ce80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc Fixes: 423f38329d26 ("xsk: add umem fill queue support and mmap") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: "Björn Töpel" <bjorn@kernel.org> Cc: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com> Cc: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com> Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240404202738.3634547-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Ilya Maximets
|
50cee416ec |
net: openvswitch: fix unwanted error log on timeout policy probing
[ Upstream commit 4539f91f2a801c0c028c252bffae56030cfb2cae ] On startup, ovs-vswitchd probes different datapath features including support for timeout policies. While probing, it tries to execute certain operations with OVS_PACKET_ATTR_PROBE or OVS_FLOW_ATTR_PROBE attributes set. These attributes tell the openvswitch module to not log any errors when they occur as it is expected that some of the probes will fail. For some reason, setting the timeout policy ignores the PROBE attribute and logs a failure anyway. This is causing the following kernel log on each re-start of ovs-vswitchd: kernel: Failed to associated timeout policy `ovs_test_tp' Fix that by using the same logging macro that all other messages are using. The message will still be printed at info level when needed and will be rate limited, but with a net rate limiter instead of generic printk one. The nf_ct_set_timeout() itself will still print some info messages, but at least this change makes logging in openvswitch module more consistent. Fixes: 06bd2bdf19d2 ("openvswitch: Add timeout support to ct action") Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org> Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240403203803.2137962-1-i.maximets@ovn.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Dmitry Antipov
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268dae0abe |
Bluetooth: Fix memory leak in hci_req_sync_complete()
commit 45d355a926ab40f3ae7bc0b0a00cb0e3e8a5a810 upstream. In 'hci_req_sync_complete()', always free the previous sync request state before assigning reference to a new one. Reported-by: syzbot+39ec16ff6cc18b1d066d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=39ec16ff6cc18b1d066d Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: f60cb30579d3 ("Bluetooth: Convert hci_req_sync family of function to new request API") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Sven Eckelmann
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b07af379a7 |
batman-adv: Avoid infinite loop trying to resize local TT
commit b1f532a3b1e6d2e5559c7ace49322922637a28aa upstream. If the MTU of one of an attached interface becomes too small to transmit the local translation table then it must be resized to fit inside all fragments (when enabled) or a single packet. But if the MTU becomes too low to transmit even the header + the VLAN specific part then the resizing of the local TT will never succeed. This can for example happen when the usable space is 110 bytes and 11 VLANs are on top of batman-adv. In this case, at least 116 byte would be needed. There will just be an endless spam of batman_adv: batadv0: Forced to purge local tt entries to fit new maximum fragment MTU (110) in the log but the function will never finish. Problem here is that the timeout will be halved all the time and will then stagnate at 0 and therefore never be able to reduce the table even more. There are other scenarios possible with a similar result. The number of BATADV_TT_CLIENT_NOPURGE entries in the local TT can for example be too high to fit inside a packet. Such a scenario can therefore happen also with only a single VLAN + 7 non-purgable addresses - requiring at least 120 bytes. While this should be handled proactively when: * interface with too low MTU is added * VLAN is added * non-purgeable local mac is added * MTU of an attached interface is reduced * fragmentation setting gets disabled (which most likely requires dropping attached interfaces) not all of these scenarios can be prevented because batman-adv is only consuming events without the the possibility to prevent these actions (non-purgable MAC address added, MTU of an attached interface is reduced). It is therefore necessary to also make sure that the code is able to handle also the situations when there were already incompatible system configuration are present. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a19d3d85e1b8 ("batman-adv: limit local translation table max size") Reported-by: syzbot+a6a4b5bb3da165594cff@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org> Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Pablo Neira Ayuso
|
5597c99f01 |
netfilter: nf_tables: discard table flag update with pending basechain deletion
commit 1bc83a019bbe268be3526406245ec28c2458a518 upstream. Hook unregistration is deferred to the commit phase, same occurs with hook updates triggered by the table dormant flag. When both commands are combined, this results in deleting a basechain while leaving its hook still registered in the core. Fixes: 179d9ba5559a ("netfilter: nf_tables: fix table flag updates") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Pablo Neira Ayuso
|
d8e67175ca |
netfilter: nf_tables: release mutex after nft_gc_seq_end from abort path
commit 0d459e2ffb541841714839e8228b845458ed3b27 upstream. The commit mutex should not be released during the critical section between nft_gc_seq_begin() and nft_gc_seq_end(), otherwise, async GC worker could collect expired objects and get the released commit lock within the same GC sequence. nf_tables_module_autoload() temporarily releases the mutex to load module dependencies, then it goes back to replay the transaction again. Move it at the end of the abort phase after nft_gc_seq_end() is called. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 720344340fb9 ("netfilter: nf_tables: GC transaction race with abort path") Reported-by: Kuan-Ting Chen <hexrabbit@devco.re> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Pablo Neira Ayuso
|
dadceb59cd |
netfilter: nf_tables: release batch on table validation from abort path
commit a45e6889575c2067d3c0212b6bc1022891e65b91 upstream. Unlike early commit path stage which triggers a call to abort, an explicit release of the batch is required on abort, otherwise mutex is released and commit_list remains in place. Add WARN_ON_ONCE to ensure commit_list is empty from the abort path before releasing the mutex. After this patch, commit_list is always assumed to be empty before grabbing the mutex, therefore 03c1f1ef1584 ("netfilter: Cleanup nft_net->module_list from nf_tables_exit_net()") only needs to release the pending modules for registration. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c0391b6ab810 ("netfilter: nf_tables: missing validation from the abort path") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Eric Dumazet
|
15397674ac |
net/smc: reduce rtnl pressure in smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list()
[ Upstream commit 00af2aa93b76b1bade471ad0d0525d4d29ca5cc0 ] Many syzbot reports show extreme rtnl pressure, and many of them hint that smc acquires rtnl in netns creation for no good reason [1] This patch returns early from smc_pnet_net_init() if there is no netdevice yet. I am not even sure why smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list() even exists, because smc_pnet_netdev_event() is also calling smc_pnet_add_base_pnetid() when handling NETDEV_UP event. [1] extract of typical syzbot reports 2 locks held by syz-executor.3/12252: #0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491 #1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline] #1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878 2 locks held by syz-executor.4/12253: #0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491 #1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline] #1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878 2 locks held by syz-executor.1/12257: #0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491 #1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline] #1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878 2 locks held by syz-executor.2/12261: #0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491 #1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline] #1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878 2 locks held by syz-executor.0/12265: #0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491 #1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline] #1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878 2 locks held by syz-executor.3/12268: #0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491 #1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline] #1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878 2 locks held by syz-executor.4/12271: #0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491 #1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline] #1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878 2 locks held by syz-executor.1/12274: #0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491 #1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline] #1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878 2 locks held by syz-executor.2/12280: #0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491 #1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline] #1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Jan Karcher <jaka@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "D. Wythe" <alibuda@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Tony Lu <tonylu@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240302100744.3868021-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Davide Caratti
|
1a0c888327 |
mptcp: don't account accept() of non-MPC client as fallback to TCP
commit 7a1b3490f47e88ec4cbde65f1a77a0f4bc972282 upstream. Current MPTCP servers increment MPTcpExtMPCapableFallbackACK when they accept non-MPC connections. As reported by Christoph, this is "surprising" because the counter might become greater than MPTcpExtMPCapableSYNRX. MPTcpExtMPCapableFallbackACK counter's name suggests it should only be incremented when a connection was seen using MPTCP options, then a fallback to TCP has been done. Let's do that by incrementing it when the subflow context of an inbound MPC connection attempt is dropped. Also, update mptcp_connect.sh kselftest, to ensure that the above MIB does not increment in case a pure TCP client connects to a MPTCP server. Fixes: fc518953bc9c ("mptcp: add and use MIB counter infrastructure") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com> Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/449 Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240329-upstream-net-20240329-fallback-mib-v1-1-324a8981da48@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Antoine Tenart
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ec7941c644 |
udp: do not accept non-tunnel GSO skbs landing in a tunnel
[ Upstream commit 3d010c8031e39f5fa1e8b13ada77e0321091011f ] When rx-udp-gro-forwarding is enabled UDP packets might be GROed when being forwarded. If such packets might land in a tunnel this can cause various issues and udp_gro_receive makes sure this isn't the case by looking for a matching socket. This is performed in udp4/6_gro_lookup_skb but only in the current netns. This is an issue with tunneled packets when the endpoint is in another netns. In such cases the packets will be GROed at the UDP level, which leads to various issues later on. The same thing can happen with rx-gro-list. We saw this with geneve packets being GROed at the UDP level. In such case gso_size is set; later the packet goes through the geneve rx path, the geneve header is pulled, the offset are adjusted and frag_list skbs are not adjusted with regard to geneve. When those skbs hit skb_fragment, it will misbehave. Different outcomes are possible depending on what the GROed skbs look like; from corrupted packets to kernel crashes. One example is a BUG_ON[1] triggered in skb_segment while processing the frag_list. Because gso_size is wrong (geneve header was pulled) skb_segment thinks there is "geneve header size" of data in frag_list, although it's in fact the next packet. The BUG_ON itself has nothing to do with the issue. This is only one of the potential issues. Looking up for a matching socket in udp_gro_receive is fragile: the lookup could be extended to all netns (not speaking about performances) but nothing prevents those packets from being modified in between and we could still not find a matching socket. It's OK to keep the current logic there as it should cover most cases but we also need to make sure we handle tunnel packets being GROed too early. This is done by extending the checks in udp_unexpected_gso: GSO packets lacking the SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL/_CSUM bits and landing in a tunnel must be segmented. [1] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4408! RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0xd2a/0xf70 __udp_gso_segment+0xaa/0x560 Fixes: 9fd1ff5d2ac7 ("udp: Support UDP fraglist GRO/GSO.") Fixes: 36707061d6ba ("udp: allow forwarding of plain (non-fraglisted) UDP GRO packets") Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Antoine Tenart
|
8c1b3d65a4 |
udp: do not transition UDP GRO fraglist partial checksums to unnecessary
commit f0b8c30345565344df2e33a8417a27503589247d upstream. UDP GRO validates checksums and in udp4/6_gro_complete fraglist packets are converted to CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY to avoid later checks. However this is an issue for CHECKSUM_PARTIAL packets as they can be looped in an egress path and then their partial checksums are not fixed. Different issues can be observed, from invalid checksum on packets to traces like: gen01: hw csum failure skb len=3008 headroom=160 headlen=1376 tailroom=0 mac=(106,14) net=(120,40) trans=160 shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=0 gso(size=0 type=0 segs=0)) csum(0xffff232e ip_summed=2 complete_sw=0 valid=0 level=0) hash(0x77e3d716 sw=1 l4=1) proto=0x86dd pkttype=0 iif=12 ... Fix this by only converting CHECKSUM_NONE packets to CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY by reusing __skb_incr_checksum_unnecessary. All other checksum types are kept as-is, including CHECKSUM_COMPLETE as fraglist packets being segmented back would have their skb->csum valid. Fixes: 9fd1ff5d2ac7 ("udp: Support UDP fraglist GRO/GSO.") Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Kuniyuki Iwashima
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66dcf54d25 |
ipv6: Fix infinite recursion in fib6_dump_done().
commit d21d40605bca7bd5fc23ef03d4c1ca1f48bc2cae upstream. syzkaller reported infinite recursive calls of fib6_dump_done() during netlink socket destruction. [1] From the log, syzkaller sent an AF_UNSPEC RTM_GETROUTE message, and then the response was generated. The following recvmmsg() resumed the dump for IPv6, but the first call of inet6_dump_fib() failed at kzalloc() due to the fault injection. [0] 12:01:34 executing program 3: r0 = socket$nl_route(0x10, 0x3, 0x0) sendmsg$nl_route(r0, ... snip ...) recvmmsg(r0, ... snip ...) (fail_nth: 8) Here, fib6_dump_done() was set to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done, and the next call of inet6_dump_fib() set it to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3]. syzkaller stopped receiving the response halfway through, and finally netlink_sock_destruct() called nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done(). fib6_dump_done() calls fib6_dump_end() and nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() if it is still not NULL. fib6_dump_end() rewrites nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() by nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3], but it has the same function, not NULL, calling itself recursively and hitting the stack guard page. To avoid the issue, let's set the destructor after kzalloc(). [0]: FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0 CPU: 1 PID: 432110 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117) should_fail_ex (lib/fault-inject.c:52 lib/fault-inject.c:153) should_failslab (mm/slub.c:3733) kmalloc_trace (mm/slub.c:3748 mm/slub.c:3827 mm/slub.c:3992) inet6_dump_fib (./include/linux/slab.h:628 ./include/linux/slab.h:749 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:662) rtnl_dump_all (net/core/rtnetlink.c:4029) netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2269) netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1988) ____sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1046 net/socket.c:2801) ___sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:2846) do_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:2943) __x64_sys_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:3041 net/socket.c:3034 net/socket.c:3034) [1]: BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at 00000000f2fa9af1 (stack is 00000000b7912430..000000009a436beb) stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 223719 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events netlink_sock_destruct_work RIP: 0010:fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:570) Code: 3c 24 e8 f3 e9 51 fd e9 28 fd ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 fd <53> 48 8d 5d 60 e8 b6 4d 07 fd 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d980000 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff84405990 RCX: ffffffff844059d3 RDX: ffff8881028e0000 RSI: ffffffff84405ac2 RDI: ffff88810c02f358 RBP: ffff88810c02f358 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000224 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff888007c82c78 R14: ffff888007c82c68 R15: ffff888007c82c68 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffc9000d97fff8 CR3: 0000000102309002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <#DF> </#DF> <TASK> fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) ... fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) netlink_sock_destruct (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:401) __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2177 (discriminator 2)) sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2224) __sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2235) sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2246) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3259) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3329 kernel/workqueue.c:3416) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:388) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:256) Modules linked in: Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240401211003.25274-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Eric Dumazet
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4588d20778 |
erspan: make sure erspan_base_hdr is present in skb->head
commit 17af420545a750f763025149fa7b833a4fc8b8f0 upstream. syzbot reported a problem in ip6erspan_rcv() [1] Issue is that ip6erspan_rcv() (and erspan_rcv()) no longer make sure erspan_base_hdr is present in skb linear part (skb->head) before getting @ver field from it. Add the missing pskb_may_pull() calls. v2: Reload iph pointer in erspan_rcv() after pskb_may_pull() because skb->head might have changed. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in pskb_may_pull_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:2742 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in pskb_may_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2756 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ip6erspan_rcv net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:541 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in gre_rcv+0x11f8/0x1930 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:610 pskb_may_pull_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:2742 [inline] pskb_may_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2756 [inline] ip6erspan_rcv net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:541 [inline] gre_rcv+0x11f8/0x1930 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:610 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1d4c/0x2ca0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438 ip6_input_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:483 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] ip6_input+0x15d/0x430 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:492 ip6_mc_input+0xa7e/0xc80 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:586 dst_input include/net/dst.h:460 [inline] ip6_rcv_finish+0x955/0x970 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] ipv6_rcv+0xde/0x390 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:310 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5538 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x1da/0xa00 net/core/dev.c:5652 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5738 [inline] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5798 tun_rx_batched+0x3ee/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1549 tun_get_user+0x5566/0x69e0 drivers/net/tun.c:2002 tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2108 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline] vfs_write+0xb63/0x1520 fs/read_write.c:590 ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:643 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x93/0xe0 fs/read_write.c:652 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3804 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3845 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x613/0xc50 mm/slub.c:3888 kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:577 __alloc_skb+0x35b/0x7a0 net/core/skbuff.c:668 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1318 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbf0 net/core/skbuff.c:6504 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa81/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2795 tun_alloc_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1525 [inline] tun_get_user+0x209a/0x69e0 drivers/net/tun.c:1846 tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2108 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline] vfs_write+0xb63/0x1520 fs/read_write.c:590 ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:643 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x93/0xe0 fs/read_write.c:652 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 CPU: 1 PID: 5045 Comm: syz-executor114 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc1-syzkaller-00021-g962490525cff #0 Fixes: cb73ee40b1b3 ("net: ip_gre: use erspan key field for tunnel lookup") Reported-by: syzbot+1c1cf138518bf0c53d68@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/000000000000772f2c0614b66ef7@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240328112248.1101491-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Eric Dumazet
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66946c581b |
net/sched: act_skbmod: prevent kernel-infoleak
commit d313eb8b77557a6d5855f42d2234bd592c7b50dd upstream. syzbot found that tcf_skbmod_dump() was copying four bytes from kernel stack to user space [1]. The issue here is that 'struct tc_skbmod' has a four bytes hole. We need to clear the structure before filling fields. [1] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x366/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:185 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline] iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline] iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline] iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline] _copy_to_iter+0x366/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:185 copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:196 [inline] simple_copy_to_iter net/core/datagram.c:532 [inline] __skb_datagram_iter+0x185/0x1000 net/core/datagram.c:420 skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5c/0x200 net/core/datagram.c:546 skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:4050 [inline] netlink_recvmsg+0x432/0x1610 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1962 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x340 net/socket.c:1068 __sys_recvfrom+0x35a/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2242 __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2260 [inline] __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2256 [inline] __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x126/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2256 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Uninit was stored to memory at: pskb_expand_head+0x30f/0x19d0 net/core/skbuff.c:2253 netlink_trim+0x2c2/0x330 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 netlink_unicast+0x9f/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1351 nlmsg_unicast include/net/netlink.h:1144 [inline] nlmsg_notify+0x21d/0x2f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2610 rtnetlink_send+0x73/0x90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:741 rtnetlink_maybe_send include/linux/rtnetlink.h:17 [inline] tcf_add_notify net/sched/act_api.c:2048 [inline] tcf_action_add net/sched/act_api.c:2071 [inline] tc_ctl_action+0x146e/0x19d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2119 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1737/0x1900 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6595 netlink_rcv_skb+0x375/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2559 rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6613 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xf4c/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 netlink_sendmsg+0x10df/0x11f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x877/0xb60 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Uninit was stored to memory at: __nla_put lib/nlattr.c:1041 [inline] nla_put+0x1c6/0x230 lib/nlattr.c:1099 tcf_skbmod_dump+0x23f/0xc20 net/sched/act_skbmod.c:256 tcf_action_dump_old net/sched/act_api.c:1191 [inline] tcf_action_dump_1+0x85e/0x970 net/sched/act_api.c:1227 tcf_action_dump+0x1fd/0x460 net/sched/act_api.c:1251 tca_get_fill+0x519/0x7a0 net/sched/act_api.c:1628 tcf_add_notify_msg net/sched/act_api.c:2023 [inline] tcf_add_notify net/sched/act_api.c:2042 [inline] tcf_action_add net/sched/act_api.c:2071 [inline] tc_ctl_action+0x1365/0x19d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2119 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1737/0x1900 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6595 netlink_rcv_skb+0x375/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2559 rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6613 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xf4c/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 netlink_sendmsg+0x10df/0x11f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x877/0xb60 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Local variable opt created at: tcf_skbmod_dump+0x9d/0xc20 net/sched/act_skbmod.c:244 tcf_action_dump_old net/sched/act_api.c:1191 [inline] tcf_action_dump_1+0x85e/0x970 net/sched/act_api.c:1227 Bytes 188-191 of 248 are uninitialized Memory access of size 248 starts at ffff888117697680 Data copied to user address 00007ffe56d855f0 Fixes: 86da71b57383 ("net_sched: Introduce skbmod action") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240403130908.93421-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Jakub Sitnicki
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55bfcbc4ba |
bpf, sockmap: Prevent lock inversion deadlock in map delete elem
commit ff91059932401894e6c86341915615c5eb0eca48 upstream. syzkaller started using corpuses where a BPF tracing program deletes elements from a sockmap/sockhash map. Because BPF tracing programs can be invoked from any interrupt context, locks taken during a map_delete_elem operation must be hardirq-safe. Otherwise a deadlock due to lock inversion is possible, as reported by lockdep: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&htab->buckets[i].lock); local_irq_disable(); lock(&host->lock); lock(&htab->buckets[i].lock); <Interrupt> lock(&host->lock); Locks in sockmap are hardirq-unsafe by design. We expects elements to be deleted from sockmap/sockhash only in task (normal) context with interrupts enabled, or in softirq context. Detect when map_delete_elem operation is invoked from a context which is _not_ hardirq-unsafe, that is interrupts are disabled, and bail out with an error. Note that map updates are not affected by this issue. BPF verifier does not allow updating sockmap/sockhash from a BPF tracing program today. Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Reported-by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com> Reported-by: yue sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com> Reported-by: syzbot+bc922f476bd65abbd466@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d4066896495db380182e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: syzbot+d4066896495db380182e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d4066896495db380182e Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=bc922f476bd65abbd466 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240402104621.1050319-1-jakub@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Eric Dumazet
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01d43d74f4 |
netfilter: validate user input for expected length
commit 0c83842df40f86e529db6842231154772c20edcc upstream. I got multiple syzbot reports showing old bugs exposed by BPF after commit 20f2505fb436 ("bpf: Try to avoid kzalloc in cgroup/{s,g}etsockopt") setsockopt() @optlen argument should be taken into account before copying data. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1111 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_ipt_set_ctl+0x902/0x3dd0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1627 Read of size 96 at addr ffff88802cd73da0 by task syz-executor.4/7238 CPU: 1 PID: 7238 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-next-20240403-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 kasan_check_range+0x282/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189 __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:105 copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1111 [inline] do_ipt_set_ctl+0x902/0x3dd0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1627 nf_setsockopt+0x295/0x2c0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101 do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a RIP: 0033:0x7fd22067dde9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fd21f9ff0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd2207abf80 RCX: 00007fd22067dde9 RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fd2206ca47a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000020000880 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fd2207abf80 R15: 00007ffd2d0170d8 </TASK> Allocated by task 7238: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4069 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x200/0x410 mm/slub.c:4082 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:664 [inline] __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd47/0x1050 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869 do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802cd73da0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of allocated 1-byte region [ffff88802cd73da0, ffff88802cd73da1) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88802cd73020 pfn:0x2cd73 flags: 0xfff80000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0xfff) page_type: 0xffffefff(slab) raw: 00fff80000000000 ffff888015041280 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 raw: ffff88802cd73020 000000008080007f 00000001ffffefff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x12cc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 5103, tgid 2119833701 (syz-executor.4), ts 5103, free_ts 70804600828 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1f3/0x230 mm/page_alloc.c:1490 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1498 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x2e7e/0x2f40 mm/page_alloc.c:3454 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x256/0x6c0 mm/page_alloc.c:4712 __alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:244 [inline] alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:271 [inline] alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x120 mm/slub.c:2249 allocate_slab+0x5a/0x2e0 mm/slub.c:2412 new_slab mm/slub.c:2465 [inline] ___slab_alloc+0xcd1/0x14b0 mm/slub.c:3615 __slab_alloc+0x58/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3705 __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3758 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3936 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4068 [inline] kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x286/0x450 mm/slub.c:4089 kstrdup+0x3a/0x80 mm/util.c:62 device_rename+0xb5/0x1b0 drivers/base/core.c:4558 dev_change_name+0x275/0x860 net/core/dev.c:1232 do_setlink+0xa4b/0x41f0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2864 __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3680 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x180b/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3727 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x89b/0x10d0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6594 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2559 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 page last free pid 5146 tgid 5146 stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline] free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1110 [inline] free_unref_page+0xd3c/0xec0 mm/page_alloc.c:2617 discard_slab mm/slub.c:2511 [inline] __put_partials+0xeb/0x130 mm/slub.c:2980 put_cpu_partial+0x17c/0x250 mm/slub.c:3055 __slab_free+0x2ea/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4254 qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:163 [inline] qlist_free_all+0x9e/0x140 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:179 kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x14f/0x170 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:286 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x23/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:322 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3888 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3948 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4068 [inline] __kmalloc_node_noprof+0x1d7/0x450 mm/slub.c:4076 kmalloc_node_noprof include/linux/slab.h:681 [inline] kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x72/0x190 mm/util.c:634 bucket_table_alloc lib/rhashtable.c:186 [inline] rhashtable_rehash_alloc+0x9e/0x290 lib/rhashtable.c:367 rht_deferred_worker+0x4e1/0x2440 lib/rhashtable.c:427 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3218 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa2c/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3299 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3380 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88802cd73c80: 07 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc fa fc fc fc ffff88802cd73d00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc >ffff88802cd73d80: fa fc fc fc 01 fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc ^ ffff88802cd73e00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc ffff88802cd73e80: 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240404122051.2303764-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Ziyang Xuan
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8b49d311c6 |
netfilter: nf_tables: Fix potential data-race in __nft_flowtable_type_get()
commit 24225011d81b471acc0e1e315b7d9905459a6304 upstream. nft_unregister_flowtable_type() within nf_flow_inet_module_exit() can concurrent with __nft_flowtable_type_get() within nf_tables_newflowtable(). And thhere is not any protection when iterate over nf_tables_flowtables list in __nft_flowtable_type_get(). Therefore, there is pertential data-race of nf_tables_flowtables list entry. Use list_for_each_entry_rcu() to iterate over nf_tables_flowtables list in __nft_flowtable_type_get(), and use rcu_read_lock() in the caller nft_flowtable_type_get() to protect the entire type query process. Fixes: 3b49e2e94e6e ("netfilter: nf_tables: add flow table netlink frontend") Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Pablo Neira Ayuso
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cd75430040 |
netfilter: nf_tables: flush pending destroy work before exit_net release
commit 24cea9677025e0de419989ecb692acd4bb34cac2 upstream. Similar to 2c9f0293280e ("netfilter: nf_tables: flush pending destroy work before netlink notifier") to address a race between exit_net and the destroy workqueue. The trace below shows an element to be released via destroy workqueue while exit_net path (triggered via module removal) has already released the set that is used in such transaction. [ 1360.547789] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.547861] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888140500cc0 by task kworker/4:1/152465 [ 1360.547870] CPU: 4 PID: 152465 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 6.8.0+ #359 [ 1360.547882] Workqueue: events nf_tables_trans_destroy_work [nf_tables] [ 1360.547984] Call Trace: [ 1360.547991] <TASK> [ 1360.547998] dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 [ 1360.548014] print_report+0xc4/0x610 [ 1360.548026] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xba/0x160 [ 1360.548040] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548054] ? nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548176] kasan_report+0xae/0xe0 [ 1360.548189] ? nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548312] nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548447] ? __pfx_nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x10/0x10 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548577] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x18/0x30 [ 1360.548591] process_one_work+0x2f1/0x670 [ 1360.548610] worker_thread+0x4d3/0x760 [ 1360.548627] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548640] kthread+0x16b/0x1b0 [ 1360.548653] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548665] ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 [ 1360.548679] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548690] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 1360.548707] </TASK> [ 1360.548719] Allocated by task 192061: [ 1360.548726] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 [ 1360.548739] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 1360.548750] __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 [ 1360.548760] __kmalloc_node+0x1f1/0x450 [ 1360.548771] nf_tables_newset+0x10c7/0x1b50 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548883] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xbc4/0xdc0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.548909] nfnetlink_rcv+0x1a8/0x1e0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.548927] netlink_unicast+0x367/0x4f0 [ 1360.548935] netlink_sendmsg+0x34b/0x610 [ 1360.548944] ____sys_sendmsg+0x4d4/0x510 [ 1360.548953] ___sys_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120 [ 1360.548961] __sys_sendmsg+0xbe/0x140 [ 1360.548971] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x120 [ 1360.548982] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d [ 1360.548994] Freed by task 192222: [ 1360.548999] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 [ 1360.549009] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 1360.549019] kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 1360.549028] poison_slab_object+0x100/0x180 [ 1360.549036] __kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x30 [ 1360.549042] kfree+0xb6/0x260 [ 1360.549049] __nft_release_table+0x473/0x6a0 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549131] nf_tables_exit_net+0x170/0x240 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549221] ops_exit_list+0x50/0xa0 [ 1360.549229] free_exit_list+0x101/0x140 [ 1360.549236] unregister_pernet_operations+0x107/0x160 [ 1360.549245] unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1c/0x30 [ 1360.549254] nf_tables_module_exit+0x43/0x80 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549345] __do_sys_delete_module+0x253/0x370 [ 1360.549352] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x120 [ 1360.549360] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d (gdb) list *__nft_release_table+0x473 0x1e033 is in __nft_release_table (net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:11354). 11349 list_for_each_entry_safe(flowtable, nf, &table->flowtables, list) { 11350 list_del(&flowtable->list); 11351 nft_use_dec(&table->use); 11352 nf_tables_flowtable_destroy(flowtable); 11353 } 11354 list_for_each_entry_safe(set, ns, &table->sets, list) { 11355 list_del(&set->list); 11356 nft_use_dec(&table->use); 11357 if (set->flags & (NFT_SET_MAP | NFT_SET_OBJECT)) 11358 nft_map_deactivate(&ctx, set); (gdb) [ 1360.549372] Last potentially related work creation: [ 1360.549376] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 [ 1360.549384] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x9b/0xb0 [ 1360.549392] __queue_work+0x3fb/0x780 [ 1360.549399] queue_work_on+0x4f/0x60 [ 1360.549407] nft_rhash_remove+0x33b/0x340 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549516] nf_tables_commit+0x1c6a/0x2620 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549625] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0x728/0xdc0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.549647] nfnetlink_rcv+0x1a8/0x1e0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.549671] netlink_unicast+0x367/0x4f0 [ 1360.549680] netlink_sendmsg+0x34b/0x610 [ 1360.549690] ____sys_sendmsg+0x4d4/0x510 [ 1360.549697] ___sys_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120 [ 1360.549706] __sys_sendmsg+0xbe/0x140 [ 1360.549715] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x120 [ 1360.549725] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d Fixes: 0935d5588400 ("netfilter: nf_tables: asynchronous release") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Pablo Neira Ayuso
|
3272b458ff |
netfilter: nf_tables: reject new basechain after table flag update
commit 994209ddf4f430946f6247616b2e33d179243769 upstream. When dormant flag is toggled, hooks are disabled in the commit phase by iterating over current chains in table (existing and new). The following configuration allows for an inconsistent state: add table x add chain x y { type filter hook input priority 0; } add table x { flags dormant; } add chain x w { type filter hook input priority 1; } which triggers the following warning when trying to unregister chain w which is already unregistered. [ 127.322252] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1211 at net/netfilter/core.c:50 1 __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260 [...] [ 127.322519] Call Trace: [ 127.322521] <TASK> [ 127.322524] ? __warn+0x9f/0x1a0 [ 127.322531] ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260 [ 127.322537] ? report_bug+0x1b1/0x1e0 [ 127.322545] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 [ 127.322552] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x40 [ 127.322556] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 127.322563] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 127.322570] ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x6a/0x260 [ 127.322577] ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260 [ 127.322583] ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x6a/0x260 [ 127.322590] ? __nf_tables_unregister_hook+0x8a/0xe0 [nf_tables] [ 127.322655] nft_table_disable+0x75/0xf0 [nf_tables] [ 127.322717] nf_tables_commit+0x2571/0x2620 [nf_tables] Fixes: 179d9ba5559a ("netfilter: nf_tables: fix table flag updates") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Mahmoud Adam
|
1d2a102b3c |
net/rds: fix possible cp null dereference
commit 62fc3357e079a07a22465b9b6ef71bb6ea75ee4b upstream. cp might be null, calling cp->cp_conn would produce null dereference [Simon Horman adds:] Analysis: * cp is a parameter of __rds_rdma_map and is not reassigned. * The following call-sites pass a NULL cp argument to __rds_rdma_map() - rds_get_mr() - rds_get_mr_for_dest * Prior to the code above, the following assumes that cp may be NULL (which is indicative, but could itself be unnecessary) trans_private = rs->rs_transport->get_mr( sg, nents, rs, &mr->r_key, cp ? cp->cp_conn : NULL, args->vec.addr, args->vec.bytes, need_odp ? ODP_ZEROBASED : ODP_NOT_NEEDED); * The code modified by this patch is guarded by IS_ERR(trans_private), where trans_private is assigned as per the previous point in this analysis. The only implementation of get_mr that I could locate is rds_ib_get_mr() which can return an ERR_PTR if the conn (4th) argument is NULL. * ret is set to PTR_ERR(trans_private). rds_ib_get_mr can return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV) if the conn (4th) argument is NULL. Thus ret may be -ENODEV in which case the code in question will execute. Conclusion: * cp may be NULL at the point where this patch adds a check; this patch does seem to address a possible bug Fixes: c055fc00c07b ("net/rds: fix WARNING in rds_conn_connect_if_down") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+ Signed-off-by: Mahmoud Adam <mngyadam@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326153132.55580-1-mngyadam@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Pablo Neira Ayuso
|
5f3d555fcd |
netfilter: nf_tables: disallow timeout for anonymous sets
commit e26d3009efda338f19016df4175f354a9bd0a4ab upstream. Never used from userspace, disallow these parameters. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> [Keerthana: code surrounding the patch is different because nft_set_desc is not present in v4.19-v5.10] Signed-off-by: Keerthana K <keerthana.kalyanasundaram@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Bastien Nocera
|
b5b302f084 |
Bluetooth: Fix TOCTOU in HCI debugfs implementation
commit 7835fcfd132eb88b87e8eb901f88436f63ab60f7 upstream. struct hci_dev members conn_info_max_age, conn_info_min_age, le_conn_max_interval, le_conn_min_interval, le_adv_max_interval, and le_adv_min_interval can be modified from the HCI core code, as well through debugfs. The debugfs implementation, that's only available to privileged users, will check for boundaries, making sure that the minimum value being set is strictly above the maximum value that already exists, and vice-versa. However, as both minimum and maximum values can be changed concurrently to us modifying them, we need to make sure that the value we check is the value we end up using. For example, with ->conn_info_max_age set to 10, conn_info_min_age_set() gets called from vfs handlers to set conn_info_min_age to 8. In conn_info_min_age_set(), this goes through: if (val == 0 || val > hdev->conn_info_max_age) return -EINVAL; Concurrently, conn_info_max_age_set() gets called to set to set the conn_info_max_age to 7: if (val == 0 || val > hdev->conn_info_max_age) return -EINVAL; That check will also pass because we used the old value (10) for conn_info_max_age. After those checks that both passed, the struct hci_dev access is mutex-locked, disabling concurrent access, but that does not matter because the invalid value checks both passed, and we'll end up with conn_info_min_age = 8 and conn_info_max_age = 7 To fix this problem, we need to lock the structure access before so the check and assignment are not interrupted. This fix was originally devised by the BassCheck[1] team, and considered the problem to be an atomicity one. This isn't the case as there aren't any concerns about the variable changing while we check it, but rather after we check it parallel to another change. This patch fixes CVE-2024-24858 and CVE-2024-24857. [1] https://sites.google.com/view/basscheck/ Co-developed-by: Gui-Dong Han <2045gemini@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Gui-Dong Han <2045gemini@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/20231222161317.6255-1-2045gemini@gmail.com/ Link: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24858 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/20231222162931.6553-1-2045gemini@gmail.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/20231222162310.6461-1-2045gemini@gmail.com/ Link: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24857 Fixes: 31ad169148df ("Bluetooth: Add conn info lifetime parameters to debugfs") Fixes: 729a1051da6f ("Bluetooth: Expose default LE advertising interval via debugfs") Fixes: 71c3b60ec6d2 ("Bluetooth: Move BR/EDR debugfs file creation into hci_debugfs.c") Signed-off-by: Bastien Nocera <hadess@hadess.net> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Hui Wang
|
e13205c8e4 |
Bluetooth: hci_event: set the conn encrypted before conn establishes
commit c569242cd49287d53b73a94233db40097d838535 upstream. We have a BT headset (Lenovo Thinkplus XT99), the pairing and connecting has no problem, once this headset is paired, bluez will remember this device and will auto re-connect it whenever the device is powered on. The auto re-connecting works well with Windows and Android, but with Linux, it always fails. Through debugging, we found at the rfcomm connection stage, the bluetooth stack reports "Connection refused - security block (0x0003)". For this device, the re-connecting negotiation process is different from other BT headsets, it sends the Link_KEY_REQUEST command before the CONNECT_REQUEST completes, and it doesn't send ENCRYPT_CHANGE command during the negotiation. When the device sends the "connect complete" to hci, the ev->encr_mode is 1. So here in the conn_complete_evt(), if ev->encr_mode is 1, link type is ACL and HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT is not set, we set HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT to this conn, and update conn->enc_key_size accordingly. After this change, this BT headset could re-connect with Linux successfully. This is the btmon log after applying the patch, after receiving the "Connect Complete" with "Encryption: Enabled", will send the command to read encryption key size: > HCI Event: Connect Request (0x04) plen 10 Address: 8C:3C:AA:D8:11:67 (OUI 8C-3C-AA) Class: 0x240404 Major class: Audio/Video (headset, speaker, stereo, video, vcr) Minor class: Wearable Headset Device Rendering (Printing, Speaker) Audio (Speaker, Microphone, Headset) Link type: ACL (0x01) ... > HCI Event: Link Key Request (0x17) plen 6 Address: 8C:3C:AA:D8:11:67 (OUI 8C-3C-AA) < HCI Command: Link Key Request Reply (0x01|0x000b) plen 22 Address: 8C:3C:AA:D8:11:67 (OUI 8C-3C-AA) Link key: ${32-hex-digits-key} ... > HCI Event: Connect Complete (0x03) plen 11 Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 256 Address: 8C:3C:AA:D8:11:67 (OUI 8C-3C-AA) Link type: ACL (0x01) Encryption: Enabled (0x01) < HCI Command: Read Encryption Key... (0x05|0x0008) plen 2 Handle: 256 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 10 L2CAP: Information Request (0x0a) ident 1 len 2 Type: Extended features supported (0x0002) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 7 Read Encryption Key Size (0x05|0x0008) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 256 Key size: 16 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://github.com/bluez/bluez/issues/704 Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de> Reviewed-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Eric Dumazet
|
8fd57cfe08 |
tcp: properly terminate timers for kernel sockets
[ Upstream commit 151c9c724d05d5b0dd8acd3e11cb69ef1f2dbada ] We had various syzbot reports about tcp timers firing after the corresponding netns has been dismantled. Fortunately Josef Bacik could trigger the issue more often, and could test a patch I wrote two years ago. When TCP sockets are closed, we call inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers() to 'stop' the timers. inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers() can be called from any context, including when socket lock is held. This is the reason it uses sk_stop_timer(), aka del_timer(). This means that ongoing timers might finish much later. For user sockets, this is fine because each running timer holds a reference on the socket, and the user socket holds a reference on the netns. For kernel sockets, we risk that the netns is freed before timer can complete, because kernel sockets do not hold reference on the netns. This patch adds inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers_sync() function that using sk_stop_timer_sync() to make sure all timers are terminated before the kernel socket is released. Modules using kernel sockets close them in their netns exit() handler. Also add sock_not_owned_by_me() helper to get LOCKDEP support : inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers_sync() must not be called while socket lock is held. It is very possible we can revert in the future commit 3a58f13a881e ("net: rds: acquire refcount on TCP sockets") which attempted to solve the issue in rds only. (net/smc/af_smc.c and net/mptcp/subflow.c have similar code) We probably can remove the check_net() tests from tcp_out_of_resources() and __tcp_close() in the future. Reported-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240314210740.GA2823176@perftesting/ Fixes: 26abe14379f8 ("net: Modify sk_alloc to not reference count the netns of kernel sockets.") Fixes: 8a68173691f0 ("net: sk_clone_lock() should only do get_net() if the parent is not a kernel socket") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CANn89i+484ffqb93aQm1N-tjxxvb3WDKX0EbD7318RwRgsatjw@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Tested-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240322135732.1535772-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Ryosuke Yasuoka
|
0399814924 |
nfc: nci: Fix uninit-value in nci_dev_up and nci_ntf_packet
[ Upstream commit d24b03535e5eb82e025219c2f632b485409c898f ] syzbot reported the following uninit-value access issue [1][2]: nci_rx_work() parses and processes received packet. When the payload length is zero, each message type handler reads uninitialized payload and KMSAN detects this issue. The receipt of a packet with a zero-size payload is considered unexpected, and therefore, such packets should be silently discarded. This patch resolved this issue by checking payload size before calling each message type handler codes. Fixes: 6a2968aaf50c ("NFC: basic NCI protocol implementation") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+7ea9413ea6749baf5574@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+29b5ca705d2e0f4a44d2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7ea9413ea6749baf5574 [1] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=29b5ca705d2e0f4a44d2 [2] Signed-off-by: Ryosuke Yasuoka <ryasuoka@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Cline <jeremy@jcline.org> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Felix Fietkau
|
ba76d18749 |
wifi: mac80211: check/clear fast rx for non-4addr sta VLAN changes
commit 4f2bdb3c5e3189297e156b3ff84b140423d64685 upstream. When moving a station out of a VLAN and deleting the VLAN afterwards, the fast_rx entry still holds a pointer to the VLAN's netdev, which can cause use-after-free bugs. Fix this by immediately calling ieee80211_check_fast_rx after the VLAN change. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: ranygh@riseup.net Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://msgid.link/20240316074336.40442-1-nbd@nbd.name Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Nathan Chancellor
|
320a36ebff |
xfrm: Avoid clang fortify warning in copy_to_user_tmpl()
commit 1a807e46aa93ebad1dfbed4f82dc3bf779423a6e upstream. After a couple recent changes in LLVM, there is a warning (or error with CONFIG_WERROR=y or W=e) from the compile time fortify source routines, specifically the memset() in copy_to_user_tmpl(). In file included from net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:14: ... include/linux/fortify-string.h:438:4: error: call to '__write_overflow_field' declared with 'warning' attribute: detected write beyond size of field (1st parameter); maybe use struct_group()? [-Werror,-Wattribute-warning] 438 | __write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size); | ^ 1 error generated. While ->xfrm_nr has been validated against XFRM_MAX_DEPTH when its value is first assigned in copy_templates() by calling validate_tmpl() first (so there should not be any issue in practice), LLVM/clang cannot really deduce that across the boundaries of these functions. Without that knowledge, it cannot assume that the loop stops before i is greater than XFRM_MAX_DEPTH, which would indeed result a stack buffer overflow in the memset(). To make the bounds of ->xfrm_nr clear to the compiler and add additional defense in case copy_to_user_tmpl() is ever used in a path where ->xfrm_nr has not been properly validated against XFRM_MAX_DEPTH first, add an explicit bound check and early return, which clears up the warning. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1985 Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Pablo Neira Ayuso
|
09cc5d717e |
netfilter: nf_tables: reject constant set with timeout
commit 5f4fc4bd5cddb4770ab120ce44f02695c4505562 upstream. This set combination is weird: it allows for elements to be added/deleted, but once bound to the rule it cannot be updated anymore. Eventually, all elements expire, leading to an empty set which cannot be updated anymore. Reject this flags combination. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 761da2935d6e ("netfilter: nf_tables: add set timeout API support") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Pablo Neira Ayuso
|
ce8ee438c4 |
netfilter: nf_tables: disallow anonymous set with timeout flag
commit 16603605b667b70da974bea8216c93e7db043bf1 upstream. Anonymous sets are never used with timeout from userspace, reject this. Exception to this rule is NFT_SET_EVAL to ensure legacy meters still work. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 761da2935d6e ("netfilter: nf_tables: add set timeout API support") Reported-by: lonial con <kongln9170@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Pablo Neira Ayuso
|
4d336701cc |
netfilter: nf_tables: mark set as dead when unbinding anonymous set with timeout
commit 552705a3650bbf46a22b1adedc1b04181490fc36 upstream. While the rhashtable set gc runs asynchronously, a race allows it to collect elements from anonymous sets with timeouts while it is being released from the commit path. Mingi Cho originally reported this issue in a different path in 6.1.x with a pipapo set with low timeouts which is not possible upstream since 7395dfacfff6 ("netfilter: nf_tables: use timestamp to check for set element timeout"). Fix this by setting on the dead flag for anonymous sets to skip async gc in this case. According to 08e4c8c5919f ("netfilter: nf_tables: mark newset as dead on transaction abort"), Florian plans to accelerate abort path by releasing objects via workqueue, therefore, this sets on the dead flag for abort path too. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5f68718b34a5 ("netfilter: nf_tables: GC transaction API to avoid race with control plane") Reported-by: Mingi Cho <mgcho.minic@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Fedor Pchelkin
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f940ca20f1 |
mac802154: fix llsec key resources release in mac802154_llsec_key_del
[ Upstream commit e8a1e58345cf40b7b272e08ac7b32328b2543e40 ] mac802154_llsec_key_del() can free resources of a key directly without following the RCU rules for waiting before the end of a grace period. This may lead to use-after-free in case llsec_lookup_key() is traversing the list of keys in parallel with a key deletion: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 16000 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x162/0x2a0 Modules linked in: CPU: 4 PID: 16000 Comm: wpan-ping Not tainted 6.7.0 #19 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x162/0x2a0 Call Trace: <TASK> llsec_lookup_key.isra.0+0x890/0x9e0 mac802154_llsec_encrypt+0x30c/0x9c0 ieee802154_subif_start_xmit+0x24/0x1e0 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x13e/0x690 sch_direct_xmit+0x2ae/0xbc0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x11dd/0x3c20 dgram_sendmsg+0x90b/0xd60 __sys_sendto+0x466/0x4c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x45/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 Also, ieee802154_llsec_key_entry structures are not freed by mac802154_llsec_key_del(): unreferenced object 0xffff8880613b6980 (size 64): comm "iwpan", pid 2176, jiffies 4294761134 (age 60.475s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 78 0d 8f 18 80 88 ff ff 22 01 00 00 00 00 ad de x......."....... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 cd ab 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<ffffffff81dcfa62>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e2/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81c43865>] kmalloc_trace+0x25/0xc0 [<ffffffff88968b09>] mac802154_llsec_key_add+0xac9/0xcf0 [<ffffffff8896e41a>] ieee802154_add_llsec_key+0x5a/0x80 [<ffffffff8892adc6>] nl802154_add_llsec_key+0x426/0x5b0 [<ffffffff86ff293e>] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1fe/0x2f0 [<ffffffff86ff46d1>] genl_rcv_msg+0x531/0x7d0 [<ffffffff86fee7a9>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x169/0x440 [<ffffffff86ff1d88>] genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 [<ffffffff86fec15c>] netlink_unicast+0x53c/0x820 [<ffffffff86fecd8b>] netlink_sendmsg+0x93b/0xe60 [<ffffffff86b91b35>] ____sys_sendmsg+0xac5/0xca0 [<ffffffff86b9c3dd>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x1c0 [<ffffffff86b9c65a>] __sys_sendmsg+0xfa/0x1d0 [<ffffffff88eadbf5>] do_syscall_64+0x45/0xf0 [<ffffffff890000ea>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 Handle the proper resource release in the RCU callback function mac802154_llsec_key_del_rcu(). Note that if llsec_lookup_key() finds a key, it gets a refcount via llsec_key_get() and locally copies key id from key_entry (which is a list element). So it's safe to call llsec_key_put() and free the list entry after the RCU grace period elapses. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: 5d637d5aabd8 ("mac802154: add llsec structures and mutators") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> Acked-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com> Message-ID: <20240228163840.6667-1-pchelkin@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Ksawlii
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809ca90c02 |
Revert "io_uring/unix: drop usage of io_uring socket"
This reverts commit
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Ksawlii
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28bfb5a650 |
Revert "net: ip_tunnel: make sure to pull inner header in ip_tunnel_rcv()"
This reverts commit
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Pablo Neira Ayuso
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15f8cfe252 |
netfilter: nf_tables: do not compare internal table flags on updates
[ Upstream commit 4a0e7f2decbf9bd72461226f1f5f7dcc4b08f139 ] Restore skipping transaction if table update does not modify flags. Fixes: 179d9ba5559a ("netfilter: nf_tables: fix table flag updates") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Pablo Neira Ayuso
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8c5100e6b6 |
netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: release elements in clone only from destroy path
[ Upstream commit b0e256f3dd2ba6532f37c5c22e07cb07a36031ee ] Clone already always provides a current view of the lookup table, use it to destroy the set, otherwise it is possible to destroy elements twice. This fix requires: 212ed75dc5fb ("netfilter: nf_tables: integrate pipapo into commit protocol") which came after: 9827a0e6e23b ("netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: release elements in clone from abort path"). Fixes: 9827a0e6e23b ("netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: release elements in clone from abort path") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Felix Maurer
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0ba27f2ba4 |
hsr: Handle failures in module init
[ Upstream commit 3cf28cd492308e5f63ed00b29ea03ca016264376 ] A failure during registration of the netdev notifier was not handled at all. A failure during netlink initialization did not unregister the netdev notifier. Handle failures of netdev notifier registration and netlink initialization. Both functions should only return negative values on failure and thereby lead to the hsr module not being loaded. Fixes: f421436a591d ("net/hsr: Add support for the High-availability Seamless Redundancy protocol (HSRv0)") Signed-off-by: Felix Maurer <fmaurer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3ce097c15e3f7ace98fc7fd9bcbf299f092e63d1.1710504184.git.fmaurer@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Yewon Choi
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5d9da780a6 |
rds: introduce acquire/release ordering in acquire/release_in_xmit()
[ Upstream commit 1422f28826d2a0c11e5240b3e951c9e214d8656e ] acquire/release_in_xmit() work as bit lock in rds_send_xmit(), so they are expected to ensure acquire/release memory ordering semantics. However, test_and_set_bit/clear_bit() don't imply such semantics, on top of this, following smp_mb__after_atomic() does not guarantee release ordering (memory barrier actually should be placed before clear_bit()). Instead, we use clear_bit_unlock/test_and_set_bit_lock() here. Fixes: 0f4b1c7e89e6 ("rds: fix rds_send_xmit() serialization") Fixes: 1f9ecd7eacfd ("RDS: Pass rds_conn_path to rds_send_xmit()") Signed-off-by: Yewon Choi <woni9911@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <michal.kubiak@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZfQUxnNTO9AJmzwc@libra05 Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Eric Dumazet
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b7a2902e57 |
packet: annotate data-races around ignore_outgoing
[ Upstream commit 6ebfad33161afacb3e1e59ed1c2feefef70f9f97 ] ignore_outgoing is read locklessly from dev_queue_xmit_nit() and packet_getsockopt() Add appropriate READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations. syzbot reported: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in dev_queue_xmit_nit / packet_setsockopt write to 0xffff888107804542 of 1 bytes by task 22618 on cpu 0: packet_setsockopt+0xd83/0xfd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:4003 do_sock_setsockopt net/socket.c:2311 [inline] __sys_setsockopt+0x1d8/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x66/0x80 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 read to 0xffff888107804542 of 1 bytes by task 27 on cpu 1: dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x82/0x620 net/core/dev.c:2248 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3527 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xcc/0x3f0 net/core/dev.c:3547 __dev_queue_xmit+0xf24/0x1dd0 net/core/dev.c:4335 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3091 [inline] batadv_send_skb_packet+0x264/0x300 net/batman-adv/send.c:108 batadv_send_broadcast_skb+0x24/0x30 net/batman-adv/send.c:127 batadv_iv_ogm_send_to_if net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c:392 [inline] batadv_iv_ogm_emit net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c:420 [inline] batadv_iv_send_outstanding_bat_ogm_packet+0x3f0/0x4b0 net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c:1700 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x465/0x990 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x526/0x730 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x1d1/0x210 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x60 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243 value changed: 0x00 -> 0x01 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 27 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Tainted: G W 6.8.0-syzkaller-08073-g480e035fc4c7 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024 Workqueue: bat_events batadv_iv_send_outstanding_bat_ogm_packet Fixes: fa788d986a3a ("packet: add sockopt to ignore outgoing packets") Reported-by: syzbot+c669c1136495a2e7c31f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89i+Z7MfbkBLOv=p7KZ7=K1rKHO4P1OL5LYDCtBiyqsa9oQ@mail.gmail.com/T/#t Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Shigeru Yoshida
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875cdd93e7 |
hsr: Fix uninit-value access in hsr_get_node()
[ Upstream commit ddbec99f58571301679addbc022256970ca3eac6 ] KMSAN reported the following uninit-value access issue [1]: ===================================================== BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in hsr_get_node+0xa2e/0xa40 net/hsr/hsr_framereg.c:246 hsr_get_node+0xa2e/0xa40 net/hsr/hsr_framereg.c:246 fill_frame_info net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:577 [inline] hsr_forward_skb+0xe12/0x30e0 net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:615 hsr_dev_xmit+0x1a1/0x270 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:223 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3548 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3564 __dev_queue_xmit+0x33b8/0x5130 net/core/dev.c:4349 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline] packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3087 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8b1d/0x9f30 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5e9/0xb10 mm/slub.c:3523 kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:560 __alloc_skb+0x318/0x740 net/core/skbuff.c:651 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1286 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbd0 net/core/skbuff.c:6334 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa80/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2787 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2936 [inline] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3030 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x70e8/0x9f30 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b CPU: 1 PID: 5033 Comm: syz-executor334 Not tainted 6.7.0-syzkaller-00562-g9f8413c4a66f #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023 ===================================================== If the packet type ID field in the Ethernet header is either ETH_P_PRP or ETH_P_HSR, but it is not followed by an HSR tag, hsr_get_skb_sequence_nr() reads an invalid value as a sequence number. This causes the above issue. This patch fixes the issue by returning NULL if the Ethernet header is not followed by an HSR tag. Fixes: f266a683a480 ("net/hsr: Better frame dispatch") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+2ef3a8ce8e91b5a50098@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2ef3a8ce8e91b5a50098 [1] Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240312152719.724530-1-syoshida@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Christophe JAILLET
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c766596d9e |
net: sunrpc: Fix an off by one in rpc_sockaddr2uaddr()
[ Upstream commit d6f4de70f73a106986ee315d7d512539f2f3303a ] The intent is to check if the strings' are truncated or not. So, >= should be used instead of >, because strlcat() and snprintf() return the length of the output, excluding the trailing NULL. Fixes: a02d69261134 ("SUNRPC: Provide functions for managing universal addresses") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Gavrilov Ilia
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3535a1edba |
net/x25: fix incorrect parameter validation in the x25_getsockopt() function
[ Upstream commit d6eb8de2015f0c24822e47356f839167ebde2945 ] The 'len' variable can't be negative when assigned the result of 'min_t' because all 'min_t' parameters are cast to unsigned int, and then the minimum one is chosen. To fix the logic, check 'len' as read from 'optlen', where the types of relevant variables are (signed) int. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Gavrilov Ilia <Ilia.Gavrilov@infotecs.ru> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Gavrilov Ilia
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1ce505502c |
net: kcm: fix incorrect parameter validation in the kcm_getsockopt) function
[ Upstream commit 3ed5f415133f9b7518fbe55ba9ae9a3f5e700929 ] The 'len' variable can't be negative when assigned the result of 'min_t' because all 'min_t' parameters are cast to unsigned int, and then the minimum one is chosen. To fix the logic, check 'len' as read from 'optlen', where the types of relevant variables are (signed) int. Fixes: ab7ac4eb9832 ("kcm: Kernel Connection Multiplexor module") Signed-off-by: Gavrilov Ilia <Ilia.Gavrilov@infotecs.ru> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Gavrilov Ilia
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480a3396ea |
udp: fix incorrect parameter validation in the udp_lib_getsockopt() function
[ Upstream commit 4bb3ba7b74fceec6f558745b25a43c6521cf5506 ] The 'len' variable can't be negative when assigned the result of 'min_t' because all 'min_t' parameters are cast to unsigned int, and then the minimum one is chosen. To fix the logic, check 'len' as read from 'optlen', where the types of relevant variables are (signed) int. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: Gavrilov Ilia <Ilia.Gavrilov@infotecs.ru> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Gavrilov Ilia
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60b65d0d74 |
l2tp: fix incorrect parameter validation in the pppol2tp_getsockopt() function
[ Upstream commit 955e9876ba4ee26eeaab1b13517f5b2c88e73d55 ] The 'len' variable can't be negative when assigned the result of 'min_t' because all 'min_t' parameters are cast to unsigned int, and then the minimum one is chosen. To fix the logic, check 'len' as read from 'optlen', where the types of relevant variables are (signed) int. Fixes: 3557baabf280 ("[L2TP]: PPP over L2TP driver core") Reviewed-by: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: Gavrilov Ilia <Ilia.Gavrilov@infotecs.ru> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Gavrilov Ilia
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a2e7014b35 |
ipmr: fix incorrect parameter validation in the ip_mroute_getsockopt() function
[ Upstream commit 5c3be3e0eb44b7f978bb6cbb20ad956adb93f736 ] The 'olr' variable can't be negative when assigned the result of 'min_t' because all 'min_t' parameters are cast to unsigned int, and then the minimum one is chosen. To fix the logic, check 'olr' as read from 'optlen', where the types of relevant variables are (signed) int. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Gavrilov Ilia <Ilia.Gavrilov@infotecs.ru> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Martin KaFai Lau
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bfc7e17c7e |
bpf: net: Change do_ip_getsockopt() to take the sockptr_t argument
[ Upstream commit 728f064cd7ebea8c182e99e6f152c8b4a0a6b071 ] Similar to the earlier patch that changes sk_getsockopt() to take the sockptr_t argument. This patch also changes do_ip_getsockopt() to take the sockptr_t argument such that a latter patch can make bpf_getsockopt(SOL_IP) to reuse do_ip_getsockopt(). Note on the change in ip_mc_gsfget(). This function is to return an array of sockaddr_storage in optval. This function is shared between ip_get_mcast_msfilter() and compat_ip_get_mcast_msfilter(). However, the sockaddr_storage is stored at different offset of the optval because of the difference between group_filter and compat_group_filter. Thus, a new 'ss_offset' argument is added to ip_mc_gsfget(). Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220902002828.2890585-1-kafai@fb.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Stable-dep-of: 5c3be3e0eb44 ("ipmr: fix incorrect parameter validation in the ip_mroute_getsockopt() function") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Gustavo A. R. Silva
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7de60845d7 |
net/ipv4/ipv6: Replace one-element arraya with flexible-array members
[ Upstream commit db243b796439c0caba47865564d8acd18a301d18 ] There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having a dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code should always use “flexible array members”[1] for these cases. The older style of one-element or zero-length arrays should no longer be used[2]. Use an anonymous union with a couple of anonymous structs in order to keep userspace unchanged and refactor the related code accordingly: $ pahole -C group_filter net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.o struct group_filter { union { struct { __u32 gf_interface_aux; /* 0 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage gf_group_aux; /* 8 128 */ /* --- cacheline 2 boundary (128 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ __u32 gf_fmode_aux; /* 136 4 */ __u32 gf_numsrc_aux; /* 140 4 */ struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage gf_slist[1]; /* 144 128 */ }; /* 0 272 */ struct { __u32 gf_interface; /* 0 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage gf_group; /* 8 128 */ /* --- cacheline 2 boundary (128 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ __u32 gf_fmode; /* 136 4 */ __u32 gf_numsrc; /* 140 4 */ struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage gf_slist_flex[0]; /* 144 0 */ }; /* 0 144 */ }; /* 0 272 */ /* size: 272, cachelines: 5, members: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 16 bytes */ }; $ pahole -C compat_group_filter net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.o struct compat_group_filter { union { struct { __u32 gf_interface_aux; /* 0 4 */ struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage gf_group_aux __attribute__((__aligned__(4))); /* 4 128 */ /* --- cacheline 2 boundary (128 bytes) was 4 bytes ago --- */ __u32 gf_fmode_aux; /* 132 4 */ __u32 gf_numsrc_aux; /* 136 4 */ struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage gf_slist[1] __attribute__((__aligned__(4))); /* 140 128 */ } __attribute__((__packed__)) __attribute__((__aligned__(4))); /* 0 268 */ struct { __u32 gf_interface; /* 0 4 */ struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage gf_group __attribute__((__aligned__(4))); /* 4 128 */ /* --- cacheline 2 boundary (128 bytes) was 4 bytes ago --- */ __u32 gf_fmode; /* 132 4 */ __u32 gf_numsrc; /* 136 4 */ struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage gf_slist_flex[0] __attribute__((__aligned__(4))); /* 140 0 */ } __attribute__((__packed__)) __attribute__((__aligned__(4))); /* 0 140 */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(1))); /* 0 268 */ /* size: 268, cachelines: 5, members: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 12 bytes */ } __attribute__((__packed__)); This helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable -Warray-bounds and get us closer to being able to tighten the FORTIFY_SOURCE routines on memcpy(). [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.10/process/deprecated.html#zero-length-and-one-element-arrays Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/79 Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/109 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Stable-dep-of: 5c3be3e0eb44 ("ipmr: fix incorrect parameter validation in the ip_mroute_getsockopt() function") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Gustavo A. R. Silva
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6cfa4d9429 |
net/ipv4: Revert use of struct_size() helper
[ Upstream commit 4167a960574fcadc9067f4280951a35b8c021c68 ] Revert the use of structr_size() and stay with IP_MSFILTER_SIZE() for now, as in this case, the size of struct ip_msfilter didn't change with the addition of the flexible array imsf_slist_flex[]. So, if we use struct_size() we will be allocating and calculating the size of struct ip_msfilter with one too many items for imsf_slist_flex[]. We might use struct_size() in the future, but for now let's stay with IP_MSFILTER_SIZE(). Fixes: 2d3e5caf96b9 ("net/ipv4: Replace one-element array with flexible-array member") Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Stable-dep-of: 5c3be3e0eb44 ("ipmr: fix incorrect parameter validation in the ip_mroute_getsockopt() function") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Gustavo A. R. Silva
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c6d945bc3e |
net/ipv4: Replace one-element array with flexible-array member
[ Upstream commit 2d3e5caf96b9449af951e63476657acd759c1a30 ] There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having a dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code should always use “flexible array members”[1] for these cases. The older style of one-element or zero-length arrays should no longer be used[2]. Use an anonymous union with a couple of anonymous structs in order to keep userspace unchanged: $ pahole -C ip_msfilter net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.o struct ip_msfilter { union { struct { __be32 imsf_multiaddr_aux; /* 0 4 */ __be32 imsf_interface_aux; /* 4 4 */ __u32 imsf_fmode_aux; /* 8 4 */ __u32 imsf_numsrc_aux; /* 12 4 */ __be32 imsf_slist[1]; /* 16 4 */ }; /* 0 20 */ struct { __be32 imsf_multiaddr; /* 0 4 */ __be32 imsf_interface; /* 4 4 */ __u32 imsf_fmode; /* 8 4 */ __u32 imsf_numsrc; /* 12 4 */ __be32 imsf_slist_flex[0]; /* 16 0 */ }; /* 0 16 */ }; /* 0 20 */ /* size: 20, cachelines: 1, members: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 20 bytes */ }; Also, refactor the code accordingly and make use of the struct_size() and flex_array_size() helpers. This helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable -Warray-bounds and get us closer to being able to tighten the FORTIFY_SOURCE routines on memcpy(). [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.10/process/deprecated.html#zero-length-and-one-element-arrays Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/79 Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/109 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Stable-dep-of: 5c3be3e0eb44 ("ipmr: fix incorrect parameter validation in the ip_mroute_getsockopt() function") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Gavrilov Ilia
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e73308a010 |
tcp: fix incorrect parameter validation in the do_tcp_getsockopt() function
[ Upstream commit 716edc9706deb3bb2ff56e2eeb83559cea8f22db ] The 'len' variable can't be negative when assigned the result of 'min_t' because all 'min_t' parameters are cast to unsigned int, and then the minimum one is chosen. To fix the logic, check 'len' as read from 'optlen', where the types of relevant variables are (signed) int. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Gavrilov Ilia <Ilia.Gavrilov@infotecs.ru> Reviewed-by: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Eric Dumazet
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7742eb3f5f |
net: ip_tunnel: make sure to pull inner header in ip_tunnel_rcv()
[ Upstream commit b0ec2abf98267f14d032102551581c833b0659d3 ] Apply the same fix than ones found in : 8d975c15c0cd ("ip6_tunnel: make sure to pull inner header in __ip6_tnl_rcv()") 1ca1ba465e55 ("geneve: make sure to pull inner header in geneve_rx()") We have to save skb->network_header in a temporary variable in order to be able to recompute the network_header pointer after a pskb_inet_may_pull() call. pskb_inet_may_pull() makes sure the needed headers are in skb->head. syzbot reported: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in IP_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:302 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ip_tunnel_rcv+0xed9/0x2ed0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:409 __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline] INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline] IP_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:302 [inline] ip_tunnel_rcv+0xed9/0x2ed0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:409 __ipgre_rcv+0x9bc/0xbc0 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:389 ipgre_rcv net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:411 [inline] gre_rcv+0x423/0x19f0 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:447 gre_rcv+0x2a4/0x390 net/ipv4/gre_demux.c:163 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x264/0x1300 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2b8/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x21f/0x490 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254 dst_input include/net/dst.h:461 [inline] ip_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] ip_rcv+0x46f/0x760 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5534 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5648 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5734 [inline] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5793 tun_rx_batched+0x3ee/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1556 tun_get_user+0x53b9/0x66e0 drivers/net/tun.c:2009 tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2055 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2087 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline] vfs_write+0xb6b/0x1520 fs/read_write.c:590 ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:643 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:652 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Uninit was created at: __alloc_pages+0x9a6/0xe00 mm/page_alloc.c:4590 alloc_pages_mpol+0x62b/0x9d0 mm/mempolicy.c:2133 alloc_pages+0x1be/0x1e0 mm/mempolicy.c:2204 skb_page_frag_refill+0x2bf/0x7c0 net/core/sock.c:2909 tun_build_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1686 [inline] tun_get_user+0xe0a/0x66e0 drivers/net/tun.c:1826 tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2055 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2087 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline] vfs_write+0xb6b/0x1520 fs/read_write.c:590 ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:643 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:652 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Fixes: c54419321455 ("GRE: Refactor GRE tunneling code.") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Shiming Cheng
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3fcb9ee2d1 |
ipv6: fib6_rules: flush route cache when rule is changed
[ Upstream commit c4386ab4f6c600f75fdfd21143f89bac3e625d0d ] When rule policy is changed, ipv6 socket cache is not refreshed. The sock's skb still uses a outdated route cache and was sent to a wrong interface. To avoid this error we should update fib node's version when rule is changed. Then skb's route will be reroute checked as route cache version is already different with fib node version. The route cache is refreshed to match the latest rule. Fixes: 101367c2f8c4 ("[IPV6]: Policy Routing Rules") Signed-off-by: Shiming Cheng <shiming.cheng@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Lena Wang <lena.wang@mediatek.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Luiz Augusto von Dentz
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decd968a51 |
Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix possible buffer overflow
[ Upstream commit 81137162bfaa7278785b24c1fd2e9e74f082e8e4 ] struct hci_dev_info has a fixed size name[8] field so in the event that hdev->name is bigger than that strcpy would attempt to write past its size, so this fixes this problem by switching to use strscpy. Fixes: dcda165706b9 ("Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix build warnings") Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Jonas Dreßler
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76b1c1f04e |
Bluetooth: Remove superfluous call to hci_conn_check_pending()
[ Upstream commit 78e3639fc8031275010c3287ac548c0bc8de83b1 ] The "pending connections" feature was originally introduced with commit 4c67bc74f016 ("[Bluetooth] Support concurrent connect requests") and 6bd57416127e ("[Bluetooth] Handling pending connect attempts after inquiry") to handle controllers supporting only a single connection request at a time. Later things were extended to also cancel ongoing inquiries on connect() with commit 89e65975fea5 ("Bluetooth: Cancel Inquiry before Create Connection"). With commit a9de9248064b ("[Bluetooth] Switch from OGF+OCF to using only opcodes"), hci_conn_check_pending() was introduced as a helper to consolidate a few places where we check for pending connections (indicated by the BT_CONNECT2 flag) and then try to connect. This refactoring commit also snuck in two more calls to hci_conn_check_pending(): - One is in the failure callback of hci_cs_inquiry(), this one probably makes sense: If we send an "HCI Inquiry" command and then immediately after a "Create Connection" command, the "Create Connection" command might fail before the "HCI Inquiry" command, and then we want to retry the "Create Connection" on failure of the "HCI Inquiry". - The other added call to hci_conn_check_pending() is in the event handler for the "Remote Name" event, this seems unrelated and is possibly a copy-paste error, so remove that one. Fixes: a9de9248064b ("[Bluetooth] Switch from OGF+OCF to using only opcodes") Signed-off-by: Jonas Dreßler <verdre@v0yd.nl> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Zhipeng Lu
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ee9218762c |
SUNRPC: fix some memleaks in gssx_dec_option_array
[ Upstream commit 3cfcfc102a5e57b021b786a755a38935e357797d ] The creds and oa->data need to be freed in the error-handling paths after their allocation. So this patch add these deallocations in the corresponding paths. Fixes: 1d658336b05f ("SUNRPC: Add RPC based upcall mechanism for RPCGSS auth") Signed-off-by: Zhipeng Lu <alexious@zju.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |