[ Upstream commit a024e377efed31ecfb39210bed562932321345b3 ]
802.2+LLC+SNAP frames received by napi_complete_done with GRO and DSA
have skb->transport_header set two bytes short, or pointing 2 bytes
before network_header & skb->data. As snap_rcv expects transport_header
to point to SNAP header (OID:PID) after LLC processing advances offset
over LLC header (llc_rcv & llc_fixup_skb), code doesn't find a match
and packet is dropped.
Between napi_complete_done and snap_rcv, transport_header is not used
until __netif_receive_skb_core, where originally it was being reset.
Commit fda55eca5a33 ("net: introduce skb_transport_header_was_set()")
only does so if not set, on the assumption the value was set correctly
by GRO (and also on assumption that "network stacks usually reset the
transport header anyway"). Afterwards it is moved forward by
llc_fixup_skb.
Locally generated traffic shows up at __netif_receive_skb_core with no
transport_header set and is processed without issue. On a setup with
GRO but no DSA, transport_header and network_header are both set to
point to skb->data which is also correct.
As issue is LLC specific, to avoid impacting non-LLC traffic, and to
follow up on original assumption made on previous code change,
llc_fixup_skb to reset the offset after skb pull. llc_fixup_skb
assumes the LLC header is at skb->data, and by definition SNAP header
immediately follows.
Fixes: fda55eca5a33 ("net: introduce skb_transport_header_was_set()")
Signed-off-by: Antonio Pastor <antonio.pastor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241225010723.2830290-1-antonio.pastor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 7f678def99d29c520418607509bb19c7fc96a6db upstream.
Christoph Paasch reports [1] about incorrect skb->truesize
after skb_expand_head() call in ip6_xmit.
This may happen because of two reasons:
- skb_set_owner_w() for newly cloned skb is called too early,
before pskb_expand_head() where truesize is adjusted for (!skb-sk) case.
- pskb_expand_head() does not adjust truesize in (skb->sk) case.
In this case sk->sk_wmem_alloc should be adjusted too.
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/8/20/1082
Fixes: f1260ff15a71 ("skbuff: introduce skb_expand_head()")
Fixes: 2d85a1b31dde ("ipv6: ip6_finish_output2: set sk into newly allocated nskb")
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/644330dd-477e-0462-83bf-9f514c41edd1@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8ca2a1eeadf09862190b2810697702d803ceef2d upstream.
When the stream_verdict program returns SK_PASS, it places the received skb
into its own receive queue, but a recursive lock eventually occurs, leading
to an operating system deadlock. This issue has been present since v6.9.
'''
sk_psock_strp_data_ready
write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock)
strp_data_ready
strp_read_sock
read_sock -> tcp_read_sock
strp_recv
cb.rcv_msg -> sk_psock_strp_read
# now stream_verdict return SK_PASS without peer sock assign
__SK_PASS = sk_psock_map_verd(SK_PASS, NULL)
sk_psock_verdict_apply
sk_psock_skb_ingress_self
sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue
sk_psock_data_ready
read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock) <= dead lock
'''
This topic has been discussed before, but it has not been fixed.
Previous discussion:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/6684a5864ec86_403d20898@john.notmuch
Fixes: 6648e613226e ("bpf, skmsg: Fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue")
Reported-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@datadoghq.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <mrpre@163.com>
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241118030910.36230-2-mrpre@163.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[srish: Apply to stable branch linux-5.10.y]
Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <srishwap4@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e891b36de161fcd96f12ff83667473e5067b9037 ]
If skb_expand_head() returns NULL, skb has been freed
and associated dst/idev could also have been freed.
We need to hold rcu_read_lock() to make sure the dst and
associated idev are alive.
Fixes: 5796015fa968 ("ipv6: allocate enough headroom in ip6_finish_output2()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Vasily Averin <vasily.averin@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240820160859.3786976-3-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit e891b36de161fcd96f12ff83667473e5067b9037)
Signed-off-by: Harshvardhan Jha <harshvardhan.j.jha@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e415ed3a4b8b246ee5e9d109ff5153efcf96b9f2 ]
Unlike skb_realloc_headroom, new helper skb_expand_head does not allocate
a new skb if possible.
Additionally this patch replaces commonly used dereferencing with variables.
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit e415ed3a4b8b246ee5e9d109ff5153efcf96b9f2)
Signed-off-by: Harshvardhan Jha <harshvardhan.j.jha@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f1260ff15a71b8fc122b2c9abd8a7abffb6e0168 ]
Like skb_realloc_headroom(), new helper increases headroom of specified skb.
Unlike skb_realloc_headroom(), it does not allocate a new skb if possible;
copies skb->sk on new skb when as needed and frees original skb in case
of failures.
This helps to simplify ip[6]_finish_output2() and a few other similar cases.
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit f1260ff15a71b8fc122b2c9abd8a7abffb6e0168)
Signed-off-by: Harshvardhan Jha <harshvardhan.j.jha@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9ecc4d858b92c1bb0673ad9c327298e600c55659 ]
skb_network_offset() and skb_transport_offset() can be negative when
they are called after we pull the transport header, for example, when
we use eBPF sockmap at the point of ->sk_data_ready().
__bpf_skb_min_len() uses an unsigned int to get these offsets, this
leads to a very large number which then causes bpf_skb_change_tail()
failed unexpectedly.
Fix this by using a signed int to get these offsets and ensure the
minimum is at least zero.
Fixes: 5293efe62df8 ("bpf: add bpf_skb_change_tail helper")
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241213034057.246437-2-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 54f89b3178d5448dd4457afbb98fc1ab99090a65 ]
When bpf_tcp_ingress() is called, the skmsg is being redirected to the
ingress of the destination socket. Therefore, we should charge its
receive socket buffer, instead of sending socket buffer.
Because sk_rmem_schedule() tests pfmemalloc of skb, we need to
introduce a wrapper and call it for skmsg.
Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241210012039.1669389-2-zijianzhang@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 70b6f46a4ed8bd56c85ffff22df91e20e8c85e33 ]
With CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING, when creating a set of type bitmap:ip, adding
it to a set of type list:set and populating it from iptables SET target
triggers a kernel warning:
| WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
| 6.12.0-rc7-01692-g5e9a28f41134-dirty #594 Not tainted
| --------------------------------------------
| ping/4018 is trying to acquire lock:
| ffff8881094a6848 (&set->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: ip_set_add+0x28c/0x360 [ip_set]
|
| but task is already holding lock:
| ffff88811034c048 (&set->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: ip_set_add+0x28c/0x360 [ip_set]
This is a false alarm: ipset does not allow nested list:set type, so the
loop in list_set_kadd() can never encounter the outer set itself. No
other set type supports embedded sets, so this is the only case to
consider.
To avoid the false report, create a distinct lock class for list:set
type ipset locks.
Fixes: f830837f0eed ("netfilter: ipset: list:set set type support")
Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c5b8ee5022a19464783058dc6042e8eefa34e8cd ]
When receiving clc msg, the field length in smc_clc_msg_hdr indicates the
length of msg should be received from network and the value should not be
fully trusted as it is from the network. Once the value of length exceeds
the value of buflen in function smc_clc_wait_msg it may run into deadloop
when trying to drain the remaining data exceeding buflen.
This patch checks the return value of sock_recvmsg when draining data in
case of deadloop in draining.
Fixes: fb4f79264c0f ("net/smc: tolerate future SMCD versions")
Signed-off-by: Guangguan Wang <guangguan.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: D. Wythe <alibuda@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a29e220d3c8edbf0e1beb0f028878a4a85966556 ]
When receiving proposal msg in server, the field iparea_offset
and the field ipv6_prefixes_cnt in proposal msg are from the
remote client and can not be fully trusted. Especially the
field iparea_offset, once exceed the max value, there has the
chance to access wrong address, and crash may happen.
This patch checks iparea_offset and ipv6_prefixes_cnt before using them.
Fixes: e7b7a64a8493 ("smc: support variable CLC proposal messages")
Signed-off-by: Guangguan Wang <guangguan.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: D. Wythe <alibuda@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 679e9ddcf90dbdf98aaaa71a492454654b627bcb ]
When application sending data more than sndbuf_space, there have chances
application will sleep in epoll_wait, and will never be wakeup again. This
is caused by a race between smc_poll and smc_cdc_tx_handler.
application tasklet
smc_tx_sendmsg(len > sndbuf_space) |
epoll_wait for EPOLL_OUT,timeout=0 |
smc_poll |
if (!smc->conn.sndbuf_space) |
| smc_cdc_tx_handler
| atomic_add sndbuf_space
| smc_tx_sndbuf_nonfull
| if (!test_bit SOCK_NOSPACE)
| do not sk_write_space;
set_bit SOCK_NOSPACE; |
return mask=0; |
Application will sleep in epoll_wait as smc_poll returns 0. And
smc_cdc_tx_handler will not call sk_write_space because the SOCK_NOSPACE
has not be set. If there is no inflight cdc msg, sk_write_space will not be
called any more, and application will sleep in epoll_wait forever.
So check sndbuf_space again after NOSPACE flag is set to break the race.
Fixes: 8dce2786a290 ("net/smc: smc_poll improvements")
Signed-off-by: Guangguan Wang <guangguan.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Suggested-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 5eb7de8cd58e73851cd37ff8d0666517d9926948 upstream.
Changes to sch->q.qlen around qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() need to happen
_before_ a call to said function because otherwise it may fail to notify
parent qdiscs when the child is about to become empty.
Signed-off-by: Lion Ackermann <nnamrec@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Artem Metla <ametla@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit fff8f17c1a6fc802ca23bbd3a276abfde8cc58e6 ]
When TT changes list is too big to fit in packet due to MTU size, an
empty OGM is sent expected other node to send TT request to get the
changes. The issue is that tt.last_changeset was not built thus the
originator was responding with previous changes to those TT requests
(see batadv_send_my_tt_response). Also the changes list was never
cleaned up effectively never ending growing from this point onwards,
repeatedly sending the same TT response changes over and over, and
creating a new empty OGM every OGM interval expecting for the local
changes to be purged.
When there is more TT changes that can fit in packet, drop all changes,
send empty OGM and wait for TT request so we can respond with a full
table instead.
Fixes: e1bf0c14096f ("batman-adv: tvlv - convert tt data sent within OGMs")
Signed-off-by: Remi Pommarel <repk@triplefau.lt>
Acked-by: Antonio Quartulli <Antonio@mandelbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8038806db64da15721775d6b834990cacbfcf0b2 ]
The number of entries filled by batadv_tt_tvlv_generate() can be less
than initially expected in batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_{global,local}_data()
(changes can be removed by batadv_tt_local_event() in ADD+DEL sequence
in the meantime as the lock held during the whole tvlv global/local data
generation).
Thus tvlv_len could be bigger than the actual TT entry size that need
to be sent so full table TT_RESPONSE could hold invalid TT entries such
as below.
* 00:00:00:00:00:00 -1 [....] ( 0) 88:12:4e:ad:7e:ba (179) (0x45845380)
* 00:00:00:00:78:79 4092 [.W..] ( 0) 88:12:4e:ad:7e:3c (145) (0x8ebadb8b)
Remove the extra allocated space to avoid sending uninitialized entries
for full table TT_RESPONSE in both batadv_send_other_tt_response() and
batadv_send_my_tt_response().
Fixes: 7ea7b4a14275 ("batman-adv: make the TT CRC logic VLAN specific")
Signed-off-by: Remi Pommarel <repk@triplefau.lt>
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f2f7358c3890e7366cbcb7512b4bc8b4394b2d61 ]
The number of TT changes can be less than initially expected in
batadv_tt_tvlv_container_update() (changes can be removed by
batadv_tt_local_event() in ADD+DEL sequence between reading
tt_diff_entries_num and actually iterating the change list under lock).
Thus tt_diff_len could be bigger than the actual changes size that need
to be sent. Because batadv_send_my_tt_response sends the whole
packet, uninitialized data can be interpreted as TT changes on other
nodes leading to weird TT global entries on those nodes such as:
* 00:00:00:00:00:00 -1 [....] ( 0) 88:12:4e:ad:7e:ba (179) (0x45845380)
* 00:00:00:00:78:79 4092 [.W..] ( 0) 88:12:4e:ad:7e:3c (145) (0x8ebadb8b)
All of the above also applies to OGM tvlv container buffer's tvlv_len.
Remove the extra allocated space to avoid sending uninitialized TT
changes in batadv_send_my_tt_response() and batadv_v_ogm_send_softif().
Fixes: e1bf0c14096f ("batman-adv: tvlv - convert tt data sent within OGMs")
Signed-off-by: Remi Pommarel <repk@triplefau.lt>
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit d7b0ff5a866724c3ad21f2628c22a63336deec3f upstream.
As the final stages of socket destruction may be delayed, it is possible
that virtio_transport_recv_listen() will be called after the accept_queue
has been flushed, but before the SOCK_DONE flag has been set. As a result,
sockets enqueued after the flush would remain unremoved, leading to a
memory leak.
vsock_release
__vsock_release
lock
virtio_transport_release
virtio_transport_close
schedule_delayed_work(close_work)
sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK
(!) flush accept_queue
release
virtio_transport_recv_pkt
vsock_find_bound_socket
lock
if flag(SOCK_DONE) return
virtio_transport_recv_listen
child = vsock_create_connected
(!) vsock_enqueue_accept(child)
release
close_work
lock
virtio_transport_do_close
set_flag(SOCK_DONE)
virtio_transport_remove_sock
vsock_remove_sock
vsock_remove_bound
release
Introduce a sk_shutdown check to disallow vsock_enqueue_accept() during
socket destruction.
unreferenced object 0xffff888109e3f800 (size 2040):
comm "kworker/5:2", pid 371, jiffies 4294940105
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
28 00 0b 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 (..@............
backtrace (crc 9e5f4e84):
[<ffffffff81418ff1>] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x2c1/0x360
[<ffffffff81d27aa0>] sk_prot_alloc+0x30/0x120
[<ffffffff81d2b54c>] sk_alloc+0x2c/0x4b0
[<ffffffff81fe049a>] __vsock_create.constprop.0+0x2a/0x310
[<ffffffff81fe6d6c>] virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x4dc/0x9a0
[<ffffffff81fe745d>] vsock_loopback_work+0xfd/0x140
[<ffffffff810fc6ac>] process_one_work+0x20c/0x570
[<ffffffff810fce3f>] worker_thread+0x1bf/0x3a0
[<ffffffff811070dd>] kthread+0xdd/0x110
[<ffffffff81044fdd>] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
[<ffffffff8100785a>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Fixes: 3fe356d58efa ("vsock/virtio: discard packets only when socket is really closed")
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
[ Adapted due to missing commit 71dc9ec9ac7d ("virtio/vsock: replace virtio_vsock_pkt with sk_buff") ]
Signed-off-by: Tomas Krcka <krckatom@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 75e072a390da9a22e7ae4a4e8434dfca5da499fb upstream.
Consider a sockmap entry being updated with the same socket:
osk = stab->sks[idx];
sock_map_add_link(psock, link, map, &stab->sks[idx]);
stab->sks[idx] = sk;
if (osk)
sock_map_unref(osk, &stab->sks[idx]);
Due to sock_map_unref(), which invokes sock_map_del_link(), all the
psock's links for stab->sks[idx] are torn:
list_for_each_entry_safe(link, tmp, &psock->link, list) {
if (link->link_raw == link_raw) {
...
list_del(&link->list);
sk_psock_free_link(link);
}
}
And that includes the new link sock_map_add_link() added just before
the unref.
This results in a sockmap holding a socket, but without the respective
link. This in turn means that close(sock) won't trigger the cleanup,
i.e. a closed socket will not be automatically removed from the sockmap.
Stop tearing the links when a matching link_raw is found.
Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241202-sockmap-replace-v1-1-1e88579e7bd5@rbox.co
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 06d64ab46f19ac12f59a1d2aa8cd196b2e4edb5b upstream.
Ensure there is enough space before adding MPTCP options in
tcp_syn_options().
Without this check, 'remaining' could underflow, and causes issues. If
there is not enough space, MPTCP should not be used.
Signed-off-by: MoYuanhao <moyuanhao3676@163.com>
Fixes: cec37a6e41aa ("mptcp: Handle MP_CAPABLE options for outgoing connections")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
[ Matt: Add Fixes, cc Stable, update Description ]
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241209-net-mptcp-check-space-syn-v1-1-2da992bb6f74@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
PLB (Protective Load Balancing) is a host based mechanism for load
balancing across switch links. It leverages congestion signals(e.g. ECN)
from transport layer to randomly change the path of the connection
experiencing congestion. PLB changes the path of the connection by
changing the outgoing IPv6 flow label for IPv6 connections (implemented
in Linux by calling sk_rethink_txhash()). Because of this implementation
mechanism, PLB can currently only work for IPv6 traffic. For more
information, see the SIGCOMM 2022 paper:
https://doi.org/10.1145/3544216.3544226
This commit adds new sysctl knobs and sets their default values for
TCP PLB.
Signed-off-by: Mubashir Adnan Qureshi <mubashirq@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
PLB support is added to TCP DCTCP code. As DCTCP uses ECN as the
congestion signal, PLB also uses ECN to make decisions whether to change
the path or not upon sustained congestion.
Signed-off-by: Mubashir Adnan Qureshi <mubashirq@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
rcv_wnd can be useful to diagnose TCP performance where receiver window
becomes the bottleneck. rehash reports the PLB and timeout triggered
rehash attempts by the TCP connection.
Signed-off-by: Mubashir Adnan Qureshi <mubashirq@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
We had various bugs over the years with code
breaking the assumption that tp->snd_cwnd is greater
than zero.
Lately, syzbot reported the WARN_ON_ONCE(!tp->prior_cwnd) added
in commit 8b8a321ff72c ("tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction")
can trigger, and without a repro we would have to spend
considerable time finding the bug.
Instead of complaining too late, we want to catch where
and when tp->snd_cwnd is set to an illegal value.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405233538.947344-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
In order to track CE marks per rate sample (one round trip), TCP needs a
per-skb header field to record the tp->delivered_ce count when the skb
was sent. To make space, we replace the "last_in_flight" field which is
used exclusively for NV congestion control. The stat needed by NV can be
alternatively approximated by existing stats tcp_sock delivered and
mss_cache.
This patch counts the number of packets delivered which have CE marks in
the rate sample, using similar approach of delivery accounting.
Cc: Lawrence Brakmo <brakmo@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Luke Hsiao <lukehsiao@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
This commit is a bug fix for the Linux TCP app-limited
(application-limited) logic that is used for collecting rate
(bandwidth) samples.
Previously the app-limited logic only looked for "bubbles" of
silence in between application writes, by checking at the start
of each sendmsg. But "bubbles" of silence can also happen before
retransmits: e.g. bubbles can happen between an application write
and a retransmit, or between two retransmits.
Retransmits are triggered by ACKs or timers. So this commit checks
for bubbles of app-limited silence upon ACKs or timers.
Why does this commit check for app-limited state at the start of
ACKs and timer handling? Because at that point we know whether
inflight was fully using the cwnd. During processing the ACK or
timer event we often change the cwnd; after changing the cwnd we
can't know whether inflight was fully using the old cwnd.
Origin-9xx-SHA1: 3fe9b53291e018407780fb8c356adb5666722cbc
Change-Id: I37221506f5166877c2b110753d39bb0757985e68
Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
For understanding the relationship between inflight and ECN signals,
to try to find the highest inflight value that has acceptable levels
ECN marking.
Effort: net-tcp_bbr
Origin-9xx-SHA1: 3eba998f2898541406c2666781182200934965a8
Change-Id: I3a964e04cee83e11649a54507043d2dfe769a3b3
Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
For connections experiencing reordering, RACK can mark packets lost
long after we receive the SACKs/ACKs hinting that the packets were
actually lost.
This means that CC modules cannot easily learn the volume of inflight
data at which packet loss happens by looking at the current inflight
or even the packets in flight when the most recently SACKed packet was
sent. To learn this, CC modules need to know how many packets were in
flight at the time lost packets were sent. This new callback, combined
with TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tx.in_flight, allows them to learn this.
This also provides a consistent callback that is invoked whether
packets are marked lost upon ACK processing, using the RACK reordering
timer, or at RTO time.
Effort: net-tcp_bbr
Origin-9xx-SHA1: afcbebe3374e4632ac6714d39e4dc8a8455956f4
Change-Id: I54826ab53df636be537e5d3c618a46145d12d51a
Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
When tcp_shifted_skb() updates state as adjacent SACKed skbs are
coalesced, previously the tx.in_flight was not adjusted, so we could
get contradictory state where the skb's recorded pcount was bigger
than the tx.in_flight (the number of segments that were in_flight
after sending the skb).
Normally have a SACKed skb with contradictory pcount/tx.in_flight
would not matter. However, with SACK reneging, the SACKed bit is
removed, and an skb once again becomes eligible for retransmitting,
fragmenting, SACKing, etc. Packetdrill testing verified the following
sequence is possible in a kernel that does not have this commit:
- skb N is SACKed
- skb N+1 is SACKed and combined with skb N using tcp_shifted_skb()
- tcp_shifted_skb() will increase the pcount of prev,
but leave tx.in_flight as-is
- so prev skb can have pcount > tx.in_flight
- RTO, tcp_timeout_mark_lost(), detect reneg,
remove "SACKed" bit, mark skb N as lost
- find pcount of skb N is greater than its tx.in_flight
I suspect this issue iw what caused the bbr2_inflight_hi_from_lost_skb():
WARN_ON_ONCE(inflight_prev < 0)
to fire in production machines using bbr2.
Effort: net-tcp_bbr
Origin-9xx-SHA1: 1a3e997e613d2dcf32b947992882854ebe873715
Change-Id: I1b0b75c27519953430c7db51c6f358f104c7af55
Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
When we fragment an skb that has already been sent, we need to update
the tx.in_flight for the first skb in the resulting pair ("buff").
Because we were not updating the tx.in_flight, the tx.in_flight value
was inconsistent with the pcount of the "buff" skb (tx.in_flight would
be too high). That meant that if the "buff" skb was lost, then
bbr2_inflight_hi_from_lost_skb() would calculate an inflight_hi value
that is too high. This could result in longer queues and higher packet
loss.
Packetdrill testing verified that without this commit, when the second
half of an skb is SACKed and then later the first half of that skb is
marked lost, the calculated inflight_hi was incorrect.
Effort: net-tcp_bbr
Origin-9xx-SHA1: 385f1ddc610798fab2837f9f372857438b25f874
Origin-9xx-SHA1: a0eb099690af net-tcp_bbr: v2: fix tcp_fragment() tx.in_flight recomputation [prod feb 8 2021; use as a fixup]
Origin-9xx-SHA1: 885503228153ff0c9114e net-tcp_bbr: v2: introduce tcp_skb_tx_in_flight_is_suspicious() helper for warnings
Change-Id: I617f8cab4e9be7a0b8e8d30b047bf8645393354d
Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Add a a new ca opts flag TCP_CONG_WANTS_CE_EVENTS that allows a
congestion control module to receive CE events.
Currently congestion control modules have to set the TCP_CONG_NEEDS_ECN
bit in opts flag to receive CE events but this may incur changes in ECN
behavior elsewhere. This patch adds a new bit TCP_CONG_WANTS_CE_EVENTS
that allows congestion control modules to receive CE events
independently of TCP_CONG_NEEDS_ECN.
Effort: net-tcp
Origin-9xx-SHA1: 9f7e14716cde760bc6c67ef8ef7e1ee48501d95b
Change-Id: I2255506985242f376d910c6fd37daabaf4744f24
Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Add logic for an experimental TCP connection behavior, enabled with
tp->fast_ack_mode = 1, which disables checking the receive window
before sending an ack in __tcp_ack_snd_check(). If this behavior is
enabled, the data receiver sends an ACK if the amount of data is >
RCV.MSS.
Change-Id: Iaa0a0fd7108221f883137a79d5bfa724f1b096d4
Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Before this commit, when there is a packet loss that creates a sequence
hole that is filled by a TLP loss probe, then tcp_process_tlp_ack()
only informs the congestion control (CC) module via a back-to-back entry
and exit of CWR. But some congestion control modules (e.g. BBR) do not
respond to CWR events.
This commit adds a new CA event with which the core TCP stack notifies
the CC module when a loss is repaired by a TLP. This will allow CC
modules that do not use the CWR mechanism to have a custom handler for
such TLP recoveries.
Effort: net-tcp_bbr
Change-Id: Ieba72332b401b329bff5a641d2b2043a3fb8f632
Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Introduce is_acking_tlp_retrans_seq into rate_sample. This bool will
export to the CC module the knowledge of whether the current ACK
matched a TLP retransmit.
Note that when this bool is true, we cannot yet tell (in general) whether
this ACK is for the original or the TLP retransmit.
Effort: net-tcp_bbr
Change-Id: I2e6494332167e75efcbdc99bd5c119034e9c39b4
Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Define and implement a new per-route feature, RTAX_FEATURE_ECN_LOW.
This feature indicates that the given destination network is a
low-latency ECN environment, meaning both that ECN CE marks are
applied by the network using a low-latency marking threshold and also
that TCP endpoints provide precise per-data-segment ECN feedback in
ACKs (where the ACK ECE flag echoes the received CE status of all
newly-acknowledged data segments). This feature indication can be used
by congestion control algorithms to decide how to interpret ECN
signals over the given destination network.
This feature is appropriate for datacenter-style ECN marking, such as
the ECN marking approach expected by DCTCP or BBR congestion control
modules.
Signed-off-by: David Morley <morleyd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Tested-by: David Morley <morleyd@google.com>
Change-Id: I6bc06e9c6cb426fbae7243fc71c9a8c18175f5d3
Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Analogous to other important ECN information, export TCPI_OPT_ECN_LOW
in tcp_info tcpi_options field.
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Change-Id: I08d8d8c7e8780e6e37df54038ee50301ac5a0320
Signed-off-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit c69c5e10adb903ae2438d4f9c16eccf43d1fcbc1 ]
The ndev->npinfo pointer in __netpoll_setup() is RCU-protected but is being
accessed directly for a NULL check. While no RCU read lock is held in this
context, we should still use proper RCU primitives for consistency and
correctness.
Replace the direct NULL check with rcu_access_pointer(), which is the
appropriate primitive when only checking for NULL without dereferencing
the pointer. This function provides the necessary ordering guarantees
without requiring RCU read-side protection.
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <michal.kubiak@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241118-netpoll_rcu-v1-1-a1888dcb4a02@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0de6a472c3b38432b2f184bd64eb70d9ea36d107 ]
Commit 51183d233b5a ("net/neighbor: Update neigh_dump_info for strict
data checking") added strict checking. The err variable is not cleared,
so if we find no table to dump we will return the validation error even
if user did not want strict checking.
I think the only way to hit this is to send an buggy request, and ask
for a table which doesn't exist, so there's no point treating this
as a real fix. I only noticed it because a syzbot repro depended on it
to trigger another bug.
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241115003221.733593-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9df99c395d0f55fb444ef39f4d6f194ca437d884 ]
sock_init_data() attaches the allocated sk pointer to the provided sock
object. If inet6_create() fails later, the sk object is released, but the
sock object retains the dangling sk pointer, which may cause use-after-free
later.
Clear the sock sk pointer on error.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241014153808.51894-8-ignat@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9365fa510c6f82e3aa550a09d0c5c6b44dbc78ff ]
sock_init_data() attaches the allocated sk object to the provided sock
object. If inet_create() fails later, the sk object is freed, but the
sock object retains the dangling pointer, which may create use-after-free
later.
Clear the sk pointer in the sock object on error.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241014153808.51894-7-ignat@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b4fcd63f6ef79c73cafae8cf4a114def5fc3d80d ]
sock_init_data() attaches the allocated sk object to the provided sock
object. If ieee802154_create() fails later, the allocated sk object is
freed, but the dangling pointer remains in the provided sock object, which
may allow use-after-free.
Clear the sk pointer in the sock object on error.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Reviewed-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241014153808.51894-6-ignat@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 811a7ca7320c062e15d0f5b171fe6ad8592d1434 ]
On error can_create() frees the allocated sk object, but sock_init_data()
has already attached it to the provided sock object. This will leave a
dangling sk pointer in the sock object and may cause use-after-free later.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241014153808.51894-5-ignat@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
