![]() [ Upstream commit ab9a9a9e9647392a19e7a885b08000e89c86b535 ] One path takes care of SKB_GSO_DODGY, assuming skb->len is bigger than hdr_len. virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() does not fully dissect TCP headers, it only make sure it is at least 20 bytes. It is possible for an user to provide a malicious 'GSO' packet, total length of 80 bytes. - 20 bytes of IPv4 header - 60 bytes TCP header - a small gso_size like 8 virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() would declare this packet as a normal GSO packet, because it would see 40 bytes of payload, bigger than gso_size. We need to make detect this case to not underflow qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len. Fixes: 1def9238d4aa ("net_sched: more precise pkt_len computation") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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.. | ||
bpf_sk_storage.c | ||
datagram.c | ||
datagram.h | ||
dev.c | ||
dev_addr_lists.c | ||
dev_ioctl.c | ||
devlink.c | ||
drop_monitor.c | ||
dst.c | ||
dst_cache.c | ||
failover.c | ||
fib_notifier.c | ||
fib_rules.c | ||
filter.c | ||
flow_dissector.c | ||
flow_offload.c | ||
gen_estimator.c | ||
gen_stats.c | ||
gro_cells.c | ||
hwbm.c | ||
link_watch.c | ||
lwt_bpf.c | ||
lwtunnel.c | ||
Makefile | ||
neighbour.c | ||
net-procfs.c | ||
net-sysfs.c | ||
net-sysfs.h | ||
net-traces.c | ||
net_namespace.c | ||
netclassid_cgroup.c | ||
netevent.c | ||
netpoll.c | ||
netprio_cgroup.c | ||
page_pool.c | ||
pktgen.c | ||
ptp_classifier.c | ||
request_sock.c | ||
rtnetlink.c | ||
scm.c | ||
secure_seq.c | ||
skbuff.c | ||
skmsg.c | ||
sock.c | ||
sock_destructor.h | ||
sock_diag.c | ||
sock_map.c | ||
sock_reuseport.c | ||
stream.c | ||
sysctl_net_core.c | ||
timestamping.c | ||
tso.c | ||
utils.c | ||
xdp.c |