kernel_samsung_a53x/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c
Mark Rutland ff921f0c79 arm64: probes: Remove broken LDR (literal) uprobe support
commit acc450aa07099d071b18174c22a1119c57da8227 upstream.

The simulate_ldr_literal() and simulate_ldrsw_literal() functions are
unsafe to use for uprobes. Both functions were originally written for
use with kprobes, and access memory with plain C accesses. When uprobes
was added, these were reused unmodified even though they cannot safely
access user memory.

There are three key problems:

1) The plain C accesses do not have corresponding extable entries, and
   thus if they encounter a fault the kernel will treat these as
   unintentional accesses to user memory, resulting in a BUG() which
   will kill the kernel thread, and likely lead to further issues (e.g.
   lockup or panic()).

2) The plain C accesses are subject to HW PAN and SW PAN, and so when
   either is in use, any attempt to simulate an access to user memory
   will fault. Thus neither simulate_ldr_literal() nor
   simulate_ldrsw_literal() can do anything useful when simulating a
   user instruction on any system with HW PAN or SW PAN.

3) The plain C accesses are privileged, as they run in kernel context,
   and in practice can access a small range of kernel virtual addresses.
   The instructions they simulate have a range of +/-1MiB, and since the
   simulated instructions must itself be a user instructions in the
   TTBR0 address range, these can address the final 1MiB of the TTBR1
   acddress range by wrapping downwards from an address in the first
   1MiB of the TTBR0 address range.

   In contemporary kernels the last 8MiB of TTBR1 address range is
   reserved, and accesses to this will always fault, meaning this is no
   worse than (1).

   Historically, it was theoretically possible for the linear map or
   vmemmap to spill into the final 8MiB of the TTBR1 address range, but
   in practice this is extremely unlikely to occur as this would
   require either:

   * Having enough physical memory to fill the entire linear map all the
     way to the final 1MiB of the TTBR1 address range.

   * Getting unlucky with KASLR randomization of the linear map such
     that the populated region happens to overlap with the last 1MiB of
     the TTBR address range.

   ... and in either case if we were to spill into the final page there
   would be larger problems as the final page would alias with error
   pointers.

Practically speaking, (1) and (2) are the big issues. Given there have
been no reports of problems since the broken code was introduced, it
appears that no-one is relying on probing these instructions with
uprobes.

Avoid these issues by not allowing uprobes on LDR (literal) and LDRSW
(literal), limiting the use of simulate_ldr_literal() and
simulate_ldrsw_literal() to kprobes. Attempts to place uprobes on LDR
(literal) and LDRSW (literal) will be rejected as
arm_probe_decode_insn() will return INSN_REJECTED. In future we can
consider introducing working uprobes support for these instructions, but
this will require more significant work.

Fixes: 9842ceae9fa8 ("arm64: Add uprobe support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008155851.801546-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-11-23 23:21:54 +01:00

174 lines
5.1 KiB
C
Executable file

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c
*
* Copyright (C) 2013 Linaro Limited.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
#include <asm/insn.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include "decode-insn.h"
#include "simulate-insn.h"
static bool __kprobes aarch64_insn_is_steppable(u32 insn)
{
/*
* Branch instructions will write a new value into the PC which is
* likely to be relative to the XOL address and therefore invalid.
* Deliberate generation of an exception during stepping is also not
* currently safe. Lastly, MSR instructions can do any number of nasty
* things we can't handle during single-stepping.
*/
if (aarch64_get_insn_class(insn) == AARCH64_INSN_CLS_BR_SYS) {
if (aarch64_insn_is_branch(insn) ||
aarch64_insn_is_msr_imm(insn) ||
aarch64_insn_is_msr_reg(insn) ||
aarch64_insn_is_exception(insn) ||
aarch64_insn_is_eret(insn) ||
aarch64_insn_is_eret_auth(insn))
return false;
/*
* The MRS instruction may not return a correct value when
* executing in the single-stepping environment. We do make one
* exception, for reading the DAIF bits.
*/
if (aarch64_insn_is_mrs(insn))
return aarch64_insn_extract_system_reg(insn)
!= AARCH64_INSN_SPCLREG_DAIF;
/*
* The HINT instruction is steppable only if it is in whitelist
* and the rest of other such instructions are blocked for
* single stepping as they may cause exception or other
* unintended behaviour.
*/
if (aarch64_insn_is_hint(insn))
return aarch64_insn_is_steppable_hint(insn);
return true;
}
/*
* Instructions which load PC relative literals are not going to work
* when executed from an XOL slot. Instructions doing an exclusive
* load/store are not going to complete successfully when single-step
* exception handling happens in the middle of the sequence.
*/
if (aarch64_insn_uses_literal(insn) ||
aarch64_insn_is_exclusive(insn))
return false;
return true;
}
/* Return:
* INSN_REJECTED If instruction is one not allowed to kprobe,
* INSN_GOOD If instruction is supported and uses instruction slot,
* INSN_GOOD_NO_SLOT If instruction is supported but doesn't use its slot.
*/
enum probe_insn __kprobes
arm_probe_decode_insn(probe_opcode_t insn, struct arch_probe_insn *api)
{
/*
* Instructions reading or modifying the PC won't work from the XOL
* slot.
*/
if (aarch64_insn_is_steppable(insn))
return INSN_GOOD;
if (aarch64_insn_is_bcond(insn)) {
api->handler = simulate_b_cond;
} else if (aarch64_insn_is_cbz(insn) ||
aarch64_insn_is_cbnz(insn)) {
api->handler = simulate_cbz_cbnz;
} else if (aarch64_insn_is_tbz(insn) ||
aarch64_insn_is_tbnz(insn)) {
api->handler = simulate_tbz_tbnz;
} else if (aarch64_insn_is_adr_adrp(insn)) {
api->handler = simulate_adr_adrp;
} else if (aarch64_insn_is_b(insn) ||
aarch64_insn_is_bl(insn)) {
api->handler = simulate_b_bl;
} else if (aarch64_insn_is_br(insn) ||
aarch64_insn_is_blr(insn) ||
aarch64_insn_is_ret(insn)) {
api->handler = simulate_br_blr_ret;
} else {
/*
* Instruction cannot be stepped out-of-line and we don't
* (yet) simulate it.
*/
return INSN_REJECTED;
}
return INSN_GOOD_NO_SLOT;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES
static bool __kprobes
is_probed_address_atomic(kprobe_opcode_t *scan_start, kprobe_opcode_t *scan_end)
{
while (scan_start >= scan_end) {
/*
* atomic region starts from exclusive load and ends with
* exclusive store.
*/
if (aarch64_insn_is_store_ex(le32_to_cpu(*scan_start)))
return false;
else if (aarch64_insn_is_load_ex(le32_to_cpu(*scan_start)))
return true;
scan_start--;
}
return false;
}
enum probe_insn __kprobes
arm_kprobe_decode_insn(kprobe_opcode_t *addr, struct arch_specific_insn *asi)
{
enum probe_insn decoded;
probe_opcode_t insn = le32_to_cpu(*addr);
probe_opcode_t *scan_end = NULL;
unsigned long size = 0, offset = 0;
struct arch_probe_insn *api = &asi->api;
if (aarch64_insn_is_ldr_lit(insn)) {
api->handler = simulate_ldr_literal;
decoded = INSN_GOOD_NO_SLOT;
} else if (aarch64_insn_is_ldrsw_lit(insn)) {
api->handler = simulate_ldrsw_literal;
decoded = INSN_GOOD_NO_SLOT;
} else {
decoded = arm_probe_decode_insn(insn, &asi->api);
}
/*
* If there's a symbol defined in front of and near enough to
* the probe address assume it is the entry point to this
* code and use it to further limit how far back we search
* when determining if we're in an atomic sequence. If we could
* not find any symbol skip the atomic test altogether as we
* could otherwise end up searching irrelevant text/literals.
* KPROBES depends on KALLSYMS so this last case should never
* happen.
*/
if (kallsyms_lookup_size_offset((unsigned long) addr, &size, &offset)) {
if (offset < (MAX_ATOMIC_CONTEXT_SIZE*sizeof(kprobe_opcode_t)))
scan_end = addr - (offset / sizeof(kprobe_opcode_t));
else
scan_end = addr - MAX_ATOMIC_CONTEXT_SIZE;
}
if (decoded != INSN_REJECTED && scan_end)
if (is_probed_address_atomic(addr - 1, scan_end))
return INSN_REJECTED;
return decoded;
}
#endif