[ Upstream commit 42c773238037c90b3302bf37a57ae3b5c3f6004a ]
Move our existing input sanity checking to the top of sel_write_load()
and add a check to ensure the buffer size is non-zero.
Move a local variable initialization from the declaration to before it
is used.
Minor style adjustments.
Reported-by: Sam Sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
[cascardo: keep fsi initialization at its declaration point as it is used earlier]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit ada1986d07976d60bed5017aa38b7f7cf27883f7 upstream.
Alfred Agrell found that TOMOYO cannot handle execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH)
inside chroot environment where /dev and /proc are not mounted, for
commit 51f39a1f0cea ("syscalls: implement execveat() system call") missed
that TOMOYO tries to canonicalize argv[0] when the filename fed to the
executed program as argv[0] is supplied using potentially nonexistent
pathname.
Since "/dev/fd/<fd>" already lost symlink information used for obtaining
that <fd>, it is too late to reconstruct symlink's pathname. Although
<filename> part of "/dev/fd/<fd>/<filename>" might not be canonicalized,
TOMOYO cannot use tomoyo_realpath_nofollow() when /dev or /proc is not
mounted. Therefore, fallback to tomoyo_realpath_from_path() when
tomoyo_realpath_nofollow() failed.
Reported-by: Alfred Agrell <blubban@gmail.com>
Closes: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1082001
Fixes: 51f39a1f0cea ("syscalls: implement execveat() system call")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19+
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 41e8149c8892ed1962bd15350b3c3e6e90cba7f4 ]
This adds a Kconfig option and boot param to allow removing
the FOLL_FORCE flag from /proc/pid/mem write calls because
it can be abused.
The traditional forcing behavior is kept as default because
it can break GDB and some other use cases.
Previously we tried a more sophisticated approach allowing
distributions to fine-tune /proc/pid/mem behavior, however
that got NAK-ed by Linus [1], who prefers this simpler
approach with semantics also easier to understand for users.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wiGWLChxYmUA5HrT5aopZrB7_2VTa0NLZcxORgkUe5tEQ@mail.gmail.com/ [1]
Cc: Doug Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@collabora.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240802080225.89408-1-adrian.ratiu@collabora.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 76a0e79bc84f466999fa501fce5bf7a07641b8a7 upstream.
Marek Gresko reports that the root user on an NFS client is able to
change the security labels on files on an NFS filesystem that is
exported with root squashing enabled.
The end of the kerneldoc comment for __vfs_setxattr_noperm() states:
* This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it
* is executed. It also assumes that the caller will make the appropriate
* permission checks.
nfsd_setattr() does do permissions checking via fh_verify() and
nfsd_permission(), but those don't do all the same permissions checks
that are done by security_inode_setxattr() and its related LSM hooks do.
Since nfsd_setattr() is the only consumer of security_inode_setsecctx(),
simplest solution appears to be to replace the call to
__vfs_setxattr_noperm() with a call to __vfs_setxattr_locked(). This
fixes the above issue and has the added benefit of causing nfsd to
recall conflicting delegations on a file when a client tries to change
its security label.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Marek Gresko <marek.gresko@protonmail.com>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218809
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
[Shivani: Modified to apply on v5.10.y]
Signed-off-by: Shivani Agarwal <shivani.agarwal@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 2749749afa071f8a0e405605de9da615e771a7ce ]
In the `smk_set_cipso` function, the `skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat`
field is directly assigned to a new value without using the appropriate
RCU pointer assignment functions. According to RCU usage rules, this is
illegal and can lead to unpredictable behavior, including data
inconsistencies and impossible-to-diagnose memory corruption issues.
This possible bug was identified using a static analysis tool developed
by myself, specifically designed to detect RCU-related issues.
To address this, the assignment is now done using rcu_assign_pointer(),
which ensures that the pointer assignment is done safely, with the
necessary memory barriers and synchronization. This change prevents
potential RCU dereference issues by ensuring that the `cat` field is
safely updated while still adhering to RCU's requirements.
Fixes: 0817534ff9ea ("smackfs: Fix use-after-free in netlbl_catmap_walk()")
Signed-off-by: Jiawei Ye <jiawei.ye@foxmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e86cac0acdb1a74f608bacefe702f2034133a047 ]
When a process accept()s connection from a unix socket
(either stream or seqpacket)
it gets the socket with the label of the connecting process.
For example, if a connecting process has a label 'foo',
the accept()ed socket will also have 'in' and 'out' labels 'foo',
regardless of the label of the listener process.
This is because kernel creates unix child sockets
in the context of the connecting process.
I do not see any obvious way for the listener to abuse
alien labels coming with the new socket, but,
to be on the safe side, it's better fix new socket labels.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2fe209d0ad2e2729f7e22b9b31a86cc3ff0db550 ]
Currently, Smack mirrors the label of incoming tcp/ipv4 connections:
when a label 'foo' connects to a label 'bar' with tcp/ipv4,
'foo' always gets 'foo' in returned ipv4 packets. So,
1) returned packets are incorrectly labeled ('foo' instead of 'bar')
2) 'bar' can write to 'foo' without being authorized to write.
Here is a scenario how to see this:
* Take two machines, let's call them C and S,
with active Smack in the default state
(no settings, no rules, no labeled hosts, only builtin labels)
* At S, add Smack rule 'foo bar w'
(labels 'foo' and 'bar' are instantiated at S at this moment)
* At S, at label 'bar', launch a program
that listens for incoming tcp/ipv4 connections
* From C, at label 'foo', connect to the listener at S.
(label 'foo' is instantiated at C at this moment)
Connection succeedes and works.
* Send some data in both directions.
* Collect network traffic of this connection.
All packets in both directions are labeled with the CIPSO
of the label 'foo'. Hence, label 'bar' writes to 'foo' without
being authorized, and even without ever being known at C.
If anybody cares: exactly the same happens with DCCP.
This behavior 1st manifested in release 2.6.29.4 (see Fixes below)
and it looks unintentional. At least, no explanation was provided.
I changed returned packes label into the 'bar',
to bring it into line with the Smack documentation claims.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 98c0cc48e27e9d269a3e4db2acd72b486c88ec77 ]
policy_unpack_test fails on big endian systems because data byte order
is expected to be little endian but is generated in host byte order.
This results in test failures such as:
# policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_null_name: EXPECTATION FAILED at security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c:150
Expected array_size == (u16)16, but
array_size == 4096 (0x1000)
(u16)16 == 16 (0x10)
# policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_null_name: pass:0 fail:1 skip:0 total:1
not ok 3 policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_null_name
# policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_name: EXPECTATION FAILED at security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c:164
Expected array_size == (u16)16, but
array_size == 4096 (0x1000)
(u16)16 == 16 (0x10)
# policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_name: pass:0 fail:1 skip:0 total:1
Add the missing endianness conversions when generating test data.
Fixes: 4d944bcd4e73 ("apparmor: add AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpack")
Cc: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 379d9af3f3da2da1bbfa67baf1820c72a080d1f1 upstream.
The count increases only when a node is successfully added to
the linked list.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 68cbd415dd4b9c5b9df69f0f091879e56bf5907a upstream.
A proper task_work_cancel() API that actually cancels a callback and not
*any* callback pointing to a given function is going to be needed for
perf events event freeing. Do the appropriate rename to prepare for
that.
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240621091601.18227-2-frederic@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2bc73505a5cd2a18a7a542022722f136c19e3b87 upstream.
Inside unpack_profile() data->data is allocated using kvmemdup() so it
should be freed with the corresponding kvfree_sensitive().
Also add missing data->data release for rhashtable insertion failure path
in unpack_profile().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).
Fixes: e025be0f26d5 ("apparmor: support querying extended trusted helper extra data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Auditing comes with a lot of overhead due to string assembly via
vsnprintf. It isn't actually needed to make SELinux work, so remove
SELinux's artificial dependency on it to make it possible to use SELinux
without the unneeded overhead.
Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
commit eb0782bbdfd0d7c4786216659277c3fd585afc0e upstream.
The current IMA ruleset is identified by the variable "ima_rules"
that default to "&ima_default_rules". When loading a custom policy
for the first time, the variable is updated to "&ima_policy_rules"
instead. That update isn't RCU-safe, and deadlocks are possible.
Indeed, some functions like ima_match_policy() may loop indefinitely
when traversing "ima_default_rules" with list_for_each_entry_rcu().
When iterating over the default ruleset back to head, if the list
head is "ima_default_rules", and "ima_rules" have been updated to
"&ima_policy_rules", the loop condition (&entry->list != ima_rules)
stays always true, traversing won't terminate, causing a soft lockup
and RCU stalls.
Introduce a temporary value for "ima_rules" when iterating over
the ruleset to avoid the deadlocks.
Signed-off-by: liqiong <liqiong@nfschina.com>
Reviewed-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr>
Fixes: 38d859f991f3 ("IMA: policy can now be updated multiple times")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> (Fix sparse: incompatible types in comparison expression.)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9da27fb65a14c18efd4473e2e82b76b53ba60252 upstream.
The expiry time of a key is unconditionally overwritten during
instantiation, defaulting to turn it permanent. This causes a problem
for DNS resolution as the expiration set by user-space is overwritten to
TIME64_MAX, disabling further DNS updates. Fix this by restoring the
condition that key_set_expiry is only called when the pre-parser sets a
specific expiry.
Fixes: 39299bdd2546 ("keys, dns: Allow key types (eg. DNS) to be reclaimed immediately on expiry")
Signed-off-by: Silvio Gissi <sifonsec@amazon.com>
cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Hazem Mohamed Abuelfotoh <abuehaze@amazon.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ac02f007d64eb2769d0bde742aac4d7a5fc6e8a5 ]
If the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr is provided, and the inode is a directory,
update the in-memory inode flags by setting SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5c6d1125f8db ("Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories") # v2.6.38.x
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9c82169208dde516510aaba6bbd8b13976690c5d ]
Since the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr makes sense only for directories, enforce
this restriction in smack_inode_setxattr().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5c6d1125f8db ("Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories") # v2.6.38.x
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5a287d3d2b9de2b3e747132c615599907ba5c3c1 ]
For these hooks the true "neutral" value is -EOPNOTSUPP, which is
currently what is returned when no LSM provides this hook and what LSMs
return when there is no security context set on the socket. Correct the
value in <linux/lsm_hooks.h> and adjust the dispatch functions in
security/security.c to avoid issues when the BPF LSM is enabled.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b10b9c342f7571f287fd422be5d5c0beb26ba974 ]
Commit 4ff09db1b79b ("bpf: net: Change sk_getsockopt() to take the
sockptr_t argument") made it possible to call sk_getsockopt()
with both user and kernel address space buffers through the use of
the sockptr_t type. Unfortunately at the time of conversion the
security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook was written to only
accept userspace buffers, and in a desire to avoid having to change
the LSM hook the commit author simply passed the sockptr_t's
userspace buffer pointer. Since the only sk_getsockopt() callers
at the time of conversion which used kernel sockptr_t buffers did
not allow SO_PEERSEC, and hence the
security_socket_getpeersec_stream() hook, this was acceptable but
also very fragile as future changes presented the possibility of
silently passing kernel space pointers to the LSM hook.
There are several ways to protect against this, including careful
code review of future commits, but since relying on code review to
catch bugs is a recipe for disaster and the upstream eBPF maintainer
is "strongly against defensive programming", this patch updates the
LSM hook, and all of the implementations to support sockptr_t and
safely handle both user and kernel space buffers.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Stable-dep-of: 5a287d3d2b9d ("lsm: fix default return value of the socket_getpeersec_*() hooks")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 2f03fc340cac9ea1dc63cbf8c93dd2eb0f227815 upstream.
Since tomoyo_write_control() updates head->write_buf when write()
of long lines is requested, we need to fetch head->write_buf after
head->io_sem is held. Otherwise, concurrent write() requests can
cause use-after-free-write and double-free problems.
Reported-by: Sam Sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAEkJfYNDspuGxYx5kym8Lvp--D36CMDUErg4rxfWFJuPbbji8g@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: bd03a3e4c9a9 ("TOMOYO: Add policy namespace support.")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # Linux 3.1+
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 99b817c173cd213671daecd25ca27f56b0c7c4ec upstream.
The inode_getsecctx LSM hook has previously been corrected to have
-EOPNOTSUPP instead of 0 as the default return value to fix BPF LSM
behavior. However, the call_int_hook()-generated loop in
security_inode_getsecctx() was left treating 0 as the neutral value, so
after an LSM returns 0, the loop continues to try other LSMs, and if one
of them returns a non-zero value, the function immediately returns with
said value. So in a situation where SELinux and the BPF LSMs registered
this hook, -EOPNOTSUPP would be incorrectly returned whenever SELinux
returned 0.
Fix this by open-coding the call_int_hook() loop and making it use the
correct LSM_RET_DEFAULT() value as the neutral one, similar to what
other hooks do.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAEjxPJ4ev-pasUwGx48fDhnmjBnq_Wh90jYPwRQRAqXxmOKD4Q@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2257983
Fixes: b36995b8609a ("lsm: fix default return value for inode_getsecctx")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f1bb47a31dff6d4b34fb14e99850860ee74bb003 upstream.
Some ioctl commands do not require ioctl permission, but are routed to
other permissions such as FILE_GETATTR or FILE_SETATTR. This routing is
done by comparing the ioctl cmd to a set of 64-bit flags (FS_IOC_*).
However, if a 32-bit process is running on a 64-bit kernel, it emits
32-bit flags (FS_IOC32_*) for certain ioctl operations. These flags are
being checked erroneously, which leads to these ioctl operations being
routed to the ioctl permission, rather than the correct file
permissions.
This was also noted in a RED-PEN finding from a while back -
"/* RED-PEN how should LSM module know it's handling 32bit? */".
This patch introduces a new hook, security_file_ioctl_compat(), that is
called from the compat ioctl syscall. All current LSMs have been changed
to support this hook.
Reviewing the three places where we are currently using
security_file_ioctl(), it appears that only SELinux needs a dedicated
compat change; TOMOYO and SMACK appear to be functional without any
change.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0b24dcb7f2f7 ("Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"")
Signed-off-by: Alfred Piccioni <alpic@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: subject tweak, line length fixes, and alignment corrections]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 55a8210c9e7d21ff2644809699765796d4bfb200 ]
When processing a packed profile in unpack_profile() described like
"profile :ns::samba-dcerpcd /usr/lib*/samba/{,samba/}samba-dcerpcd {...}"
a string ":samba-dcerpcd" is unpacked as a fully-qualified name and then
passed to aa_splitn_fqname().
aa_splitn_fqname() treats ":samba-dcerpcd" as only containing a namespace.
Thus it returns NULL for tmpname, meanwhile tmpns is non-NULL. Later
aa_alloc_profile() crashes as the new profile name is NULL now.
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 6 PID: 1657 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-dirty #16
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? strlen+0x1e/0xa0
aa_policy_init+0x1bb/0x230
aa_alloc_profile+0xb1/0x480
unpack_profile+0x3bc/0x4960
aa_unpack+0x309/0x15e0
aa_replace_profiles+0x213/0x33c0
policy_update+0x261/0x370
profile_replace+0x20e/0x2a0
vfs_write+0x2af/0xe00
ksys_write+0x126/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0
It seems such behaviour of aa_splitn_fqname() is expected and checked in
other places where it is called (e.g. aa_remove_profiles). Well, there
is an explicit comment "a ns name without a following profile is allowed"
inside.
AFAICS, nothing can prevent unpacked "name" to be in form like
":samba-dcerpcd" - it is passed from userspace.
Deny the whole profile set replacement in such case and inform user with
EPROTO and an explaining message.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).
Fixes: 04dc715e24d0 ("apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load")
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit bbf5a1d0e5d0fb3bdf90205aa872636122692a50 ]
The IPv6 network stack first checks the sockaddr length (-EINVAL error)
before checking the family (-EAFNOSUPPORT error).
This was discovered thanks to commit a549d055a22e ("selftests/landlock:
Add network tests").
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0584f91c-537c-4188-9e4f-04f192565667@collabora.com
Fixes: 0f8db8cc73df ("selinux: add AF_UNSPEC and INADDR_ANY checks to selinux_socket_bind()")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Tested-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 39299bdd2546688d92ed9db4948f6219ca1b9542 ]
If a key has an expiration time, then when that time passes, the key is
left around for a certain amount of time before being collected (5 mins by
default) so that EKEYEXPIRED can be returned instead of ENOKEY. This is a
problem for DNS keys because we want to redo the DNS lookup immediately at
that point.
Fix this by allowing key types to be marked such that keys of that type
don't have this extra period, but are reclaimed as soon as they expire and
turn this on for dns_resolver-type keys. To make this easier to handle,
key->expiry is changed to be permanent if TIME64_MAX rather than 0.
Furthermore, give such new-style negative DNS results a 1s default expiry
if no other expiry time is set rather than allowing it to stick around
indefinitely. This shouldn't be zero as ls will follow a failing stat call
immediately with a second with AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW added.
Fixes: 1a4240f4764a ("DNS: Separate out CIFS DNS Resolver code")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Markus Suvanto <markus.suvanto@gmail.com>
cc: Wang Lei <wang840925@gmail.com>
cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit b836c4d29f2744200b2af41e14bf50758dddc818 upstream.
Commit 18b44bc5a672 ("ovl: Always reevaluate the file signature for
IMA") forced signature re-evaulation on every file access.
Instead of always re-evaluating the file's integrity, detect a change
to the backing file, by comparing the cached file metadata with the
backing file's metadata. Verifying just the i_version has not changed
is insufficient. In addition save and compare the i_ino and s_dev
as well.
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Raul E Rangel <rrangel@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
