[ Upstream commit 46d4e5ac6f2f801f97bcd0ec82365969197dc9b1 ]
The macro is not used in the current version of kernel, it looks like
can be removed to avoid a build warning:
../arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c: At top level:
../arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c:7: warning: macro "GENERATING_ASM_OFFSETS" is not used [-Wunused-macros]
7 | #define GENERATING_ASM_OFFSETS
Fixes: 9639a44394b9 ("RISC-V: Provide a cleaner raw_smp_processor_id()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Chunyan Zhang <zhangchunyan@iscas.ac.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008094141.549248-2-zhangchunyan@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d41373a4b910961df5a5e3527d7bde6ad45ca438 ]
The IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NX_COMPAT informs the firmware that the
EFI binary does not rely on pages that are both executable and
writable.
The flag is used by some distro versions of GRUB to decide if the EFI
binary may be executed.
As the Linux kernel neither has RWX sections nor needs RWX pages for
relocation we should set the flag.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Emil Renner Berthing <emil.renner.berthing@canonical.com>
Fixes: cb7d2dd5612a ("RISC-V: Add PE/COFF header for EFI stub")
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240929140233.211800-1-heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit bf40167d54d55d4b54d0103713d86a8638fb9290 ]
The compiler is smart enough to insert a call to memset() in
riscv_vdso_get_cpus(), which generates a dynamic relocation.
So prevent this by using -fno-builtin option.
Fixes: e2c0cdfba7f6 ("RISC-V: User-facing API")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241016083625.136311-2-alexghiti@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d14fa1fcf69db9d070e75f1c4425211fa619dfc8 ]
childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread
in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since
the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the
gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other
means.
[From the email thread]
The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used
for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or
when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have
PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.
childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable
from userspace in at least five ways:
1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting
register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has
sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers
zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.
This is a bug in its own right, but I'm unwilling to bet that it is the only
way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.
2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread
before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only
happen at user/kernel boundaries.
3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly happy to read pt_regs for
user_mode_helpers before the exec completes, but gp is not one of the
registers it returns.
4. PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER: LOCKDOWN_PERF normally prevents access to kernel
addresses via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, but due to this bug kernel addresses
are also exposed via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER which is permitted under
LOCKDOWN_PERF. I have not attempted to write exploit code.
5. Much of the tracing infrastructure allows access to user registers. I have
not attempted to determine which forms of tracing allow access to user
registers without already allowing access to kernel registers.
Fixes: 7db91e57a0ac ("RISC-V: Task implementation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan O'Rear <sorear@fastmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327061258.2370291-1-sorear@fastmail.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fea2fed201ee5647699018a56fbb6a5e8cc053a5 ]
This enables the use of per-task stack canary values if GCC has
support for emitting the stack canary reference relative to the
value of tp, which holds the task struct pointer in the riscv
kernel.
After compare arm64 and x86 implementations, seems arm64's is more
flexible and readable. The key point is how gcc get the offset of
stack_canary from gs/el0_sp.
x86: Use a fix offset from gs, not flexible.
struct fixed_percpu_data {
/*
* GCC hardcodes the stack canary as %gs:40. Since the
* irq_stack is the object at %gs:0, we reserve the bottom
* 48 bytes of the irq stack for the canary.
*/
char gs_base[40]; // :(
unsigned long stack_canary;
};
arm64: Use -mstack-protector-guard-offset & guard-reg
gcc options:
-mstack-protector-guard=sysreg
-mstack-protector-guard-reg=sp_el0
-mstack-protector-guard-offset=xxx
riscv: Use -mstack-protector-guard-offset & guard-reg
gcc options:
-mstack-protector-guard=tls
-mstack-protector-guard-reg=tp
-mstack-protector-guard-offset=xxx
GCC's implementation has been merged:
commit c931e8d5a96463427040b0d11f9c4352ac22b2b0
Author: Cooper Qu <cooper.qu@linux.alibaba.com>
Date: Mon Jul 13 16:15:08 2020 +0800
RISC-V: Add support for TLS stack protector canary access
In the end, these codes are inserted by gcc before return:
* 0xffffffe00020b396 <+120>: ld a5,1008(tp) # 0x3f0
* 0xffffffe00020b39a <+124>: xor a5,a5,a4
* 0xffffffe00020b39c <+126>: mv a0,s5
* 0xffffffe00020b39e <+128>: bnez a5,0xffffffe00020b61c <_do_fork+766>
0xffffffe00020b3a2 <+132>: ld ra,136(sp)
0xffffffe00020b3a4 <+134>: ld s0,128(sp)
0xffffffe00020b3a6 <+136>: ld s1,120(sp)
0xffffffe00020b3a8 <+138>: ld s2,112(sp)
0xffffffe00020b3aa <+140>: ld s3,104(sp)
0xffffffe00020b3ac <+142>: ld s4,96(sp)
0xffffffe00020b3ae <+144>: ld s5,88(sp)
0xffffffe00020b3b0 <+146>: ld s6,80(sp)
0xffffffe00020b3b2 <+148>: ld s7,72(sp)
0xffffffe00020b3b4 <+150>: addi sp,sp,144
0xffffffe00020b3b6 <+152>: ret
...
* 0xffffffe00020b61c <+766>: auipc ra,0x7f8
* 0xffffffe00020b620 <+770>: jalr -1764(ra) # 0xffffffe000a02f38 <__stack_chk_fail>
Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Cooper Qu <cooper.qu@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Stable-dep-of: d14fa1fcf69d ("riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 22e0eb04837a63af111fae35a92f7577676b9bc8 ]
This is a backport of a fix that was done in OpenSBI: ec0559eb315b
("lib: sbi_misaligned_ldst: Fix handling of C.SWSP and C.SDSP").
Unlike C.LWSP/C.LDSP, these encodings can be used with the zero
register, so checking that the rs2 field is non-zero is unnecessary.
Additionally, the previous check was incorrect since it was checking
the immediate field of the instruction instead of the rs2 field.
Fixes: 956d705dd279 ("riscv: Unaligned load/store handling for M_MODE")
Signed-off-by: Clément Léger <cleger@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231103090223.702340-1-cleger@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
