1183 commits
Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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OGAWA Hirofumi
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e739627286 |
fat: fix uninitialized variable
commit 963a7f4d3b90ee195b895ca06b95757fcba02d1a upstream. syszbot produced this with a corrupted fs image. In theory, however an IO error would trigger this also. This affects just an error report, so should not be a serious error. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87r08wjsnh.fsf@mail.parknet.co.jp Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/66ff2c95.050a0220.49194.03e9.GAE@google.com Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp> Reported-by: syzbot+ef0d7bc412553291aa86@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Jan Kara
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b4693ba24d |
ext4: fix warning in ext4_dio_write_end_io()
commit 619f75dae2cf117b1d07f27b046b9ffb071c4685 upstream. The syzbot has reported that it can hit the warning in ext4_dio_write_end_io() because i_size < i_disksize. Indeed the reproducer creates a race between DIO IO completion and truncate expanding the file and thus ext4_dio_write_end_io() sees an inconsistent inode state where i_disksize is already updated but i_size is not updated yet. Since we are careful when setting up DIO write and consider it extending (and thus performing the IO synchronously with i_rwsem held exclusively) whenever it goes past either of i_size or i_disksize, we can use the same test during IO completion without risking entering ext4_handle_inode_extension() without i_rwsem held. This way we make it obvious both i_size and i_disksize are large enough when we report DIO completion without relying on unreliable WARN_ON. Reported-by: <syzbot+47479b71cdfc78f56d30@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Fixes: 91562895f803 ("ext4: properly sync file size update after O_SYNC direct IO") Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130095653.22679-1-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Yanjun Zhang
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4bb48602f3 |
NFSv4: Prevent NULL-pointer dereference in nfs42_complete_copies()
[ Upstream commit a848c29e3486189aaabd5663bc11aea50c5bd144 ] On the node of an NFS client, some files saved in the mountpoint of the NFS server were copied to another location of the same NFS server. Accidentally, the nfs42_complete_copies() got a NULL-pointer dereference crash with the following syslog: [232064.838881] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116 [232064.839360] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116 [232066.588183] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000058 [232066.588586] Mem abort info: [232066.588701] ESR = 0x0000000096000007 [232066.588862] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [232066.589084] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [232066.589216] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [232066.589340] FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault [232066.589559] Data abort info: [232066.589683] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007 [232066.589842] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [232066.589967] user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00002000956ff400 [232066.590231] [0000000000000058] pgd=08001100ae100003, p4d=08001100ae100003, pud=08001100ae100003, pmd=08001100b3c00003, pte=0000000000000000 [232066.590757] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP [232066.590958] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap tun ipt_rpfilter xt_multiport ip_set_hash_ip ip_set_hash_net xfrm_interface xfrm6_tunnel tunnel4 tunnel6 esp4 ah4 wireguard libcurve25519_generic veth xt_addrtype xt_set nf_conntrack_netlink ip_set_hash_ipportnet ip_set_hash_ipportip ip_set_bitmap_port ip_set_hash_ipport dummy ip_set ip_vs_sh ip_vs_wrr ip_vs_rr ip_vs iptable_filter sch_ingress nfnetlink_cttimeout vport_gre ip_gre ip_tunnel gre vport_geneve geneve vport_vxlan vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel openvswitch nf_conncount dm_round_robin dm_service_time dm_multipath xt_nat xt_MASQUERADE nft_chain_nat nf_nat xt_mark xt_conntrack xt_comment nft_compat nft_counter nf_tables nfnetlink ocfs2 ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ipmi_ssif nbd overlay 8021q garp mrp bonding tls rfkill sunrpc ext4 mbcache jbd2 [232066.591052] vfat fat cas_cache cas_disk ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas sg acpi_ipmi ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ip_tables vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_virqfd vfio_iommu_type1 vfio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc fuse xfs libcrc32c ast drm_vram_helper qla2xxx drm_kms_helper syscopyarea crct10dif_ce sysfillrect ghash_ce sysimgblt sha2_ce fb_sys_fops cec sha256_arm64 sha1_ce drm_ttm_helper ttm nvme_fc igb sbsa_gwdt nvme_fabrics drm nvme_core i2c_algo_bit i40e scsi_transport_fc megaraid_sas aes_neon_bs [232066.596953] CPU: 6 PID: 4124696 Comm: 10.253.166.125- Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.15.131-9.cl9_ocfs2.aarch64 #1 [232066.597356] Hardware name: Great Wall .\x93\x8e...RF6260 V5/GWMSSE2GL1T, BIOS T656FBE_V3.0.18 2024-01-06 [232066.597721] pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [232066.598034] pc : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4] [232066.598327] lr : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x12c/0x800 [nfsv4] [232066.598595] sp : ffff8000f568fc70 [232066.598731] x29: ffff8000f568fc70 x28: 0000000000001000 x27: ffff21003db33000 [232066.599030] x26: ffff800005521ae0 x25: ffff0100f98fa3f0 x24: 0000000000000001 [232066.599319] x23: ffff800009920008 x22: ffff21003db33040 x21: ffff21003db33050 [232066.599628] x20: ffff410172fe9e40 x19: ffff410172fe9e00 x18: 0000000000000000 [232066.599914] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000004 x15: 0000000000000000 [232066.600195] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800008e685a8 x12: 00000000eac0c6e6 [232066.600498] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000008 x9 : ffff8000054e5828 [232066.600784] x8 : 00000000ffffffbf x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 000000000a9eb14a [232066.601062] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff70ff8a14a800 x3 : 0000000000000058 [232066.601348] x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 54dce46366daa6c6 x0 : 0000000000000000 [232066.601636] Call trace: [232066.601749] nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4] [232066.601998] nfs4_do_reclaim+0x1b8/0x28c [nfsv4] [232066.602218] nfs4_state_manager+0x928/0x10f0 [nfsv4] [232066.602455] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x78/0x1b0 [nfsv4] [232066.602690] kthread+0x110/0x114 [232066.602830] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [232066.602985] Code: 1400000d f9403f20 f9402e61 91016003 (f9402c00) [232066.603284] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [232066.606936] Starting crashdump kernel... [232066.607146] Bye! Analysing the vmcore, we know that nfs4_copy_state listed by destination nfs_server->ss_copies was added by the field copies in handle_async_copy(), and we found a waiting copy process with the stack as: PID: 3511963 TASK: ffff710028b47e00 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "cp" #0 [ffff8001116ef740] __switch_to at ffff8000081b92f4 #1 [ffff8001116ef760] __schedule at ffff800008dd0650 #2 [ffff8001116ef7c0] schedule at ffff800008dd0a00 #3 [ffff8001116ef7e0] schedule_timeout at ffff800008dd6aa0 #4 [ffff8001116ef860] __wait_for_common at ffff800008dd166c #5 [ffff8001116ef8e0] wait_for_completion_interruptible at ffff800008dd1898 #6 [ffff8001116ef8f0] handle_async_copy at ffff8000055142f4 [nfsv4] #7 [ffff8001116ef970] _nfs42_proc_copy at ffff8000055147c8 [nfsv4] #8 [ffff8001116efa80] nfs42_proc_copy at ffff800005514cf0 [nfsv4] #9 [ffff8001116efc50] __nfs4_copy_file_range.constprop.0 at ffff8000054ed694 [nfsv4] The NULL-pointer dereference was due to nfs42_complete_copies() listed the nfs_server->ss_copies by the field ss_copies of nfs4_copy_state. So the nfs4_copy_state address ffff0100f98fa3f0 was offset by 0x10 and the data accessed through this pointer was also incorrect. Generally, the ordered list nfs4_state_owner->so_states indicate open(O_RDWR) or open(O_WRITE) states are reclaimed firstly by nfs4_reclaim_open_state(). When destination state reclaim is failed with NFS_STATE_RECOVERY_FAILED and copies are not deleted in nfs_server->ss_copies, the source state may be passed to the nfs42_complete_copies() process earlier, resulting in this crash scene finally. To solve this issue, we add a list_head nfs_server->ss_src_copies for a server-to-server copy specially. Fixes: 0e65a32c8a56 ("NFS: handle source server reboot") Signed-off-by: Yanjun Zhang <zhangyanjun@cestc.cn> Reviewed-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Dan Carpenter
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8f25df6566 |
SUNRPC: Fix integer overflow in decode_rc_list()
[ Upstream commit 6dbf1f341b6b35bcc20ff95b6b315e509f6c5369 ] The math in "rc_list->rcl_nrefcalls * 2 * sizeof(uint32_t)" could have an integer overflow. Add bounds checking on rc_list->rcl_nrefcalls to fix that. Fixes: 4aece6a19cf7 ("nfs41: cb_sequence xdr implementation") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Chuck Lever
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504cb79c21 |
NFSD: Mark filecache "down" if init fails
[ Upstream commit dc0d0f885aa422f621bc1c2124133eff566b0bc8 ] NeilBrown says: > The handling of NFSD_FILE_CACHE_UP is strange. nfsd_file_cache_init() > sets it, but doesn't clear it on failure. So if nfsd_file_cache_init() > fails for some reason, nfsd_file_cache_shutdown() would still try to > clean up if it was called. Reported-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Fixes: c7b824c3d06c ("NFSD: Replace the "init once" mechanism") Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Wojciech Gładysz
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b9112f49aa |
ext4: nested locking for xattr inode
[ Upstream commit d1bc560e9a9c78d0b2314692847fc8661e0aeb99 ] Add nested locking with I_MUTEX_XATTR subclass to avoid lockdep warning while handling xattr inode on file open syscall at ext4_xattr_inode_iget. Backtrace EXT4-fs (loop0): Ignoring removed oldalloc option ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.10.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor543/2794 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880215e1a48 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline] ffff8880215e1a48 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x42a/0x5c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:425 but task is already holding lock: ffff8880215e3278 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0x136d/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5559 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0x197/0x480 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5566 down_write+0x93/0x180 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1564 ext4_update_i_disksize fs/ext4/ext4.h:3267 [inline] ext4_xattr_inode_write fs/ext4/xattr.c:1390 [inline] ext4_xattr_inode_lookup_create fs/ext4/xattr.c:1538 [inline] ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x331a/0x3d80 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1662 ext4_xattr_ibody_set+0x124/0x390 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2228 ext4_xattr_set_handle+0xc27/0x14e0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2385 ext4_xattr_set+0x219/0x390 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2498 ext4_xattr_user_set+0xc9/0xf0 fs/ext4/xattr_user.c:40 __vfs_setxattr+0x404/0x450 fs/xattr.c:177 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x11d/0x4f0 fs/xattr.c:208 __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x1f9/0x210 fs/xattr.c:266 vfs_setxattr+0x112/0x2c0 fs/xattr.c:283 setxattr+0x1db/0x3e0 fs/xattr.c:548 path_setxattr+0x15a/0x240 fs/xattr.c:567 __do_sys_setxattr fs/xattr.c:582 [inline] __se_sys_setxattr fs/xattr.c:578 [inline] __x64_sys_setxattr+0xc5/0xe0 fs/xattr.c:578 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb -> #0 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2988 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3113 [inline] validate_chain+0x1695/0x58f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3729 __lock_acquire+0x12fd/0x20d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4955 lock_acquire+0x197/0x480 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5566 down_write+0x93/0x180 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1564 inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline] ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x42a/0x5c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:425 ext4_xattr_inode_get+0x138/0x410 fs/ext4/xattr.c:485 ext4_xattr_move_to_block fs/ext4/xattr.c:2580 [inline] ext4_xattr_make_inode_space fs/ext4/xattr.c:2682 [inline] ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0xe70/0x1bb0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2774 __ext4_expand_extra_isize+0x304/0x3f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5898 ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize fs/ext4/inode.c:5941 [inline] __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x591/0x810 fs/ext4/inode.c:6018 ext4_setattr+0x1400/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5562 notify_change+0xbb6/0xe60 fs/attr.c:435 do_truncate+0x1de/0x2c0 fs/open.c:64 handle_truncate fs/namei.c:2970 [inline] do_open fs/namei.c:3311 [inline] path_openat+0x29f3/0x3290 fs/namei.c:3425 do_filp_open+0x20b/0x450 fs/namei.c:3452 do_sys_openat2+0x124/0x460 fs/open.c:1207 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1223 [inline] __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1231 [inline] __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1227 [inline] __x64_sys_open+0x221/0x270 fs/open.c:1227 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&ei->i_data_sem/3); lock(&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1); lock(&ei->i_data_sem/3); lock(&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by syz-executor543/2794: #0: ffff888026fbc448 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x4a/0x2a0 fs/namespace.c:365 #1: ffff8880215e3488 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#7){++++}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline] #1: ffff8880215e3488 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#7){++++}-{3:3}, at: do_truncate+0x1cf/0x2c0 fs/open.c:62 #2: ffff8880215e3310 (&ei->i_mmap_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0xec4/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5519 #3: ffff8880215e3278 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0x136d/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5559 #4: ffff8880215e30c8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_write_trylock_xattr fs/ext4/xattr.h:162 [inline] #4: ffff8880215e30c8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize fs/ext4/inode.c:5938 [inline] #4: ffff8880215e30c8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x4fb/0x810 fs/ext4/inode.c:6018 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 2794 Comm: syz-executor543 Not tainted 5.10.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x177/0x211 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_circular_bug+0x146/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2002 check_noncircular+0x2cc/0x390 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2123 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2988 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3113 [inline] validate_chain+0x1695/0x58f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3729 __lock_acquire+0x12fd/0x20d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4955 lock_acquire+0x197/0x480 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5566 down_write+0x93/0x180 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1564 inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline] ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x42a/0x5c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:425 ext4_xattr_inode_get+0x138/0x410 fs/ext4/xattr.c:485 ext4_xattr_move_to_block fs/ext4/xattr.c:2580 [inline] ext4_xattr_make_inode_space fs/ext4/xattr.c:2682 [inline] ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0xe70/0x1bb0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2774 __ext4_expand_extra_isize+0x304/0x3f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5898 ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize fs/ext4/inode.c:5941 [inline] __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x591/0x810 fs/ext4/inode.c:6018 ext4_setattr+0x1400/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5562 notify_change+0xbb6/0xe60 fs/attr.c:435 do_truncate+0x1de/0x2c0 fs/open.c:64 handle_truncate fs/namei.c:2970 [inline] do_open fs/namei.c:3311 [inline] path_openat+0x29f3/0x3290 fs/namei.c:3425 do_filp_open+0x20b/0x450 fs/namei.c:3452 do_sys_openat2+0x124/0x460 fs/open.c:1207 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1223 [inline] __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1231 [inline] __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1227 [inline] __x64_sys_open+0x221/0x270 fs/open.c:1227 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb RIP: 0033:0x7f0cde4ea229 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 21 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffd81d1c978 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0030656c69662f30 RCX: 00007f0cde4ea229 RDX: 0000000000000089 RSI: 00000000000a0a00 RDI: 00000000200001c0 RBP: 2f30656c69662f2e R08: 0000000000208000 R09: 0000000000208000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd81d1c9c0 R13: 00007ffd81d1ca00 R14: 0000000000080000 R15: 0000000000000003 EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea:2730: inode #13: comm syz-executor543: corrupted in-inode xattr Signed-off-by: Wojciech Gładysz <wojciech.gladysz@infogain.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240801143827.19135-1-wojciech.gladysz@infogain.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
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52bec9283f |
unicode: Don't special case ignorable code points
commit 5c26d2f1d3f5e4be3e196526bead29ecb139cf91 upstream. We don't need to handle them separately. Instead, just let them decompose/casefold to themselves. Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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zhanchengbin
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9a68c22120 |
ext4: fix inode tree inconsistency caused by ENOMEM
commit 3f5424790d4377839093b68c12b130077a4e4510 upstream. If ENOMEM fails when the extent is splitting, we need to restore the length of the split extent. In the ext4_split_extent_at function, only in ext4_ext_create_new_leaf will it alloc memory and change the shape of the extent tree,even if an ENOMEM is returned at this time, the extent tree is still self-consistent, Just restore the split extent lens in the function ext4_split_extent_at. ext4_split_extent_at ext4_ext_insert_extent ext4_ext_create_new_leaf 1)ext4_ext_split ext4_find_extent 2)ext4_ext_grow_indepth ext4_find_extent Signed-off-by: zhanchengbin <zhanchengbin1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230103022812.130603-1-zhanchengbin1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Zhihao Cheng
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eb2d9a8577 |
ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writing
[ Upstream commit dda898d7ffe85931f9cca6d702a51f33717c501e ] The dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocks and copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signal handling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and added on inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceed the inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as: dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1 dax_iomap_rw iomap_iter // round 1 ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data iomap_iter // round 2 iomap_iter_advance iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter fatal_signal_pending done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M ext4_handle_inode_extension ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2M fsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix? Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smaller than expected. Fixes: 776722e85d3b ("ext4: DAX iomap write support") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219136 Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240809121532.2105494-1-chengzhihao@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Jan Kara
|
8d891d670a |
ext4: properly sync file size update after O_SYNC direct IO
[ Upstream commit 91562895f8030cb9a0470b1db49de79346a69f91 ] Gao Xiang has reported that on ext4 O_SYNC direct IO does not properly sync file size update and thus if we crash at unfortunate moment, the file can have smaller size although O_SYNC IO has reported successful completion. The problem happens because update of on-disk inode size is handled in ext4_dio_write_iter() *after* iomap_dio_rw() (and thus dio_complete() in particular) has returned and generic_file_sync() gets called by dio_complete(). Fix the problem by handling on-disk inode size update directly in our ->end_io completion handler. References: https://lore.kernel.org/all/02d18236-26ef-09b0-90ad-030c4fe3ee20@linux.alibaba.com Reported-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 378f32bab371 ("ext4: introduce direct I/O write using iomap infrastructure") Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Tested-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: "Ritesh Harjani (IBM)" <ritesh.list@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231013121350.26872-1-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Stable-dep-of: dda898d7ffe8 ("ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writing") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Filipe Manana
|
cfbf212995 |
btrfs: wait for fixup workers before stopping cleaner kthread during umount
commit 41fd1e94066a815a7ab0a7025359e9b40e4b3576 upstream. During unmount, at close_ctree(), we have the following steps in this order: 1) Park the cleaner kthread - this doesn't destroy the kthread, it basically halts its execution (wake ups against it work but do nothing); 2) We stop the cleaner kthread - this results in freeing the respective struct task_struct; 3) We call btrfs_stop_all_workers() which waits for any jobs running in all the work queues and then free the work queues. Syzbot reported a case where a fixup worker resulted in a crash when doing a delayed iput on its inode while attempting to wake up the cleaner at btrfs_add_delayed_iput(), because the task_struct of the cleaner kthread was already freed. This can happen during unmount because we don't wait for any fixup workers still running before we call kthread_stop() against the cleaner kthread, which stops and free all its resources. Fix this by waiting for any fixup workers at close_ctree() before we call kthread_stop() against the cleaner and run pending delayed iputs. The stack traces reported by syzbot were the following: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x77/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5065 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880272a8a18 by task kworker/u8:3/52 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 52 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Workqueue: btrfs-fixup btrfs_work_helper Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 __lock_acquire+0x77/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5065 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 class_raw_spinlock_irqsave_constructor include/linux/spinlock.h:551 [inline] try_to_wake_up+0xb0/0x1480 kernel/sched/core.c:4154 btrfs_writepage_fixup_worker+0xc16/0xdf0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:2842 btrfs_work_helper+0x390/0xc50 fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:314 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa63/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> Allocated by task 2: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:319 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:345 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:247 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4086 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4135 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x16b/0x320 mm/slub.c:4187 alloc_task_struct_node kernel/fork.c:180 [inline] dup_task_struct+0x57/0x8c0 kernel/fork.c:1107 copy_process+0x5d1/0x3d50 kernel/fork.c:2206 kernel_clone+0x223/0x880 kernel/fork.c:2787 kernel_thread+0x1bc/0x240 kernel/fork.c:2849 create_kthread kernel/kthread.c:412 [inline] kthreadd+0x60d/0x810 kernel/kthread.c:765 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Freed by task 61: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x59/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:230 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2343 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4580 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x1a2/0x420 mm/slub.c:4682 put_task_struct include/linux/sched/task.h:144 [inline] delayed_put_task_struct+0x125/0x300 kernel/exit.c:228 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2567 [inline] rcu_core+0xaaa/0x17a0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2823 handle_softirqs+0x2c5/0x980 kernel/softirq.c:554 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu+0xf4/0x1c0 kernel/softirq.c:637 irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:649 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1037 [inline] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1037 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x3f/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xac/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:541 __call_rcu_common kernel/rcu/tree.c:3086 [inline] call_rcu+0x167/0xa70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3190 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5318 [inline] __schedule+0x184b/0x4ae0 kernel/sched/core.c:6675 schedule_idle+0x56/0x90 kernel/sched/core.c:6793 do_idle+0x56a/0x5d0 kernel/sched/idle.c:354 cpu_startup_entry+0x42/0x60 kernel/sched/idle.c:424 start_secondary+0x102/0x110 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:314 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x147 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880272a8000 which belongs to the cache task_struct of size 7424 The buggy address is located 2584 bytes inside of freed 7424-byte region [ffff8880272a8000, ffff8880272a9d00) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x272a8 head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0xfff00000000040(head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801bafa500 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080040004 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801bafa500 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000000 0000000080040004 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 00fff00000000003 ffffea00009caa01 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 2, tgid 2 (kthreadd), ts 71247381401, free_ts 71214998153 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1f3/0x230 mm/page_alloc.c:1537 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1545 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x3039/0x3180 mm/page_alloc.c:3457 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x256/0x6c0 mm/page_alloc.c:4733 alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x3e8/0x680 mm/mempolicy.c:2265 alloc_slab_page+0x6a/0x120 mm/slub.c:2413 allocate_slab+0x5a/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:2579 new_slab mm/slub.c:2632 [inline] ___slab_alloc+0xcd1/0x14b0 mm/slub.c:3819 __slab_alloc+0x58/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3909 __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3962 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4123 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x1fe/0x320 mm/slub.c:4187 alloc_task_struct_node kernel/fork.c:180 [inline] dup_task_struct+0x57/0x8c0 kernel/fork.c:1107 copy_process+0x5d1/0x3d50 kernel/fork.c:2206 kernel_clone+0x223/0x880 kernel/fork.c:2787 kernel_thread+0x1bc/0x240 kernel/fork.c:2849 create_kthread kernel/kthread.c:412 [inline] kthreadd+0x60d/0x810 kernel/kthread.c:765 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 page last free pid 5230 tgid 5230 stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline] free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1108 [inline] free_unref_page+0xcd0/0xf00 mm/page_alloc.c:2638 discard_slab mm/slub.c:2678 [inline] __put_partials+0xeb/0x130 mm/slub.c:3146 put_cpu_partial+0x17c/0x250 mm/slub.c:3221 __slab_free+0x2ea/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4450 qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:163 [inline] qlist_free_all+0x9a/0x140 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:179 kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x14f/0x170 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:286 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x23/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:329 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:247 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4086 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4135 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x135/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:4142 getname_flags+0xb7/0x540 fs/namei.c:139 do_sys_openat2+0xd2/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1409 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1430 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1446 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1441 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x247/0x2a0 fs/open.c:1441 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8880272a8900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880272a8980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff8880272a8a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8880272a8a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880272a8b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Reported-by: syzbot+8aaf2df2ef0164ffe1fb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/66fb36b1.050a0220.aab67.003b.GAE@google.com/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Qu Wenruo
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e03ae5b888 |
btrfs: fix a NULL pointer dereference when failed to start a new trasacntion
commit c3b47f49e83197e8dffd023ec568403bcdbb774b upstream. [BUG] Syzbot reported a NULL pointer dereference with the following crash: FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. start_transaction+0x830/0x1670 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:676 prepare_to_relocate+0x31f/0x4c0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3642 relocate_block_group+0x169/0xd20 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3678 ... BTRFS info (device loop0): balance: ended with status: -12 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000cc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000660-0x0000000000000667] RIP: 0010:btrfs_update_reloc_root+0x362/0xa80 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:926 Call Trace: <TASK> commit_fs_roots+0x2ee/0x720 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1496 btrfs_commit_transaction+0xfaf/0x3740 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2430 del_balance_item fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3678 [inline] reset_balance_state+0x25e/0x3c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3742 btrfs_balance+0xead/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4574 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3673 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [CAUSE] The allocation failure happens at the start_transaction() inside prepare_to_relocate(), and during the error handling we call unset_reloc_control(), which makes fs_info->balance_ctl to be NULL. Then we continue the error path cleanup in btrfs_balance() by calling reset_balance_state() which will call del_balance_item() to fully delete the balance item in the root tree. However during the small window between set_reloc_contrl() and unset_reloc_control(), we can have a subvolume tree update and created a reloc_root for that subvolume. Then we go into the final btrfs_commit_transaction() of del_balance_item(), and into btrfs_update_reloc_root() inside commit_fs_roots(). That function checks if fs_info->reloc_ctl is in the merge_reloc_tree stage, but since fs_info->reloc_ctl is NULL, it results a NULL pointer dereference. [FIX] Just add extra check on fs_info->reloc_ctl inside btrfs_update_reloc_root(), before checking fs_info->reloc_ctl->merge_reloc_tree. That DEAD_RELOC_TREE handling is to prevent further modification to the reloc tree during merge stage, but since there is no reloc_ctl at all, we do not need to bother that. Reported-by: syzbot+283673dbc38527ef9f3d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/66f6bfa7.050a0220.38ace9.0019.GAE@google.com/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Chuck Lever
|
770d812d36 |
NFSD: Fix NFSv4's PUTPUBFH operation
commit 202f39039a11402dcbcd5fece8d9fa6be83f49ae upstream. According to RFC 8881, all minor versions of NFSv4 support PUTPUBFH. Replace the XDR decoder for PUTPUBFH with a "noop" since we no longer want the minorversion check, and PUTPUBFH has no arguments to decode. (Ideally nfsd4_decode_noop should really be called nfsd4_decode_void). PUTPUBFH should now behave just like PUTROOTFH. Reported-by: Cedric Blancher <cedric.blancher@gmail.com> Fixes: e1a90ebd8b23 ("NFSD: Combine decode operations for v4 and v4.1") Cc: Dan Shelton <dan.f.shelton@gmail.com> Cc: Roland Mainz <roland.mainz@nrubsig.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Li Lingfeng
|
5b22601874 |
nfsd: map the EBADMSG to nfserr_io to avoid warning
commit 340e61e44c1d2a15c42ec72ade9195ad525fd048 upstream. Ext4 will throw -EBADMSG through ext4_readdir when a checksum error occurs, resulting in the following WARNING. Fix it by mapping EBADMSG to nfserr_io. nfsd_buffered_readdir iterate_dir // -EBADMSG -74 ext4_readdir // .iterate_shared ext4_dx_readdir ext4_htree_fill_tree htree_dirblock_to_tree ext4_read_dirblock __ext4_read_dirblock ext4_dirblock_csum_verify warn_no_space_for_csum __warn_no_space_for_csum return ERR_PTR(-EFSBADCRC) // -EBADMSG -74 nfserrno // WARNING [ 161.115610] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 161.116465] nfsd: non-standard errno: -74 [ 161.117315] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 780 at fs/nfsd/nfsproc.c:878 nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0 [ 161.118596] Modules linked in: [ 161.119243] CPU: 1 PID: 780 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 5.10.0-00014-g79679361fd5d #138 [ 161.120684] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qe mu.org 04/01/2014 [ 161.123601] RIP: 0010:nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0 [ 161.124676] Code: 0f 87 da 30 dd 00 83 e3 01 b8 00 00 00 05 75 d7 44 89 ee 48 c7 c7 c0 57 24 98 89 44 24 04 c6 05 ce 2b 61 03 01 e8 99 20 d8 00 <0f> 0b 8b 44 24 04 eb b5 4c 89 e6 48 c7 c7 a0 6d a4 99 e8 cc 15 33 [ 161.127797] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000e2f9c0 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 161.128794] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 161.130089] RDX: 1ffff1103ee16f6d RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: fffff520001c5f2a [ 161.131379] RBP: 0000000000000022 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8881f70c1827 [ 161.132664] R10: ffffed103ee18304 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000021 [ 161.133949] R13: 00000000ffffffb6 R14: ffff8881317c0000 R15: ffffc90000e2fbd8 [ 161.135244] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881f7080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 161.136695] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 161.137761] CR2: 00007fcaad70b348 CR3: 0000000144256006 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 [ 161.139041] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 161.140291] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 161.141519] PKRU: 55555554 [ 161.142076] Call Trace: [ 161.142575] ? __warn+0x9b/0x140 [ 161.143229] ? nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0 [ 161.143872] ? report_bug+0x125/0x150 [ 161.144595] ? handle_bug+0x41/0x90 [ 161.145284] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70 [ 161.146009] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20 [ 161.146816] ? nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0 [ 161.147487] nfsd_buffered_readdir+0x28b/0x2b0 [ 161.148333] ? nfsd4_encode_dirent_fattr+0x380/0x380 [ 161.149258] ? nfsd_buffered_filldir+0xf0/0xf0 [ 161.150093] ? wait_for_concurrent_writes+0x170/0x170 [ 161.151004] ? generic_file_llseek_size+0x48/0x160 [ 161.151895] nfsd_readdir+0x132/0x190 [ 161.152606] ? nfsd4_encode_dirent_fattr+0x380/0x380 [ 161.153516] ? nfsd_unlink+0x380/0x380 [ 161.154256] ? override_creds+0x45/0x60 [ 161.155006] nfsd4_encode_readdir+0x21a/0x3d0 [ 161.155850] ? nfsd4_encode_readlink+0x210/0x210 [ 161.156731] ? write_bytes_to_xdr_buf+0x97/0xe0 [ 161.157598] ? __write_bytes_to_xdr_buf+0xd0/0xd0 [ 161.158494] ? lock_downgrade+0x90/0x90 [ 161.159232] ? nfs4svc_decode_voidarg+0x10/0x10 [ 161.160092] nfsd4_encode_operation+0x15a/0x440 [ 161.160959] nfsd4_proc_compound+0x718/0xe90 [ 161.161818] nfsd_dispatch+0x18e/0x2c0 [ 161.162586] svc_process_common+0x786/0xc50 [ 161.163403] ? nfsd_svc+0x380/0x380 [ 161.164137] ? svc_printk+0x160/0x160 [ 161.164846] ? svc_xprt_do_enqueue.part.0+0x365/0x380 [ 161.165808] ? nfsd_svc+0x380/0x380 [ 161.166523] ? rcu_is_watching+0x23/0x40 [ 161.167309] svc_process+0x1a5/0x200 [ 161.168019] nfsd+0x1f5/0x380 [ 161.168663] ? nfsd_shutdown_threads+0x260/0x260 [ 161.169554] kthread+0x1c4/0x210 [ 161.170224] ? kthread_insert_work_sanity_check+0x80/0x80 [ 161.171246] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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NeilBrown
|
2f271f8591 |
nfsd: fix delegation_blocked() to block correctly for at least 30 seconds
commit 45bb63ed20e02ae146336412889fe5450316a84f upstream. The pair of bloom filtered used by delegation_blocked() was intended to block delegations on given filehandles for between 30 and 60 seconds. A new filehandle would be recorded in the "new" bit set. That would then be switch to the "old" bit set between 0 and 30 seconds later, and it would remain as the "old" bit set for 30 seconds. Unfortunately the code intended to clear the old bit set once it reached 30 seconds old, preparing it to be the next new bit set, instead cleared the *new* bit set before switching it to be the old bit set. This means that the "old" bit set is always empty and delegations are blocked between 0 and 30 seconds. This patch updates bd->new before clearing the set with that index, instead of afterwards. Reported-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 6282cd565553 ("NFSD: Don't hand out delegations for 30 seconds after recalling them.") Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Yuezhang Mo
|
defa602d2c |
exfat: fix memory leak in exfat_load_bitmap()
commit d2b537b3e533f28e0d97293fe9293161fe8cd137 upstream. If the first directory entry in the root directory is not a bitmap directory entry, 'bh' will not be released and reassigned, which will cause a memory leak. Fixes: 1e49a94cf707 ("exfat: add bitmap operations") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yuezhang Mo <Yuezhang.Mo@sony.com> Reviewed-by: Aoyama Wataru <wataru.aoyama@sony.com> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Lizhi Xu
|
e721564d9c |
ocfs2: fix possible null-ptr-deref in ocfs2_set_buffer_uptodate
commit 33b525cef4cff49e216e4133cc48452e11c0391e upstream. When doing cleanup, if flags without OCFS2_BH_READAHEAD, it may trigger NULL pointer dereference in the following ocfs2_set_buffer_uptodate() if bh is NULL. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240902023636.1843422-3-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com Fixes: cf76c78595ca ("ocfs2: don't put and assigning null to bh allocated outside") Signed-off-by: Lizhi Xu <lizhi.xu@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Reported-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Suggested-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.20+] Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Julian Sun
|
e7014629c9 |
ocfs2: fix null-ptr-deref when journal load failed.
commit 5784d9fcfd43bd853654bb80c87ef293b9e8e80a upstream. During the mounting process, if journal_reset() fails because of too short journal, then lead to jbd2_journal_load() fails with NULL j_sb_buffer. Subsequently, ocfs2_journal_shutdown() calls jbd2_journal_flush()->jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail()-> __jbd2_update_log_tail()->jbd2_journal_update_sb_log_tail() ->lock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer), resulting in a null-pointer dereference error. To resolve this issue, we should check the JBD2_LOADED flag to ensure the journal was properly loaded. Additionally, use journal instead of osb->journal directly to simplify the code. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=05b9b39d8bdfe1a0861f Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240902030844.422725-1-sunjunchao2870@gmail.com Fixes: f6f50e28f0cb ("jbd2: Fail to load a journal if it is too short") Signed-off-by: Julian Sun <sunjunchao2870@gmail.com> Reported-by: syzbot+05b9b39d8bdfe1a0861f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Suggested-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Lizhi Xu
|
c656a23346 |
ocfs2: remove unreasonable unlock in ocfs2_read_blocks
commit c03a82b4a0c935774afa01fd6d128b444fd930a1 upstream. Patch series "Misc fixes for ocfs2_read_blocks", v5. This series contains 2 fixes for ocfs2_read_blocks(). The first patch fix the issue reported by syzbot, which detects bad unlock balance in ocfs2_read_blocks(). The second patch fixes an issue reported by Heming Zhao when reviewing above fix. This patch (of 2): There was a lock release before exiting, so remove the unreasonable unlock. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240902023636.1843422-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240902023636.1843422-2-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com Fixes: cf76c78595ca ("ocfs2: don't put and assigning null to bh allocated outside") Signed-off-by: Lizhi Xu <lizhi.xu@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Reported-by: syzbot+ab134185af9ef88dfed5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ab134185af9ef88dfed5 Tested-by: syzbot+ab134185af9ef88dfed5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.20+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Joseph Qi
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687a6ab8c4 |
ocfs2: cancel dqi_sync_work before freeing oinfo
commit 35fccce29feb3706f649726d410122dd81b92c18 upstream. ocfs2_global_read_info() will initialize and schedule dqi_sync_work at the end, if error occurs after successfully reading global quota, it will trigger the following warning with CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_* enabled: ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: 00000000d8b0ce28 object type: timer_list hint: qsync_work_fn+0x0/0x16c This reports that there is an active delayed work when freeing oinfo in error handling, so cancel dqi_sync_work first. BTW, return status instead of -1 when .read_file_info fails. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f7af59df5d6b25f0febd Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240904071004.2067695-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com Fixes: 171bf93ce11f ("ocfs2: Periodic quota syncing") Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Reported-by: syzbot+f7af59df5d6b25f0febd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: syzbot+f7af59df5d6b25f0febd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Gautham Ananthakrishna
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63e2db6c0b |
ocfs2: reserve space for inline xattr before attaching reflink tree
commit 5ca60b86f57a4d9648f68418a725b3a7de2816b0 upstream. One of our customers reported a crash and a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem. The crash was due to the detection of corruption. Upon troubleshooting, the fsck -fn output showed the below corruption [EXTENT_LIST_FREE] Extent list in owner 33080590 claims 230 as the next free chain record, but fsck believes the largest valid value is 227. Clamp the next record value? n The stat output from the debugfs.ocfs2 showed the following corruption where the "Next Free Rec:" had overshot the "Count:" in the root metadata block. Inode: 33080590 Mode: 0640 Generation: 2619713622 (0x9c25a856) FS Generation: 904309833 (0x35e6ac49) CRC32: 00000000 ECC: 0000 Type: Regular Attr: 0x0 Flags: Valid Dynamic Features: (0x16) HasXattr InlineXattr Refcounted Extended Attributes Block: 0 Extended Attributes Inline Size: 256 User: 0 (root) Group: 0 (root) Size: 281320357888 Links: 1 Clusters: 141738 ctime: 0x66911b56 0x316edcb8 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.829349048 2024 atime: 0x66911d6b 0x7f7a28d -- Fri Jul 12 06:11:23.133669517 2024 mtime: 0x66911b56 0x12ed75d7 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.317552087 2024 dtime: 0x0 -- Wed Dec 31 17:00:00 1969 Refcount Block: 2777346 Last Extblk: 2886943 Orphan Slot: 0 Sub Alloc Slot: 0 Sub Alloc Bit: 14 Tree Depth: 1 Count: 227 Next Free Rec: 230 ## Offset Clusters Block# 0 0 2310 2776351 1 2310 2139 2777375 2 4449 1221 2778399 3 5670 731 2779423 4 6401 566 2780447 ....... .... ....... ....... .... ....... The issue was in the reflink workfow while reserving space for inline xattr. The problematic function is ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(). By the time this function is called the reflink tree is already recreated at the destination inode from the source inode. At this point, this function reserves space for inline xattrs at the destination inode without even checking if there is space at the root metadata block. It simply reduces the l_count from 243 to 227 thereby making space of 256 bytes for inline xattr whereas the inode already has extents beyond this index (in this case up to 230), thereby causing corruption. The fix for this is to reserve space for inline metadata at the destination inode before the reflink tree gets recreated. The customer has verified the fix. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240918063844.1830332-1-gautham.ananthakrishna@oracle.com Fixes: ef962df057aa ("ocfs2: xattr: fix inlined xattr reflink") Signed-off-by: Gautham Ananthakrishna <gautham.ananthakrishna@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Joseph Qi
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33b11064c4 |
ocfs2: fix uninit-value in ocfs2_get_block()
commit 2af148ef8549a12f8025286b8825c2833ee6bcb8 upstream. syzbot reported an uninit-value BUG: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ocfs2_get_block+0xed2/0x2710 fs/ocfs2/aops.c:159 ocfs2_get_block+0xed2/0x2710 fs/ocfs2/aops.c:159 do_mpage_readpage+0xc45/0x2780 fs/mpage.c:225 mpage_readahead+0x43f/0x840 fs/mpage.c:374 ocfs2_readahead+0x269/0x320 fs/ocfs2/aops.c:381 read_pages+0x193/0x1110 mm/readahead.c:160 page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x901/0x9f0 mm/readahead.c:273 do_page_cache_ra mm/readahead.c:303 [inline] force_page_cache_ra+0x3b1/0x4b0 mm/readahead.c:332 force_page_cache_readahead mm/internal.h:347 [inline] generic_fadvise+0x6b0/0xa90 mm/fadvise.c:106 vfs_fadvise mm/fadvise.c:185 [inline] ksys_fadvise64_64 mm/fadvise.c:199 [inline] __do_sys_fadvise64 mm/fadvise.c:214 [inline] __se_sys_fadvise64 mm/fadvise.c:212 [inline] __x64_sys_fadvise64+0x1fb/0x3a0 mm/fadvise.c:212 x64_sys_call+0xe11/0x3ba0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:222 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f This is because when ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks() fails, p_blkno is uninitialized. So the error log will trigger the above uninit-value access. The error log is out-of-date since get_blocks() was removed long time ago. And the error code will be logged in ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks() once ocfs2_get_cluster() fails, so fix this by only logging inode and block. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9709e73bae885b05314b Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240925090600.3643376-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com Fixes: ccd979bdbce9 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem") Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Reported-by: syzbot+9709e73bae885b05314b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: syzbot+9709e73bae885b05314b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Heming Zhao
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0ff194d066 |
ocfs2: fix the la space leak when unmounting an ocfs2 volume
commit dfe6c5692fb525e5e90cefe306ee0dffae13d35f upstream. This bug has existed since the initial OCFS2 code. The code logic in ocfs2_sync_local_to_main() is wrong, as it ignores the last contiguous free bits, which causes an OCFS2 volume to lose the last free clusters of LA window on each umount command. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240719114310.14245-1-heming.zhao@suse.com Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Su Yue <glass.su@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Kemeng Shi
|
b9329bdfe6 |
jbd2: correctly compare tids with tid_geq function in jbd2_fc_begin_commit
commit f0e3c14802515f60a47e6ef347ea59c2733402aa upstream. Use tid_geq to compare tids to work over sequence number wraps. Signed-off-by: Kemeng Shi <shikemeng@huaweicloud.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240801013815.2393869-2-shikemeng@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Baokun Li
|
7477cade32 |
jbd2: stop waiting for space when jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail() returns error
commit f5cacdc6f2bb2a9bf214469dd7112b43dd2dd68a upstream. In __jbd2_log_wait_for_space(), we might call jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail() to recover some journal space. But if an error occurs while executing jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail() (e.g., an EIO), we don't stop waiting for free space right away, we try other branches, and if j_committing_transaction is NULL (i.e., the tid is 0), we will get the following complain: ============================================ JBD2: I/O error when updating journal superblock for sdd-8. __jbd2_log_wait_for_space: needed 256 blocks and only had 217 space available __jbd2_log_wait_for_space: no way to get more journal space in sdd-8 ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 139804 at fs/jbd2/checkpoint.c:109 __jbd2_log_wait_for_space+0x251/0x2e0 Modules linked in: CPU: 2 PID: 139804 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 6.6.0+ #1 RIP: 0010:__jbd2_log_wait_for_space+0x251/0x2e0 Call Trace: <TASK> add_transaction_credits+0x5d1/0x5e0 start_this_handle+0x1ef/0x6a0 jbd2__journal_start+0x18b/0x340 ext4_dirty_inode+0x5d/0xb0 __mark_inode_dirty+0xe4/0x5d0 generic_update_time+0x60/0x70 [...] ============================================ So only if jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail() returns 1, i.e., there is nothing to clean up at the moment, continue to try to reclaim free space in other ways. Note that this fix relies on commit 6f6a6fda2945 ("jbd2: fix ocfs2 corrupt when updating journal superblock fails") to make jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail return the correct error code. Fixes: 8c3f25d8950c ("jbd2: don't give up looking for space so easily in __jbd2_log_wait_for_space") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240718115336.2554501-1-libaokun@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Helge Deller
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603d38c5da |
parisc: Fix stack start for ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE personality
commit f31b256994acec6929306dfa86ac29716e7503d6 upstream. Fix the stack start address calculation for the parisc architecture in setup_arg_pages() when address randomization is disabled. When the ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE process personality is disabled there is no need to add additional space for the stack. Note that this patch touches code inside an #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP hunk, which is why only the parisc architecture is affected since it's the only Linux architecture where the stack grows upwards. Without this patch you will find the stack in the middle of some mapped libaries and suddenly limited to 6MB instead of 8MB: root@parisc:~# setarch -R /bin/bash -c "cat /proc/self/maps" 00010000-00019000 r-xp 00000000 08:05 1182034 /usr/bin/cat 00019000-0001a000 rwxp 00009000 08:05 1182034 /usr/bin/cat 0001a000-0003b000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] f90c4000-f9283000 r-xp 00000000 08:05 1573004 /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 f9283000-f9285000 r--p 001bf000 08:05 1573004 /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 f9285000-f928a000 rwxp 001c1000 08:05 1573004 /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 f928a000-f9294000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 f9301000-f9323000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] f98b4000-f98e4000 r-xp 00000000 08:05 1572869 /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/ld.so.1 f98e4000-f98e5000 r--p 00030000 08:05 1572869 /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/ld.so.1 f98e5000-f98e9000 rwxp 00031000 08:05 1572869 /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/ld.so.1 f9ad8000-f9b00000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 f9b00000-f9b01000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] With the patch the stack gets correctly mapped at the end of the process memory map: root@panama:~# setarch -R /bin/bash -c "cat /proc/self/maps" 00010000-00019000 r-xp 00000000 08:13 16385582 /usr/bin/cat 00019000-0001a000 rwxp 00009000 08:13 16385582 /usr/bin/cat 0001a000-0003b000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] fef29000-ff0eb000 r-xp 00000000 08:13 16122400 /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 ff0eb000-ff0ed000 r--p 001c2000 08:13 16122400 /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 ff0ed000-ff0f2000 rwxp 001c4000 08:13 16122400 /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 ff0f2000-ff0fc000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 ff4b4000-ff4e4000 r-xp 00000000 08:13 16121913 /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/ld.so.1 ff4e4000-ff4e6000 r--p 00030000 08:13 16121913 /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/ld.so.1 ff4e6000-ff4ea000 rwxp 00032000 08:13 16121913 /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/ld.so.1 ff6d7000-ff6ff000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 ff6ff000-ff700000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] ff700000-ff722000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] Reported-by: Camm Maguire <camm@maguirefamily.org> Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Fixes: d045c77c1a69 ("parisc,metag: Fix crashes due to stack randomization on stack-grows-upwards architectures") Fixes: 17d9822d4b4c ("parisc: Consider stack randomization for mmap base only when necessary") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2+ Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Luis Henriques (SUSE)
|
4af33d15cb |
ext4: fix incorrect tid assumption in ext4_wait_for_tail_page_commit()
commit dd589b0f1445e1ea1085b98edca6e4d5dedb98d0 upstream. Function ext4_wait_for_tail_page_commit() assumes that '0' is not a valid value for transaction IDs, which is incorrect. Don't assume that and invoke jbd2_log_wait_commit() if the journal had a committing transaction instead. Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques (SUSE) <luis.henriques@linux.dev> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240724161119.13448-2-luis.henriques@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Baokun Li
|
39b44a0c92 |
ext4: update orig_path in ext4_find_extent()
commit 5b4b2dcace35f618fe361a87bae6f0d13af31bc1 upstream. In ext4_find_extent(), if the path is not big enough, we free it and set *orig_path to NULL. But after reallocating and successfully initializing the path, we don't update *orig_path, in which case the caller gets a valid path but a NULL ppath, and this may cause a NULL pointer dereference or a path memory leak. For example: ext4_split_extent path = *ppath = 2000 ext4_find_extent if (depth > path[0].p_maxdepth) kfree(path = 2000); *orig_path = path = NULL; path = kcalloc() = 3000 ext4_split_extent_at(*ppath = NULL) path = *ppath; ex = path[depth].p_ext; // NULL pointer dereference! ================================================================== BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 576 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.11.0-rc2-dirty #847 RIP: 0010:ext4_split_extent_at+0x6d/0x560 Call Trace: <TASK> ext4_split_extent.isra.0+0xcb/0x1b0 ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized+0x168/0x6c0 ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents+0x325/0x4d0 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x520/0xdb0 ext4_map_blocks+0x2b0/0x690 ext4_iomap_begin+0x20e/0x2c0 [...] ================================================================== Therefore, *orig_path is updated when the extent lookup succeeds, so that the caller can safely use path or *ppath. Fixes: 10809df84a4d ("ext4: teach ext4_ext_find_extent() to realloc path if necessary") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822023545.1994557-6-libaokun@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Baokun Li
|
1751fc5974 |
ext4: fix double brelse() the buffer of the extents path
commit dcaa6c31134c0f515600111c38ed7750003e1b9c upstream. In ext4_ext_try_to_merge_up(), set path[1].p_bh to NULL after it has been released, otherwise it may be released twice. An example of what triggers this is as follows: split2 map split1 |--------|-------|--------| ext4_ext_map_blocks ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents ext4_split_convert_extents // path->p_depth == 0 ext4_split_extent // 1. do split1 ext4_split_extent_at |ext4_ext_insert_extent | ext4_ext_create_new_leaf | ext4_ext_grow_indepth | le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_depth, 1) | ext4_find_extent | // return -ENOMEM |// get error and try zeroout |path = ext4_find_extent | path->p_depth = 1 |ext4_ext_try_to_merge | ext4_ext_try_to_merge_up | path->p_depth = 0 | brelse(path[1].p_bh) ---> not set to NULL here |// zeroout success // 2. update path ext4_find_extent // 3. do split2 ext4_split_extent_at ext4_ext_insert_extent ext4_ext_create_new_leaf ext4_ext_grow_indepth le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_depth, 1) ext4_find_extent path[0].p_bh = NULL; path->p_depth = 1 read_extent_tree_block ---> return err // path[1].p_bh is still the old value ext4_free_ext_path ext4_ext_drop_refs // path->p_depth == 1 brelse(path[1].p_bh) ---> brelse a buffer twice Finally got the following WARRNING when removing the buffer from lru: ============================================ VFS: brelse: Trying to free free buffer WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 72 at fs/buffer.c:1241 __brelse+0x58/0x90 CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: kworker/u19:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-dirty #716 RIP: 0010:__brelse+0x58/0x90 Call Trace: <TASK> __find_get_block+0x6e7/0x810 bdev_getblk+0x2b/0x480 __ext4_get_inode_loc+0x48a/0x1240 ext4_get_inode_loc+0xb2/0x150 ext4_reserve_inode_write+0xb7/0x230 __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x144/0x6a0 ext4_ext_insert_extent+0x9c8/0x3230 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xf45/0x2dc0 ext4_map_blocks+0x724/0x1700 ext4_do_writepages+0x12d6/0x2a70 [...] ============================================ Fixes: ecb94f5fdf4b ("ext4: collapse a single extent tree block into the inode if possible") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822023545.1994557-9-libaokun@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Baokun Li
|
d6a31f504e |
ext4: aovid use-after-free in ext4_ext_insert_extent()
commit a164f3a432aae62ca23d03e6d926b122ee5b860d upstream. As Ojaswin mentioned in Link, in ext4_ext_insert_extent(), if the path is reallocated in ext4_ext_create_new_leaf(), we'll use the stale path and cause UAF. Below is a sample trace with dummy values: ext4_ext_insert_extent path = *ppath = 2000 ext4_ext_create_new_leaf(ppath) ext4_find_extent(ppath) path = *ppath = 2000 if (depth > path[0].p_maxdepth) kfree(path = 2000); *ppath = path = NULL; path = kcalloc() = 3000 *ppath = 3000; return path; /* here path is still 2000, UAF! */ eh = path[depth].p_hdr ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_ext_insert_extent+0x26d4/0x3330 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881027bf7d0 by task kworker/u36:1/179 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 179 Comm: kworker/u6:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc2-dirty #866 Call Trace: <TASK> ext4_ext_insert_extent+0x26d4/0x3330 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xe22/0x2d40 ext4_map_blocks+0x71e/0x1700 ext4_do_writepages+0x1290/0x2800 [...] Allocated by task 179: ext4_find_extent+0x81c/0x1f70 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x146/0x2d40 ext4_map_blocks+0x71e/0x1700 ext4_do_writepages+0x1290/0x2800 ext4_writepages+0x26d/0x4e0 do_writepages+0x175/0x700 [...] Freed by task 179: kfree+0xcb/0x240 ext4_find_extent+0x7c0/0x1f70 ext4_ext_insert_extent+0xa26/0x3330 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xe22/0x2d40 ext4_map_blocks+0x71e/0x1700 ext4_do_writepages+0x1290/0x2800 ext4_writepages+0x26d/0x4e0 do_writepages+0x175/0x700 [...] ================================================================== So use *ppath to update the path to avoid the above problem. Reported-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZqyL6rmtwl6N4MWR@li-bb2b2a4c-3307-11b2-a85c-8fa5c3a69313.ibm.com Fixes: 10809df84a4d ("ext4: teach ext4_ext_find_extent() to realloc path if necessary") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822023545.1994557-7-libaokun@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Baokun Li
|
a92dad3741 |
ext4: drop ppath from ext4_ext_replay_update_ex() to avoid double-free
commit 5c0f4cc84d3a601c99bc5e6e6eb1cbda542cce95 upstream. When calling ext4_force_split_extent_at() in ext4_ext_replay_update_ex(), the 'ppath' is updated but it is the 'path' that is freed, thus potentially triggering a double-free in the following process: ext4_ext_replay_update_ex ppath = path ext4_force_split_extent_at(&ppath) ext4_split_extent_at ext4_ext_insert_extent ext4_ext_create_new_leaf ext4_ext_grow_indepth ext4_find_extent if (depth > path[0].p_maxdepth) kfree(path) ---> path First freed *orig_path = path = NULL ---> null ppath kfree(path) ---> path double-free !!! So drop the unnecessary ppath and use path directly to avoid this problem. And use ext4_find_extent() directly to update path, avoiding unnecessary memory allocation and freeing. Also, propagate the error returned by ext4_find_extent() instead of using strange error codes. Fixes: 8016e29f4362 ("ext4: fast commit recovery path") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822023545.1994557-8-libaokun@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Luis Henriques (SUSE)
|
12dbad5099 |
ext4: fix incorrect tid assumption in __jbd2_log_wait_for_space()
commit 972090651ee15e51abfb2160e986fa050cfc7a40 upstream. Function __jbd2_log_wait_for_space() assumes that '0' is not a valid value for transaction IDs, which is incorrect. Don't assume that and invoke jbd2_log_wait_commit() if the journal had a committing transaction instead. Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques (SUSE) <luis.henriques@linux.dev> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240724161119.13448-3-luis.henriques@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Baokun Li
|
d833f09638 |
ext4: propagate errors from ext4_find_extent() in ext4_insert_range()
commit 369c944ed1d7c3fb7b35f24e4735761153afe7b3 upstream. Even though ext4_find_extent() returns an error, ext4_insert_range() still returns 0. This may confuse the user as to why fallocate returns success, but the contents of the file are not as expected. So propagate the error returned by ext4_find_extent() to avoid inconsistencies. Fixes: 331573febb6a ("ext4: Add support FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE for fallocate") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822023545.1994557-11-libaokun@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Baokun Li
|
36cf824440 |
ext4: fix slab-use-after-free in ext4_split_extent_at()
commit c26ab35702f8cd0cdc78f96aa5856bfb77be798f upstream. We hit the following use-after-free: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_split_extent_at+0xba8/0xcc0 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810548ed08 by task kworker/u20:0/40 CPU: 0 PID: 40 Comm: kworker/u20:0 Not tainted 6.9.0-dirty #724 Call Trace: <TASK> kasan_report+0x93/0xc0 ext4_split_extent_at+0xba8/0xcc0 ext4_split_extent.isra.0+0x18f/0x500 ext4_split_convert_extents+0x275/0x750 ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents+0x73e/0x1580 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xe20/0x2dc0 ext4_map_blocks+0x724/0x1700 ext4_do_writepages+0x12d6/0x2a70 [...] Allocated by task 40: __kmalloc_noprof+0x1ac/0x480 ext4_find_extent+0xf3b/0x1e70 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x188/0x2dc0 ext4_map_blocks+0x724/0x1700 ext4_do_writepages+0x12d6/0x2a70 [...] Freed by task 40: kfree+0xf1/0x2b0 ext4_find_extent+0xa71/0x1e70 ext4_ext_insert_extent+0xa22/0x3260 ext4_split_extent_at+0x3ef/0xcc0 ext4_split_extent.isra.0+0x18f/0x500 ext4_split_convert_extents+0x275/0x750 ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents+0x73e/0x1580 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xe20/0x2dc0 ext4_map_blocks+0x724/0x1700 ext4_do_writepages+0x12d6/0x2a70 [...] ================================================================== The flow of issue triggering is as follows: ext4_split_extent_at path = *ppath ext4_ext_insert_extent(ppath) ext4_ext_create_new_leaf(ppath) ext4_find_extent(orig_path) path = *orig_path read_extent_tree_block // return -ENOMEM or -EIO ext4_free_ext_path(path) kfree(path) *orig_path = NULL a. If err is -ENOMEM: ext4_ext_dirty(path + path->p_depth) // path use-after-free !!! b. If err is -EIO and we have EXT_DEBUG defined: ext4_ext_show_leaf(path) eh = path[depth].p_hdr // path also use-after-free !!! So when trying to zeroout or fix the extent length, call ext4_find_extent() to update the path. In addition we use *ppath directly as an ext4_ext_show_leaf() input to avoid possible use-after-free when EXT_DEBUG is defined, and to avoid unnecessary path updates. Fixes: dfe5080939ea ("ext4: drop EXT4_EX_NOFREE_ON_ERR from rest of extents handling code") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822023545.1994557-4-libaokun@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Edward Adam Davis
|
3e2686893a |
ext4: no need to continue when the number of entries is 1
commit 1a00a393d6a7fb1e745a41edd09019bd6a0ad64c upstream. Fixes: ac27a0ec112a ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3") Reported-by: syzbot+ae688d469e36fb5138d0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ae688d469e36fb5138d0 Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com> Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+ae688d469e36fb5138d0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_BE7AEE6C7C2D216CB8949CE8E6EE7ECC2C0A@qq.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Artem Sadovnikov
|
fe7c357e85 |
ext4: fix i_data_sem unlock order in ext4_ind_migrate()
[ Upstream commit cc749e61c011c255d81b192a822db650c68b313f ] Fuzzing reports a possible deadlock in jbd2_log_wait_commit. This issue is triggered when an EXT4_IOC_MIGRATE ioctl is set to require synchronous updates because the file descriptor is opened with O_SYNC. This can lead to the jbd2_journal_stop() function calling jbd2_might_wait_for_commit(), potentially causing a deadlock if the EXT4_IOC_MIGRATE call races with a write(2) system call. This problem only arises when CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING is enabled. In this case, the jbd2_might_wait_for_commit macro locks jbd2_handle in the jbd2_journal_stop function while i_data_sem is locked. This triggers lockdep because the jbd2_journal_start function might also lock the same jbd2_handle simultaneously. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with syzkaller. Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Mikhail Ukhin <mish.uxin2012@yandex.ru> Signed-off-by: Mikhail Ukhin <mish.uxin2012@yandex.ru> Signed-off-by: Artem Sadovnikov <ancowi69@gmail.com> Rule: add Link: https://lore.kernel.org/stable/20240404095000.5872-1-mish.uxin2012%40yandex.ru Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240829152210.2754-1-ancowi69@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Baokun Li
|
2997f7a995 |
ext4: avoid use-after-free in ext4_ext_show_leaf()
[ Upstream commit 4e2524ba2ca5f54bdbb9e5153bea00421ef653f5 ] In ext4_find_extent(), path may be freed by error or be reallocated, so using a previously saved *ppath may have been freed and thus may trigger use-after-free, as follows: ext4_split_extent path = *ppath; ext4_split_extent_at(ppath) path = ext4_find_extent(ppath) ext4_split_extent_at(ppath) // ext4_find_extent fails to free path // but zeroout succeeds ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path) eh = path[depth].p_hdr // path use-after-free !!! Similar to ext4_split_extent_at(), we use *ppath directly as an input to ext4_ext_show_leaf(). Fix a spelling error by the way. Same problem in ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents(). Since 'path' is only used in ext4_ext_show_leaf(), remove 'path' and use *ppath directly. This issue is triggered only when EXT_DEBUG is defined and therefore does not affect functionality. Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822023545.1994557-5-libaokun@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Zhao Mengmeng
|
2ff373f85e |
jfs: Fix uninit-value access of new_ea in ea_buffer
[ Upstream commit 2b59ffad47db1c46af25ccad157bb3b25147c35c ] syzbot reports that lzo1x_1_do_compress is using uninit-value: ===================================================== BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in lzo1x_1_do_compress+0x19f9/0x2510 lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c:178 ... Uninit was stored to memory at: ea_put fs/jfs/xattr.c:639 [inline] ... Local variable ea_buf created at: __jfs_setxattr+0x5d/0x1ae0 fs/jfs/xattr.c:662 __jfs_xattr_set+0xe6/0x1f0 fs/jfs/xattr.c:934 ===================================================== The reason is ea_buf->new_ea is not initialized properly. Fix this by using memset to empty its content at the beginning in ea_get(). Reported-by: syzbot+02341e0daa42a15ce130@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=02341e0daa42a15ce130 Signed-off-by: Zhao Mengmeng <zhaomengmeng@kylinos.cn> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Edward Adam Davis
|
9fcdffe74e |
jfs: check if leafidx greater than num leaves per dmap tree
[ Upstream commit d64ff0d2306713ff084d4b09f84ed1a8c75ecc32 ] syzbot report a out of bounds in dbSplit, it because dmt_leafidx greater than num leaves per dmap tree, add a checking for dmt_leafidx in dbFindLeaf. Shaggy: Modified sanity check to apply to control pages as well as leaf pages. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+dca05492eff41f604890@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=dca05492eff41f604890 Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Edward Adam Davis
|
6122749c1d |
jfs: Fix uaf in dbFreeBits
[ Upstream commit d6c1b3599b2feb5c7291f5ac3a36e5fa7cedb234 ] [syzbot reported] ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_lock+0xfe/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880229254b0 by task syz-executor357/5216 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5216 Comm: syz-executor357 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00156-gd7a5aa4b3c00 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/27/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 [inline] __mutex_lock+0xfe/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 dbFreeBits+0x7ea/0xd90 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2390 dbFreeDmap fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2089 [inline] dbFree+0x35b/0x680 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:409 dbDiscardAG+0x8a9/0xa20 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:1650 jfs_ioc_trim+0x433/0x670 fs/jfs/jfs_discard.c:100 jfs_ioctl+0x2d0/0x3e0 fs/jfs/ioctl.c:131 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 Freed by task 5218: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579 poison_slab_object+0xe0/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:240 __kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:256 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2252 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4473 [inline] kfree+0x149/0x360 mm/slub.c:4594 dbUnmount+0x11d/0x190 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:278 jfs_mount_rw+0x4ac/0x6a0 fs/jfs/jfs_mount.c:247 jfs_remount+0x3d1/0x6b0 fs/jfs/super.c:454 reconfigure_super+0x445/0x880 fs/super.c:1083 vfs_cmd_reconfigure fs/fsopen.c:263 [inline] vfs_fsconfig_locked fs/fsopen.c:292 [inline] __do_sys_fsconfig fs/fsopen.c:473 [inline] __se_sys_fsconfig+0xb6e/0xf80 fs/fsopen.c:345 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [Analysis] There are two paths (dbUnmount and jfs_ioc_trim) that generate race condition when accessing bmap, which leads to the occurrence of uaf. Use the lock s_umount to synchronize them, in order to avoid uaf caused by race condition. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+3c010e21296f33a5dc16@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Remington Brasga
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41aeda6a14 |
jfs: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in dbFindBits
[ Upstream commit b0b2fc815e514221f01384f39fbfbff65d897e1c ] Fix issue with UBSAN throwing shift-out-of-bounds warning. Reported-by: syzbot+e38d703eeb410b17b473@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Remington Brasga <rbrasga@uci.edu> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Adrian Ratiu
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72291ae00f |
proc: add config & param to block forcing mem writes
[ Upstream commit 41e8149c8892ed1962bd15350b3c3e6e90cba7f4 ] This adds a Kconfig option and boot param to allow removing the FOLL_FORCE flag from /proc/pid/mem write calls because it can be abused. The traditional forcing behavior is kept as default because it can break GDB and some other use cases. Previously we tried a more sophisticated approach allowing distributions to fine-tune /proc/pid/mem behavior, however that got NAK-ed by Linus [1], who prefers this simpler approach with semantics also easier to understand for users. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wiGWLChxYmUA5HrT5aopZrB7_2VTa0NLZcxORgkUe5tEQ@mail.gmail.com/ [1] Cc: Doug Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@collabora.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240802080225.89408-1-adrian.ratiu@collabora.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Jann Horn
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3877a33618 |
f2fs: Require FMODE_WRITE for atomic write ioctls
commit 4f5a100f87f32cb65d4bb1ad282a08c92f6f591e upstream. The F2FS ioctls for starting and committing atomic writes check for inode_owner_or_capable(), but this does not give LSMs like SELinux or Landlock an opportunity to deny the write access - if the caller's FSUID matches the inode's UID, inode_owner_or_capable() immediately returns true. There are scenarios where LSMs want to deny a process the ability to write particular files, even files that the FSUID of the process owns; but this can currently partially be bypassed using atomic write ioctls in two ways: - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_REPLACE + F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE can truncate an inode to size 0 - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE + F2FS_IOC_ABORT_ATOMIC_WRITE can revert changes another process concurrently made to a file Fix it by requiring FMODE_WRITE for these operations, just like for F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE. Since any legitimate caller should only be using these ioctls when intending to write into the file, that seems unlikely to break anything. Fixes: 88b88a667971 ("f2fs: support atomic writes") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Xiubo Li
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0c92def6af |
ceph: remove the incorrect Fw reference check when dirtying pages
[ Upstream commit c08dfb1b49492c09cf13838c71897493ea3b424e ] When doing the direct-io reads it will also try to mark pages dirty, but for the read path it won't hold the Fw caps and there is case will it get the Fw reference. Fixes: 5dda377cf0a6 ("ceph: set i_head_snapc when getting CEPH_CAP_FILE_WR reference") Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Patrick Donnelly <pdonnell@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Li Lingfeng
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33d69e565e |
nfs: fix memory leak in error path of nfs4_do_reclaim
commit 8f6a7c9467eaf39da4c14e5474e46190ab3fb529 upstream. Commit c77e22834ae9 ("NFSv4: Fix a potential sleep while atomic in nfs4_do_reclaim()") separate out the freeing of the state owners from nfs4_purge_state_owners() and finish it outside the rcu lock. However, the error path is omitted. As a result, the state owners in "freeme" will not be released. Fix it by adding freeing in the error path. Fixes: c77e22834ae9 ("NFSv4: Fix a potential sleep while atomic in nfs4_do_reclaim()") Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.3+ Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Mickaël Salaün
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33a22518e4 |
fs: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies
commit 26f204380a3c182e5adf1a798db0724d6111b597 upstream. The fcntl's F_SETOWN command sets the process that handle SIGIO/SIGURG for the related file descriptor. Before this change, the file_set_fowner LSM hook was always called, ignoring the VFS logic which may not actually change the process that handles SIGIO (e.g. TUN, TTY, dnotify), nor update the related UID/EUID. Moreover, because security_file_set_fowner() was called without lock (e.g. f_owner.lock), concurrent F_SETOWN commands could result to a race condition and inconsistent LSM states (e.g. SELinux's fown_sid) compared to struct fown_struct's UID/EUID. This change makes sure the LSM states are always in sync with the VFS state by moving the security_file_set_fowner() call close to the UID/EUID updates and using the same f_owner.lock . Rename f_modown() to __f_setown() to simplify code. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Julian Sun
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3b9c45c479 |
vfs: fix race between evice_inodes() and find_inode()&iput()
commit 88b1afbf0f6b221f6c5bb66cc80cd3b38d696687 upstream. Hi, all Recently I noticed a bug[1] in btrfs, after digged it into and I believe it'a race in vfs. Let's assume there's a inode (ie ino 261) with i_count 1 is called by iput(), and there's a concurrent thread calling generic_shutdown_super(). cpu0: cpu1: iput() // i_count is 1 ->spin_lock(inode) ->dec i_count to 0 ->iput_final() generic_shutdown_super() ->__inode_add_lru() ->evict_inodes() // cause some reason[2] ->if (atomic_read(inode->i_count)) continue; // return before // inode 261 passed the above check // list_lru_add_obj() // and then schedule out ->spin_unlock() // note here: the inode 261 // was still at sb list and hash list, // and I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE was not been set btrfs_iget() // after some function calls ->find_inode() // found the above inode 261 ->spin_lock(inode) // check I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE // and passed ->__iget() ->spin_unlock(inode) // schedule back ->spin_lock(inode) // check (I_NEW|I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE) flags, // passed and set I_FREEING iput() ->spin_unlock(inode) ->spin_lock(inode) ->evict() // dec i_count to 0 ->iput_final() ->spin_unlock() ->evict() Now, we have two threads simultaneously evicting the same inode, which may trigger the BUG(inode->i_state & I_CLEAR) statement both within clear_inode() and iput(). To fix the bug, recheck the inode->i_count after holding i_lock. Because in the most scenarios, the first check is valid, and the overhead of spin_lock() can be reduced. If there is any misunderstanding, please let me know, thanks. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000eabe1d0619c48986@google.com/ [2]: The reason might be 1. SB_ACTIVE was removed or 2. mapping_shrinkable() return false when I reproduced the bug. Reported-by: syzbot+67ba3c42bcbb4665d3ad@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=67ba3c42bcbb4665d3ad CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 63997e98a3be ("split invalidate_inodes()") Signed-off-by: Julian Sun <sunjunchao2870@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240823130730.658881-1-sunjunchao2870@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Nikita Zhandarovich
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331eb7909d |
f2fs: avoid potential int overflow in sanity_check_area_boundary()
commit 50438dbc483ca6a133d2bce9d5d6747bcee38371 upstream. While calculating the end addresses of main area and segment 0, u32 may be not enough to hold the result without the danger of int overflow. Just in case, play it safe and cast one of the operands to a wider type (u64). Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with static analysis tool SVACE. Fixes: fd694733d523 ("f2fs: cover large section in sanity check of super") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Nikita Zhandarovich
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67b4e793e4 |
f2fs: prevent possible int overflow in dir_block_index()
commit 47f268f33dff4a5e31541a990dc09f116f80e61c upstream. The result of multiplication between values derived from functions dir_buckets() and bucket_blocks() *could* technically reach 2^30 * 2^2 = 2^32. While unlikely to happen, it is prudent to ensure that it will not lead to integer overflow. Thus, use mul_u32_u32() as it's more appropriate to mitigate the issue. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with static analysis tool SVACE. Fixes: 3843154598a0 ("f2fs: introduce large directory support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Chao Yu
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7aff4e5b85 |
f2fs: remove unneeded check condition in __f2fs_setxattr()
[ Upstream commit bc3994ffa4cf23f55171943c713366132c3ff45d ] It has checked return value of write_all_xattrs(), remove unneeded following check condition. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Stable-dep-of: aaf8c0b9ae04 ("f2fs: reduce expensive checkpoint trigger frequency") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |