Commit graph

59 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Eric Dumazet
a687d1d501 net: do not delay dst_entries_add() in dst_release()
commit ac888d58869bb99753e7652be19a151df9ecb35d upstream.

dst_entries_add() uses per-cpu data that might be freed at netns
dismantle from ip6_route_net_exit() calling dst_entries_destroy()

Before ip6_route_net_exit() can be called, we release all
the dsts associated with this netns, via calls to dst_release(),
which waits an rcu grace period before calling dst_destroy()

dst_entries_add() use in dst_destroy() is racy, because
dst_entries_destroy() could have been called already.

Decrementing the number of dsts must happen sooner.

Notes:

1) in CONFIG_XFRM case, dst_destroy() can call
   dst_release_immediate(child), this might also cause UAF
   if the child does not have DST_NOCOUNT set.
   IPSEC maintainers might take a look and see how to address this.

2) There is also discussion about removing this count of dst,
   which might happen in future kernels.

Fixes: f88649721268 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CANn89iLCCGsP7SFn9HKpvnKu96Td4KD08xf7aGtiYgZnkjaL=w@mail.gmail.com/T/
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241008143110.1064899-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
[ resolved conflict due to bc9d3a9f2afc ("net: dst: Switch to rcuref_t
  reference counting") is not in the tree ]
Signed-off-by: Abdelkareem Abdelsaamad <kareemem@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-11-30 02:33:26 +01:00
madaidan
6527a24e6f Make more sysctl constants read-only 2024-11-30 02:15:48 +01:00
Ksawlii
403fa37a8b Revert "net: linkwatch: use system_unbound_wq"
This reverts commit 511ce8b5bf.
2024-11-24 00:23:55 +01:00
Ksawlii
92b9ce75e1 Revert "ethtool: check device is present when getting link settings"
This reverts commit ef4f72282f.
2024-11-24 00:23:49 +01:00
Ksawlii
efd33de913 Revert "inet: inet_defrag: prevent sk release while still in use"
This reverts commit d2e0105e54.
2024-11-24 00:23:32 +01:00
Ksawlii
b7f3288f98 Revert "sock_map: Add a cond_resched() in sock_hash_free()"
This reverts commit 566ecb4ff1.
2024-11-24 00:23:30 +01:00
Ksawlii
839e4817e0 Revert "net: avoid potential underflow in qdisc_pkt_len_init() with UFO"
This reverts commit 43c718d118.
2024-11-24 00:23:12 +01:00
Ksawlii
26d0ee6612 Revert "net: add more sanity checks to qdisc_pkt_len_init()"
This reverts commit db458c02bc.
2024-11-24 00:23:12 +01:00
Benoît Monin
4454492a69 net: skip offload for NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM if ipv6 header contains extension
[ Upstream commit 04c20a9356f283da623903e81e7c6d5df7e4dc3c ]

As documented in skbuff.h, devices with NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM capability
can only checksum TCP and UDP over IPv6 if the IP header does not
contains extension.

This is enforced for UDP packets emitted from user-space to an IPv6
address as they go through ip6_make_skb(), which calls
__ip6_append_data() where a check is done on the header size before
setting CHECKSUM_PARTIAL.

But the introduction of UDP encapsulation with fou6 added a code-path
where it is possible to get an skb with a partial UDP checksum and an
IPv6 header with extension:
* fou6 adds a UDP header with a partial checksum if the inner packet
does not contains a valid checksum.
* ip6_tunnel adds an IPv6 header with a destination option extension
header if encap_limit is non-zero (the default value is 4).

The thread linked below describes in more details how to reproduce the
problem with GRE-in-UDP tunnel.

Add a check on the network header size in skb_csum_hwoffload_help() to
make sure no IPv6 packet with extension header is handed to a network
device with NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM capability.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/26548921.1r3eYUQgxm@benoit.monin/T/#u
Fixes: aa3463d65e7b ("fou: Add encap ops for IPv6 tunnels")
Signed-off-by: Benoît Monin <benoit.monin@gmx.fr>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/5fbeecfc311ea182aa1d1c771725ab8b4cac515e.1729778144.git.benoit.monin@gmx.fr
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-23 23:22:04 +01:00
Xin Long
6b64885b30 net: support ip generic csum processing in skb_csum_hwoffload_help
[ Upstream commit 62fafcd63139920eb25b3fbf154177ce3e6f3232 ]

NETIF_F_IP|IPV6_CSUM feature flag indicates UDP and TCP csum offload
while NETIF_F_HW_CSUM feature flag indicates ip generic csum offload
for HW, which includes not only for TCP/UDP csum, but also for other
protocols' csum like GRE's.

However, in skb_csum_hwoffload_help() it only checks features against
NETIF_F_CSUM_MASK(NETIF_F_HW|IP|IPV6_CSUM). So if it's a non TCP/UDP
packet and the features doesn't support NETIF_F_HW_CSUM, but supports
NETIF_F_IP|IPV6_CSUM only, it would still return 0 and leave the HW
to do csum.

This patch is to support ip generic csum processing by checking
NETIF_F_HW_CSUM for all protocols, and check (NETIF_F_IP_CSUM |
NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM) only for TCP and UDP.

Note that we're using skb->csum_offset to check if it's a TCP/UDP
proctol, this might be fragile. However, as Alex said, for now we
only have a few L4 protocols that are requesting Tx csum offload,
we'd better fix this until a new protocol comes with a same csum
offset.

v1->v2:
  - not extend skb->csum_not_inet, but use skb->csum_offset to tell
    if it's an UDP/TCP csum packet.
v2->v3:
  - add a note in the changelog, as Willem suggested.

Suggested-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.duyck@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 04c20a9356f2 ("net: skip offload for NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM if ipv6 header contains extension")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-23 23:22:03 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
db458c02bc net: add more sanity checks to qdisc_pkt_len_init()
[ Upstream commit ab9a9a9e9647392a19e7a885b08000e89c86b535 ]

One path takes care of SKB_GSO_DODGY, assuming
skb->len is bigger than hdr_len.

virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() does not fully dissect TCP headers,
it only make sure it is at least 20 bytes.

It is possible for an user to provide a malicious 'GSO' packet,
total length of 80 bytes.

- 20 bytes of IPv4 header
- 60 bytes TCP header
- a small gso_size like 8

virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() would declare this packet as a normal
GSO packet, because it would see 40 bytes of payload,
bigger than gso_size.

We need to make detect this case to not underflow
qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len.

Fixes: 1def9238d4aa ("net_sched: more precise pkt_len computation")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-23 23:21:35 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
43c718d118 net: avoid potential underflow in qdisc_pkt_len_init() with UFO
[ Upstream commit c20029db28399ecc50e556964eaba75c43b1e2f1 ]

After commit 7c6d2ecbda83 ("net: be more gentle about silly gso
requests coming from user") virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() had sanity check
to detect malicious attempts from user space to cook a bad GSO packet.

Then commit cf9acc90c80ec ("net: virtio_net_hdr_to_skb: count
transport header in UFO") while fixing one issue, allowed user space
to cook a GSO packet with the following characteristic :

IPv4 SKB_GSO_UDP, gso_size=3, skb->len = 28.

When this packet arrives in qdisc_pkt_len_init(), we end up
with hdr_len = 28 (IPv4 header + UDP header), matching skb->len

Then the following sets gso_segs to 0 :

gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len - hdr_len,
                        shinfo->gso_size);

Then later we set qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len to back to zero :/

qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len += (gso_segs - 1) * hdr_len;

This leads to the following crash in fq_codel [1]

qdisc_pkt_len_init() is best effort, we only want an estimation
of the bytes sent on the wire, not crashing the kernel.

This patch is fixing this particular issue, a following one
adds more sanity checks for another potential bug.

[1]
[   70.724101] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[   70.724561] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[   70.724561] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[   70.724561] PGD 10ac61067 P4D 10ac61067 PUD 107ee2067 PMD 0
[   70.724561] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[   70.724561] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 2163 Comm: b358537762 Not tainted 6.11.0-virtme #991
[   70.724561] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   70.724561] RIP: 0010:fq_codel_enqueue (net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:120 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:168 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:230) sch_fq_codel
[ 70.724561] Code: 24 08 49 c1 e1 06 44 89 7c 24 18 45 31 ed 45 31 c0 31 ff 89 44 24 14 4c 03 8b 90 01 00 00 eb 04 39 ca 73 37 4d 8b 39 83 c7 01 <49> 8b 17 49 89 11 41 8b 57 28 45 8b 5f 34 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 49
All code
========
   0:	24 08                	and    $0x8,%al
   2:	49 c1 e1 06          	shl    $0x6,%r9
   6:	44 89 7c 24 18       	mov    %r15d,0x18(%rsp)
   b:	45 31 ed             	xor    %r13d,%r13d
   e:	45 31 c0             	xor    %r8d,%r8d
  11:	31 ff                	xor    %edi,%edi
  13:	89 44 24 14          	mov    %eax,0x14(%rsp)
  17:	4c 03 8b 90 01 00 00 	add    0x190(%rbx),%r9
  1e:	eb 04                	jmp    0x24
  20:	39 ca                	cmp    %ecx,%edx
  22:	73 37                	jae    0x5b
  24:	4d 8b 39             	mov    (%r9),%r15
  27:	83 c7 01             	add    $0x1,%edi
  2a:*	49 8b 17             	mov    (%r15),%rdx		<-- trapping instruction
  2d:	49 89 11             	mov    %rdx,(%r9)
  30:	41 8b 57 28          	mov    0x28(%r15),%edx
  34:	45 8b 5f 34          	mov    0x34(%r15),%r11d
  38:	49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 	movq   $0x0,(%r15)
  3f:	49                   	rex.WB

Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================
   0:	49 8b 17             	mov    (%r15),%rdx
   3:	49 89 11             	mov    %rdx,(%r9)
   6:	41 8b 57 28          	mov    0x28(%r15),%edx
   a:	45 8b 5f 34          	mov    0x34(%r15),%r11d
   e:	49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 	movq   $0x0,(%r15)
  15:	49                   	rex.WB
[   70.724561] RSP: 0018:ffff95ae85e6fb90 EFLAGS: 00000202
[   70.724561] RAX: 0000000002000000 RBX: ffff95ae841de000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   70.724561] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001
[   70.724561] RBP: ffff95ae85e6fbf8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff95b710a30000
[   70.724561] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: bdf289445ce31881 R12: ffff95ae85e6fc58
[   70.724561] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000040 R15: 0000000000000000
[   70.724561] FS:  000000002c5c1380(0000) GS:ffff95bd7fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   70.724561] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   70.724561] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010c568000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[   70.724561] Call Trace:
[   70.724561]  <TASK>
[   70.724561] ? __die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:421 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434)
[   70.724561] ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:715)
[   70.724561] ? exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:26 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:87 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:147 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1489 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1539)
[   70.724561] ? asm_exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:623)
[   70.724561] ? fq_codel_enqueue (net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:120 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:168 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:230) sch_fq_codel
[   70.724561] dev_qdisc_enqueue (net/core/dev.c:3784)
[   70.724561] __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:3880 (discriminator 2) net/core/dev.c:4390 (discriminator 2))
[   70.724561] ? irqentry_enter (kernel/entry/common.c:237)
[   70.724561] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/hardirq.h:74 (discriminator 2) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 (discriminator 2) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 (discriminator 2))
[   70.724561] ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:58 (discriminator 4))
[   70.724561] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702)
[   70.724561] ? virtio_net_hdr_to_skb.constprop.0 (./include/linux/virtio_net.h:129 (discriminator 1))
[   70.724561] packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3145 (discriminator 1) net/packet/af_packet.c:3177 (discriminator 1))
[   70.724561] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:107 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2170 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1302 (discriminator 4) ./include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:111 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/spinlock.h:187 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:127 (discriminator 4) kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 (discriminator 4))
[   70.724561] ? netdev_name_node_lookup_rcu (net/core/dev.c:325 (discriminator 1))
[   70.724561] __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:730 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:745 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2210 (discriminator 1))
[   70.724561] ? __sys_setsockopt (./include/linux/file.h:34 net/socket.c:2355)
[   70.724561] __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2222 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2218 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2218 (discriminator 1))
[   70.724561] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 (discriminator 1))
[   70.724561] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
[   70.724561] RIP: 0033:0x41ae09

Fixes: cf9acc90c80ec ("net: virtio_net_hdr_to_skb: count transport header in UFO")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@nutanix.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@nutanix.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-23 23:21:35 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
566ecb4ff1 sock_map: Add a cond_resched() in sock_hash_free()
[ Upstream commit b1339be951ad31947ae19bc25cb08769bf255100 ]

Several syzbot soft lockup reports all have in common sock_hash_free()

If a map with a large number of buckets is destroyed, we need to yield
the cpu when needed.

Fixes: 75e68e5bf2c7 ("bpf, sockhash: Synchronize delete from bucket list on map free")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240906154449.3742932-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-23 23:21:18 +01:00
Florian Westphal
d2e0105e54 inet: inet_defrag: prevent sk release while still in use
commit 18685451fc4e546fc0e718580d32df3c0e5c8272 upstream.

ip_local_out() and other functions can pass skb->sk as function argument.

If the skb is a fragment and reassembly happens before such function call
returns, the sk must not be released.

This affects skb fragments reassembled via netfilter or similar
modules, e.g. openvswitch or ct_act.c, when run as part of tx pipeline.

Eric Dumazet made an initial analysis of this bug.  Quoting Eric:
  Calling ip_defrag() in output path is also implying skb_orphan(),
  which is buggy because output path relies on sk not disappearing.

  A relevant old patch about the issue was :
  8282f27449bf ("inet: frag: Always orphan skbs inside ip_defrag()")

  [..]

  net/ipv4/ip_output.c depends on skb->sk being set, and probably to an
  inet socket, not an arbitrary one.

  If we orphan the packet in ipvlan, then downstream things like FQ
  packet scheduler will not work properly.

  We need to change ip_defrag() to only use skb_orphan() when really
  needed, ie whenever frag_list is going to be used.

Eric suggested to stash sk in fragment queue and made an initial patch.
However there is a problem with this:

If skb is refragmented again right after, ip_do_fragment() will copy
head->sk to the new fragments, and sets up destructor to sock_wfree.
IOW, we have no choice but to fix up sk_wmem accouting to reflect the
fully reassembled skb, else wmem will underflow.

This change moves the orphan down into the core, to last possible moment.
As ip_defrag_offset is aliased with sk_buff->sk member, we must move the
offset into the FRAG_CB, else skb->sk gets clobbered.

This allows to delay the orphaning long enough to learn if the skb has
to be queued or if the skb is completing the reasm queue.

In the former case, things work as before, skb is orphaned.  This is
safe because skb gets queued/stolen and won't continue past reasm engine.

In the latter case, we will steal the skb->sk reference, reattach it to
the head skb, and fix up wmem accouting when inet_frag inflates truesize.

Fixes: 7026b1ddb6b8 ("netfilter: Pass socket pointer down through okfn().")
Diagnosed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com>
Reported-by: yue sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+e5167d7144a62715044c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326101845.30836-1-fw@strlen.de
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mirzamohammadi <saeed.mirzamohammadi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-11-23 23:21:16 +01:00
Connor O'Brien
f1c11f7790 bpf, cgroups: Fix cgroup v2 fallback on v1/v2 mixed mode
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

commit 8520e224f547cd070c7c8f97b1fc6d58cff7ccaa upstream.

Fix cgroup v1 interference when non-root cgroup v2 BPF programs are used.
Back in the days, commit bd1060a1d671 ("sock, cgroup: add sock->sk_cgroup")
embedded per-socket cgroup information into sock->sk_cgrp_data and in order
to save 8 bytes in struct sock made both mutually exclusive, that is, when
cgroup v1 socket tagging (e.g. net_cls/net_prio) is used, then cgroup v2
falls back to the root cgroup in sock_cgroup_ptr() (&cgrp_dfl_root.cgrp).

The assumption made was "there is no reason to mix the two and this is in line
with how legacy and v2 compatibility is handled" as stated in bd1060a1d671.
However, with Kubernetes more widely supporting cgroups v2 as well nowadays,
this assumption no longer holds, and the possibility of the v1/v2 mixed mode
with the v2 root fallback being hit becomes a real security issue.

Many of the cgroup v2 BPF programs are also used for policy enforcement, just
to pick _one_ example, that is, to programmatically deny socket related system
calls like connect(2) or bind(2). A v2 root fallback would implicitly cause
a policy bypass for the affected Pods.

In production environments, we have recently seen this case due to various
circumstances: i) a different 3rd party agent and/or ii) a container runtime
such as [0] in the user's environment configuring legacy cgroup v1 net_cls
tags, which triggered implicitly mentioned root fallback. Another case is
Kubernetes projects like kind [1] which create Kubernetes nodes in a container
and also add cgroup namespaces to the mix, meaning programs which are attached
to the cgroup v2 root of the cgroup namespace get attached to a non-root
cgroup v2 path from init namespace point of view. And the latter's root is
out of reach for agents on a kind Kubernetes node to configure. Meaning, any
entity on the node setting cgroup v1 net_cls tag will trigger the bypass
despite cgroup v2 BPF programs attached to the namespace root.

Generally, this mutual exclusiveness does not hold anymore in today's user
environments and makes cgroup v2 usage from BPF side fragile and unreliable.
This fix adds proper struct cgroup pointer for the cgroup v2 case to struct
sock_cgroup_data in order to address these issues; this implicitly also fixes
the tradeoffs being made back then with regards to races and refcount leaks
as stated in bd1060a1d671, and removes the fallback, so that cgroup v2 BPF
programs always operate as expected.

  [0] https://github.com/nestybox/sysbox/
  [1] https://kind.sigs.k8s.io/

Fixes: bd1060a1d671 ("sock, cgroup: add sock->sk_cgroup")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210913230759.2313-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
[resolve trivial conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <connor.obrien@crowdstrike.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-11-23 23:20:59 +01:00
Jamie Bainbridge
ef4f72282f ethtool: check device is present when getting link settings
[ Upstream commit a699781c79ecf6cfe67fb00a0331b4088c7c8466 ]

A sysfs reader can race with a device reset or removal, attempting to
read device state when the device is not actually present. eg:

     [exception RIP: qed_get_current_link+17]
  #8 [ffffb9e4f2907c48] qede_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc07a994a [qede]
  #9 [ffffb9e4f2907cd8] __rh_call_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b01a3
 #10 [ffffb9e4f2907d38] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b04e4
 #11 [ffffb9e4f2907d90] duplex_show at ffffffff99260300
 #12 [ffffb9e4f2907e38] dev_attr_show at ffffffff9905a01c
 #13 [ffffb9e4f2907e50] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff98e0145b
 #14 [ffffb9e4f2907e68] seq_read at ffffffff98d902e3
 #15 [ffffb9e4f2907ec8] vfs_read at ffffffff98d657d1
 #16 [ffffb9e4f2907f00] ksys_read at ffffffff98d65c3f
 #17 [ffffb9e4f2907f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff98a052fb

 crash> struct net_device.state ffff9a9d21336000
    state = 5,

state 5 is __LINK_STATE_START (0b1) and __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER (0b100).
The device is not present, note lack of __LINK_STATE_PRESENT (0b10).

This is the same sort of panic as observed in commit 4224cfd7fb65
("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show").

There are many other callers of __ethtool_get_link_ksettings() which
don't have a device presence check.

Move this check into ethtool to protect all callers.

Fixes: d519e17e2d01 ("net: export device speed and duplex via sysfs")
Fixes: 4224cfd7fb65 ("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show")
Signed-off-by: Jamie Bainbridge <jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8bae218864beaa44ed01628140475b9bf641c5b0.1724393671.git.jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-23 23:20:55 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
511ce8b5bf net: linkwatch: use system_unbound_wq
[ Upstream commit 3e7917c0cdad835a5121520fc5686d954b7a61ab ]

linkwatch_event() grabs possibly very contended RTNL mutex.

system_wq is not suitable for such work.

Inspired by many noisy syzbot reports.

3 locks held by kworker/0:7/5266:
 #0: ffff888015480948 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3206 [inline]
 #0: ffff888015480948 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x90a/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3312
 #1: ffffc90003f6fd00 ((linkwatch_work).work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3207 [inline]
 , at: process_scheduled_works+0x945/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3312
 #2: ffffffff8fa6f208 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: linkwatch_event+0xe/0x60 net/core/link_watch.c:276

Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240805085821.1616528-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-23 23:20:22 +01:00
Fred Li
4e1a409742 bpf: Fix a segment issue when downgrading gso_size
[ Upstream commit fa5ef655615a01533035c6139248c5b33aa27028 ]

Linearize the skb when downgrading gso_size because it may trigger a
BUG_ON() later when the skb is segmented as described in [1,2].

Fixes: 2be7e212d5419 ("bpf: add bpf_skb_adjust_room helper")
Signed-off-by: Fred Li <dracodingfly@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240626065555.35460-2-dracodingfly@gmail.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/668d5cf1ec330_1c18c32947@willemb.c.googlers.com.notmuch [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240719024653.77006-1-dracodingfly@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-23 23:20:17 +01:00
Taehee Yoo
b8529bdf8a xdp: fix invalid wait context of page_pool_destroy()
[ Upstream commit 59a931c5b732ca5fc2ca727f5a72aeabaafa85ec ]

If the driver uses a page pool, it creates a page pool with
page_pool_create().
The reference count of page pool is 1 as default.
A page pool will be destroyed only when a reference count reaches 0.
page_pool_destroy() is used to destroy page pool, it decreases a
reference count.
When a page pool is destroyed, ->disconnect() is called, which is
mem_allocator_disconnect().
This function internally acquires mutex_lock().

If the driver uses XDP, it registers a memory model with
xdp_rxq_info_reg_mem_model().
The xdp_rxq_info_reg_mem_model() internally increases a page pool
reference count if a memory model is a page pool.
Now the reference count is 2.

To destroy a page pool, the driver should call both page_pool_destroy()
and xdp_unreg_mem_model().
The xdp_unreg_mem_model() internally calls page_pool_destroy().
Only page_pool_destroy() decreases a reference count.

If a driver calls page_pool_destroy() then xdp_unreg_mem_model(), we
will face an invalid wait context warning.
Because xdp_unreg_mem_model() calls page_pool_destroy() with
rcu_read_lock().
The page_pool_destroy() internally acquires mutex_lock().

Splat looks like:
=============================
[ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
6.10.0-rc6+ #4 Tainted: G W
-----------------------------
ethtool/1806 is trying to lock:
ffffffff90387b90 (mem_id_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: mem_allocator_disconnect+0x73/0x150
other info that might help us debug this:
context-{5:5}
3 locks held by ethtool/1806:
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 1806 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc6+ #4 f916f41f172891c800f2fed
Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0
__lock_acquire+0x1681/0x4de0
? _printk+0x64/0xe0
? __pfx_mark_lock.part.0+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
lock_acquire+0x1b3/0x580
? mem_allocator_disconnect+0x73/0x150
? __wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x16/0xc0
? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
? dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xc0
__mutex_lock+0x15c/0x1690
? mem_allocator_disconnect+0x73/0x150
? __pfx_prb_read_valid+0x10/0x10
? mem_allocator_disconnect+0x73/0x150
? __pfx_llist_add_batch+0x10/0x10
? console_unlock+0x193/0x1b0
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xbe/0x140
? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
? tick_nohz_tick_stopped+0x16/0x90
? __irq_work_queue_local+0x1e5/0x330
? irq_work_queue+0x39/0x50
? __wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x79/0xc0
? mem_allocator_disconnect+0x73/0x150
mem_allocator_disconnect+0x73/0x150
? __pfx_mem_allocator_disconnect+0x10/0x10
? mark_held_locks+0xa5/0xf0
? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
page_pool_release+0x36e/0x6d0
page_pool_destroy+0xd7/0x440
xdp_unreg_mem_model+0x1a7/0x2a0
? __pfx_xdp_unreg_mem_model+0x10/0x10
? kfree+0x125/0x370
? bnxt_free_ring.isra.0+0x2eb/0x500
? bnxt_free_mem+0x5ac/0x2500
xdp_rxq_info_unreg+0x4a/0xd0
bnxt_free_mem+0x1356/0x2500
bnxt_close_nic+0xf0/0x3b0
? __pfx_bnxt_close_nic+0x10/0x10
? ethnl_parse_bit+0x2c6/0x6d0
? __pfx___nla_validate_parse+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_ethnl_parse_bit+0x10/0x10
bnxt_set_features+0x2a8/0x3e0
__netdev_update_features+0x4dc/0x1370
? ethnl_parse_bitset+0x4ff/0x750
? __pfx_ethnl_parse_bitset+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___netdev_update_features+0x10/0x10
? mark_held_locks+0xa5/0xf0
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x42/0x70
? __pm_runtime_resume+0x7d/0x110
ethnl_set_features+0x32d/0xa20

To fix this problem, it uses rhashtable_lookup_fast() instead of
rhashtable_lookup() with rcu_read_lock().
Using xa without rcu_read_lock() here is safe.
xa is freed by __xdp_mem_allocator_rcu_free() and this is called by
call_rcu() of mem_xa_remove().
The mem_xa_remove() is called by page_pool_destroy() if a reference
count reaches 0.
The xa is already protected by the reference count mechanism well in the
control plane.
So removing rcu_read_lock() for page_pool_destroy() is safe.

Fixes: c3f812cea0d7 ("page_pool: do not release pool until inflight == 0.")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240712095116.3801586-1-ap420073@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-23 23:20:08 +01:00
Wang Yufen
faa5a4f2be bpf, sockmap: Fix sk->sk_forward_alloc warn_on in sk_stream_kill_queues
commit d8616ee2affcff37c5d315310da557a694a3303d upstream.

During TCP sockmap redirect pressure test, the following warning is triggered:

WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2145 at net/core/stream.c:205 sk_stream_kill_queues+0xbc/0xd0
CPU: 3 PID: 2145 Comm: iperf Kdump: loaded Tainted: G        W         5.10.0+ #9
Call Trace:
 inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x55/0x110
 inet_csk_listen_stop+0xbb/0x380
 tcp_close+0x41b/0x480
 inet_release+0x42/0x80
 __sock_release+0x3d/0xa0
 sock_close+0x11/0x20
 __fput+0x9d/0x240
 task_work_run+0x62/0x90
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x110/0x120
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x190
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The reason we observed is that:

When the listener is closing, a connection may have completed the three-way
handshake but not accepted, and the client has sent some packets. The child
sks in accept queue release by inet_child_forget()->inet_csk_destroy_sock(),
but psocks of child sks have not released.

To fix, add sock_map_destroy to release psocks.

Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220524075311.649153-1-wangyufen@huawei.com
[ Conflict in include/linux/bpf.h due to function declaration position
  and remove non-existed sk_psock_stop helper from sock_map_destroy.  ]
Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-11-19 14:19:42 +01:00
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
1dc4514cd5 xdp: xdp_mem_allocator can be NULL in trace_mem_connect().
commit e0ae713023a9d09d6e1b454bdc8e8c1dd32c586e upstream.

Since the commit mentioned below __xdp_reg_mem_model() can return a NULL
pointer. This pointer is dereferenced in trace_mem_connect() which leads
to segfault.

The trace points (mem_connect + mem_disconnect) were put in place to
pair connect/disconnect using the IDs. The ID is only assigned if
__xdp_reg_mem_model() does not return NULL. That connect trace point is
of no use if there is no ID.

Skip that connect trace point if xdp_alloc is NULL.

[ Toke Høiland-Jørgensen delivered the reasoning for skipping the trace
  point ]

Fixes: 4a48ef70b93b8 ("xdp: Allow registering memory model without rxq reference")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YikmmXsffE+QajTB@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-11-19 14:19:39 +01:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
801214fc3c ipv6: Fix data races around sk->sk_prot.
commit 364f997b5cfe1db0d63a390fe7c801fa2b3115f6 upstream.

Commit 086d49058cd8 ("ipv6: annotate some data-races around sk->sk_prot")
fixed some data-races around sk->sk_prot but it was not enough.

Some functions in inet6_(stream|dgram)_ops still access sk->sk_prot
without lock_sock() or rtnl_lock(), so they need READ_ONCE() to avoid
load tearing.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kazunori Kobayashi <kazunori.kobayashi@miraclelinux.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-11-19 14:19:35 +01:00
Anton Protopopov
5076e3b751 bpf: Add a check for struct bpf_fib_lookup size
[ Upstream commit 59b418c7063d30e0a3e1f592d47df096db83185c ]

The struct bpf_fib_lookup should not grow outside of its 64 bytes.
Add a static assert to validate this.

Suggested-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <aspsk@isovalent.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240326101742.17421-4-aspsk@isovalent.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-19 14:19:32 +01:00
Daniil Dulov
5c96e80a6e xdp: Remove WARN() from __xdp_reg_mem_model()
[ Upstream commit 7e9f79428372c6eab92271390851be34ab26bfb4 ]

syzkaller reports a warning in __xdp_reg_mem_model().

The warning occurs only if __mem_id_init_hash_table() returns an error. It
returns the error in two cases:

  1. memory allocation fails;
  2. rhashtable_init() fails when some fields of rhashtable_params
     struct are not initialized properly.

The second case cannot happen since there is a static const rhashtable_params
struct with valid fields. So, warning is only triggered when there is a
problem with memory allocation.

Thus, there is no sense in using WARN() to handle this error and it can be
safely removed.

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5065 at net/core/xdp.c:299 __xdp_reg_mem_model+0x2d9/0x650 net/core/xdp.c:299

CPU: 0 PID: 5065 Comm: syz-executor883 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-05271-gf99c5f563c17 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
RIP: 0010:__xdp_reg_mem_model+0x2d9/0x650 net/core/xdp.c:299

Call Trace:
 xdp_reg_mem_model+0x22/0x40 net/core/xdp.c:344
 xdp_test_run_setup net/bpf/test_run.c:188 [inline]
 bpf_test_run_xdp_live+0x365/0x1e90 net/bpf/test_run.c:377
 bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x813/0x11b0 net/bpf/test_run.c:1267
 bpf_prog_test_run+0x33a/0x3b0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4240
 __sys_bpf+0x48d/0x810 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5649
 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5738 [inline]
 __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736
 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with syzkaller.

Fixes: 8d5d88527587 ("xdp: rhashtable with allocator ID to pointer mapping")
Signed-off-by: Daniil Dulov <d.dulov@aladdin.ru>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240617162708.492159-1-d.dulov@aladdin.ru
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240624080747.36858-1-d.dulov@aladdin.ru
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-19 14:19:32 +01:00
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
76b48089bb xdp: Allow registering memory model without rxq reference
[ Upstream commit 4a48ef70b93b8c7ed5190adfca18849e76387b80 ]

The functions that register an XDP memory model take a struct xdp_rxq as
parameter, but the RXQ is not actually used for anything other than pulling
out the struct xdp_mem_info that it embeds. So refactor the register
functions and export variants that just take a pointer to the xdp_mem_info.

This is in preparation for enabling XDP_REDIRECT in bpf_prog_run(), using a
page_pool instance that is not connected to any network device.

Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220103150812.87914-2-toke@redhat.com
Stable-dep-of: 7e9f79428372 ("xdp: Remove WARN() from __xdp_reg_mem_model()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-19 14:19:32 +01:00
Jakub Kicinski
8325a788a2 xdp: Move the rxq_info.mem clearing to unreg_mem_model()
[ Upstream commit a78cae2476812cecaa4a33d0086bbb53986906bc ]

xdp_rxq_info_unreg() implicitly calls xdp_rxq_info_unreg_mem_model().
This may well be confusing to the driver authors, and lead to double free
if they call xdp_rxq_info_unreg_mem_model() before xdp_rxq_info_unreg()
(when mem model type == MEM_TYPE_PAGE_POOL).

In fact error path of mvpp2_rxq_init() seems to currently do exactly that.

The double free will result in refcount underflow in page_pool_destroy().
Make the interface a little more programmer friendly by clearing type and
id so that xdp_rxq_info_unreg_mem_model() can be called multiple times.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210625221612.2637086-1-kuba@kernel.org
Stable-dep-of: 7e9f79428372 ("xdp: Remove WARN() from __xdp_reg_mem_model()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-19 14:19:31 +01:00
Yue Haibing
4f76885213 netns: Make get_net_ns() handle zero refcount net
[ Upstream commit ff960f9d3edbe08a736b5a224d91a305ccc946b0 ]

Syzkaller hit a warning:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 7890 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 7890 Comm: tun Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3-00100-gcaa4f9578aba-dirty #310
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
Code: 41 49 04 31 ff 89 de e8 9f 1e cd fe 84 db 75 9c e8 76 26 cd fe c6 05 b6 41 49 04 01 90 48 c7 c7 b8 8e 25 86 e8 d2 05 b5 fe 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 e9 79 ff ff ff e8 53 26 cd fe 0f b6 1
RSP: 0018:ffff8881067b7da0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff811c72ac
RDX: ffff8881026a2140 RSI: ffffffff811c72b5 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff8881067b7db0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 205b5d3730353139
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 205d303938375420 R12: ffff8881086500c4
R13: ffff8881086500c4 R14: ffff8881086500b0 R15: ffff888108650040
FS:  00007f5b2961a4c0(0000) GS:ffff88823bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055d7ed36fd18 CR3: 00000001482f6000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? show_regs+0xa3/0xc0
 ? __warn+0xa5/0x1c0
 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
 ? report_bug+0x1fc/0x2d0
 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
 ? handle_bug+0xa1/0x110
 ? exc_invalid_op+0x3c/0xb0
 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
 ? __warn_printk+0xcc/0x140
 ? __warn_printk+0xd5/0x140
 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
 get_net_ns+0xa4/0xc0
 ? __pfx_get_net_ns+0x10/0x10
 open_related_ns+0x5a/0x130
 __tun_chr_ioctl+0x1616/0x2370
 ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x58/0xa0
 ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp2+0x1c/0x30
 ? __pfx_tun_chr_ioctl+0x10/0x10
 tun_chr_ioctl+0x2f/0x40
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x11b/0x160
 x64_sys_call+0x1211/0x20d0
 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f5b28f165d7
Code: b3 66 90 48 8b 05 b1 48 2d 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 81 48 2d 00 8
RSP: 002b:00007ffc2b59c5e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5b28f165d7
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000054e3 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffc2b59c650 R08: 00007f5b291ed8c0 R09: 00007f5b2961a4c0
R10: 0000000029690010 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400730
R13: 00007ffc2b59cf40 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...

This is trigger as below:
          ns0                                    ns1
tun_set_iff() //dev is tun0
   tun->dev = dev
//ip link set tun0 netns ns1
                                       put_net() //ref is 0
__tun_chr_ioctl() //TUNGETDEVNETNS
   net = dev_net(tun->dev);
   open_related_ns(&net->ns, get_net_ns); //ns1
     get_net_ns()
        get_net() //addition on 0

Use maybe_get_net() in get_net_ns in case net's ref is zero to fix this

Fixes: 0c3e0e3bb623 ("tun: Add ioctl() TUNGETDEVNETNS cmd to allow obtaining real net ns of tun device")
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614131302.2698509-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-19 14:19:08 +01:00
Breno Leitao
87cdf1fd25 netpoll: Fix race condition in netpoll_owner_active
[ Upstream commit c2e6a872bde9912f1a7579639c5ca3adf1003916 ]

KCSAN detected a race condition in netpoll:

	BUG: KCSAN: data-race in net_rx_action / netpoll_send_skb
	write (marked) to 0xffff8881164168b0 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 10:
	net_rx_action (./include/linux/netpoll.h:90 net/core/dev.c:6712 net/core/dev.c:6822)
<snip>
	read to 0xffff8881164168b0 of 4 bytes by task 1 on cpu 2:
	netpoll_send_skb (net/core/netpoll.c:319 net/core/netpoll.c:345 net/core/netpoll.c:393)
	netpoll_send_udp (net/core/netpoll.c:?)
<snip>
	value changed: 0x0000000a -> 0xffffffff

This happens because netpoll_owner_active() needs to check if the
current CPU is the owner of the lock, touching napi->poll_owner
non atomically. The ->poll_owner field contains the current CPU holding
the lock.

Use an atomic read to check if the poll owner is the current CPU.

Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240429100437.3487432-1-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-19 14:19:06 +01:00
Wander Lairson Costa
997c00b7f9 drop_monitor: replace spin_lock by raw_spin_lock
[ Upstream commit f1e197a665c2148ebc25fe09c53689e60afea195 ]

trace_drop_common() is called with preemption disabled, and it acquires
a spin_lock. This is problematic for RT kernels because spin_locks are
sleeping locks in this configuration, which causes the following splat:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 449, name: rcuc/47
preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 2, expected: 2
5 locks held by rcuc/47/449:
 #0: ff1100086ec30a60 ((softirq_ctrl.lock)){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __local_bh_disable_ip+0x105/0x210
 #1: ffffffffb394a280 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rt_spin_lock+0xbf/0x130
 #2: ffffffffb394a280 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __local_bh_disable_ip+0x11c/0x210
 #3: ffffffffb394a160 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_do_batch+0x360/0xc70
 #4: ff1100086ee07520 (&data->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: trace_drop_common.constprop.0+0xb5/0x290
irq event stamp: 139909
hardirqs last  enabled at (139908): [<ffffffffb1df2b33>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x63/0x80
hardirqs last disabled at (139909): [<ffffffffb19bd03d>] trace_drop_common.constprop.0+0x26d/0x290
softirqs last  enabled at (139892): [<ffffffffb07a1083>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x103/0x170
softirqs last disabled at (139898): [<ffffffffb0909b33>] rcu_cpu_kthread+0x93/0x1f0
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffffffffb1de786b>] rt_mutex_slowunlock+0xab/0x2e0
CPU: 47 PID: 449 Comm: rcuc/47 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-rt1+ #7
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R650/0Y2G81, BIOS 1.6.5 04/15/2022
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xd0
 dump_stack+0x14/0x20
 __might_resched+0x21e/0x2f0
 rt_spin_lock+0x5e/0x130
 ? trace_drop_common.constprop.0+0xb5/0x290
 ? skb_queue_purge_reason.part.0+0x1bf/0x230
 trace_drop_common.constprop.0+0xb5/0x290
 ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4a/0x80
 ? __pfx_trace_drop_common.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
 ? rt_mutex_slowunlock+0x26a/0x2e0
 ? skb_queue_purge_reason.part.0+0x1bf/0x230
 ? __pfx_rt_mutex_slowunlock+0x10/0x10
 ? skb_queue_purge_reason.part.0+0x1bf/0x230
 trace_kfree_skb_hit+0x15/0x20
 trace_kfree_skb+0xe9/0x150
 kfree_skb_reason+0x7b/0x110
 skb_queue_purge_reason.part.0+0x1bf/0x230
 ? __pfx_skb_queue_purge_reason.part.0+0x10/0x10
 ? mark_lock.part.0+0x8a/0x520
...

trace_drop_common() also disables interrupts, but this is a minor issue
because we could easily replace it with a local_lock.

Replace the spin_lock with raw_spin_lock to avoid sleeping in atomic
context.

Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Hu Chunyu <chuhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-19 14:19:06 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
38d1d83d12 net: give more chances to rcu in netdev_wait_allrefs_any()
[ Upstream commit cd42ba1c8ac9deb9032add6adf491110e7442040 ]

This came while reviewing commit c4e86b4363ac ("net: add two more
call_rcu_hurry()").

Paolo asked if adding one synchronize_rcu() would help.

While synchronize_rcu() does not help, making sure to call
rcu_barrier() before msleep(wait) is definitely helping
to make sure lazy call_rcu() are completed.

Instead of waiting ~100 seconds in my tests, the ref_tracker
splats occurs one time only, and netdev_wait_allrefs_any()
latency is reduced to the strict minimum.

Ideally we should audit our call_rcu() users to make sure
no refcount (or cascading call_rcu()) is held too long,
because rcu_barrier() is quite expensive.

Fixes: 0e4be9e57e8c ("net: use exponential backoff in netdev_wait_allrefs")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/28bbf698-befb-42f6-b561-851c67f464aa@kernel.org/T/#m76d73ed6b03cd930778ac4d20a777f22a08d6824
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-19 12:26:55 +01:00
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
bc6eaae798 net: fix out-of-bounds access in ops_init
commit a26ff37e624d12e28077e5b24d2b264f62764ad6 upstream.

net_alloc_generic is called by net_alloc, which is called without any
locking. It reads max_gen_ptrs, which is changed under pernet_ops_rwsem. It
is read twice, first to allocate an array, then to set s.len, which is
later used to limit the bounds of the array access.

It is possible that the array is allocated and another thread is
registering a new pernet ops, increments max_gen_ptrs, which is then used
to set s.len with a larger than allocated length for the variable array.

Fix it by reading max_gen_ptrs only once in net_alloc_generic. If
max_gen_ptrs is later incremented, it will be caught in net_assign_generic.

Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com>
Fixes: 073862ba5d24 ("netns: fix net_alloc_generic()")
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502132006.3430840-1-cascardo@igalia.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-11-19 11:32:49 +01:00
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
90b69f2e08 kcov: Remove kcov include from sched.h and move it to its users.
[ Upstream commit 183f47fcaa54a5ffe671d990186d330ac8c63b10 ]

The recent addition of in_serving_softirq() to kconv.h results in
compile failure on PREEMPT_RT because it requires
task_struct::softirq_disable_cnt. This is not available if kconv.h is
included from sched.h.

It is not needed to include kconv.h from sched.h. All but the net/ user
already include the kconv header file.

Move the include of the kconv.h header from sched.h it its users.
Additionally include sched.h from kconv.h to ensure that everything
task_struct related is available.

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Acked-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210218173124.iy5iyqv3a4oia4vv@linutronix.de
Stable-dep-of: 19e35f24750d ("nfc: nci: Fix kcov check in nci_rx_work()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-19 11:32:46 +01:00
Roded Zats
b99c97d0fa rtnetlink: Correct nested IFLA_VF_VLAN_LIST attribute validation
[ Upstream commit 1aec77b2bb2ed1db0f5efc61c4c1ca3813307489 ]

Each attribute inside a nested IFLA_VF_VLAN_LIST is assumed to be a
struct ifla_vf_vlan_info so the size of such attribute needs to be at least
of sizeof(struct ifla_vf_vlan_info) which is 14 bytes.
The current size validation in do_setvfinfo is against NLA_HDRLEN (4 bytes)
which is less than sizeof(struct ifla_vf_vlan_info) so this validation
is not enough and a too small attribute might be cast to a
struct ifla_vf_vlan_info, this might result in an out of bands
read access when accessing the saved (casted) entry in ivvl.

Fixes: 79aab093a0b5 ("net: Update API for VF vlan protocol 802.1ad support")
Signed-off-by: Roded Zats <rzats@paloaltonetworks.com>
Reviewed-by: Donald Hunter <donald.hunter@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502155751.75705-1-rzats@paloaltonetworks.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-19 11:32:45 +01:00
linke li
cc048a6781 net: mark racy access on sk->sk_rcvbuf
[ Upstream commit c2deb2e971f5d9aca941ef13ee05566979e337a4 ]

sk->sk_rcvbuf in __sock_queue_rcv_skb() and __sk_receive_skb() can be
changed by other threads. Mark this as benign using READ_ONCE().

This patch is aimed at reducing the number of benign races reported by
KCSAN in order to focus future debugging effort on harmful races.

Signed-off-by: linke li <lilinke99@qq.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-19 11:32:43 +01:00
Felix Fietkau
2a58e94c3f net: core: reject skb_copy(_expand) for fraglist GSO skbs
[ Upstream commit d091e579b864fa790dd6a0cd537a22c383126681 ]

SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs must not be linearized, otherwise they become
invalid. Return NULL if such an skb is passed to skb_copy or
skb_copy_expand, in order to prevent a crash on a potential later
call to skb_gso_segment.

Fixes: 3a1296a38d0c ("net: Support GRO/GSO fraglist chaining.")
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-19 11:32:43 +01:00
Jakub Sitnicki
55bfcbc4ba bpf, sockmap: Prevent lock inversion deadlock in map delete elem
commit ff91059932401894e6c86341915615c5eb0eca48 upstream.

syzkaller started using corpuses where a BPF tracing program deletes
elements from a sockmap/sockhash map. Because BPF tracing programs can be
invoked from any interrupt context, locks taken during a map_delete_elem
operation must be hardirq-safe. Otherwise a deadlock due to lock inversion
is possible, as reported by lockdep:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&htab->buckets[i].lock);
                               local_irq_disable();
                               lock(&host->lock);
                               lock(&htab->buckets[i].lock);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(&host->lock);

Locks in sockmap are hardirq-unsafe by design. We expects elements to be
deleted from sockmap/sockhash only in task (normal) context with interrupts
enabled, or in softirq context.

Detect when map_delete_elem operation is invoked from a context which is
_not_ hardirq-unsafe, that is interrupts are disabled, and bail out with an
error.

Note that map updates are not affected by this issue. BPF verifier does not
allow updating sockmap/sockhash from a BPF tracing program today.

Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Reported-by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com>
Reported-by: yue sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+bc922f476bd65abbd466@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d4066896495db380182e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: syzbot+d4066896495db380182e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d4066896495db380182e
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=bc922f476bd65abbd466
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240402104621.1050319-1-jakub@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-11-19 09:22:46 +01:00
Ksawlii
809ca90c02 Revert "io_uring/unix: drop usage of io_uring socket"
This reverts commit 6cf9b744bf.
2024-11-19 09:11:51 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
b7a2902e57 packet: annotate data-races around ignore_outgoing
[ Upstream commit 6ebfad33161afacb3e1e59ed1c2feefef70f9f97 ]

ignore_outgoing is read locklessly from dev_queue_xmit_nit()
and packet_getsockopt()

Add appropriate READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.

syzbot reported:

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in dev_queue_xmit_nit / packet_setsockopt

write to 0xffff888107804542 of 1 bytes by task 22618 on cpu 0:
 packet_setsockopt+0xd83/0xfd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:4003
 do_sock_setsockopt net/socket.c:2311 [inline]
 __sys_setsockopt+0x1d8/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
 __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x66/0x80 net/socket.c:2340
 do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75

read to 0xffff888107804542 of 1 bytes by task 27 on cpu 1:
 dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x82/0x620 net/core/dev.c:2248
 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3527 [inline]
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0xcc/0x3f0 net/core/dev.c:3547
 __dev_queue_xmit+0xf24/0x1dd0 net/core/dev.c:4335
 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3091 [inline]
 batadv_send_skb_packet+0x264/0x300 net/batman-adv/send.c:108
 batadv_send_broadcast_skb+0x24/0x30 net/batman-adv/send.c:127
 batadv_iv_ogm_send_to_if net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c:392 [inline]
 batadv_iv_ogm_emit net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c:420 [inline]
 batadv_iv_send_outstanding_bat_ogm_packet+0x3f0/0x4b0 net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c:1700
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0x465/0x990 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 worker_thread+0x526/0x730 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
 kthread+0x1d1/0x210 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x60 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243

value changed: 0x00 -> 0x01

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 27 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Tainted: G        W          6.8.0-syzkaller-08073-g480e035fc4c7 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024
Workqueue: bat_events batadv_iv_send_outstanding_bat_ogm_packet

Fixes: fa788d986a3a ("packet: add sockopt to ignore outgoing packets")
Reported-by: syzbot+c669c1136495a2e7c31f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89i+Z7MfbkBLOv=p7KZ7=K1rKHO4P1OL5LYDCtBiyqsa9oQ@mail.gmail.com/T/#t
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-19 08:44:59 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
3bdc7fce89 sock_diag: annotate data-races around sock_diag_handlers[family]
[ Upstream commit efd402537673f9951992aea4ef0f5ff51d858f4b ]

__sock_diag_cmd() and sock_diag_bind() read sock_diag_handlers[family]
without a lock held.

Use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations to avoid potential issues.

Fixes: 8ef874bfc729 ("sock_diag: Move the sock_ code to net/core/")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-19 08:44:38 +01:00
Jens Axboe
6cf9b744bf io_uring/unix: drop usage of io_uring socket
Commit a4104821ad651d8a0b374f0b2474c345bbb42f82 upstream.

Since we no longer allow sending io_uring fds over SCM_RIGHTS, move to
using io_is_uring_fops() to detect whether this is a io_uring fd or not.
With that done, kill off io_uring_get_socket() as nobody calls it
anymore.

This is in preparation to yanking out the rest of the core related to
unix gc with io_uring.

Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-19 08:44:21 +01:00
Paul Moore
a6e74ab11b lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safe
[ Upstream commit b10b9c342f7571f287fd422be5d5c0beb26ba974 ]

Commit 4ff09db1b79b ("bpf: net: Change sk_getsockopt() to take the
sockptr_t argument") made it possible to call sk_getsockopt()
with both user and kernel address space buffers through the use of
the sockptr_t type.  Unfortunately at the time of conversion the
security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook was written to only
accept userspace buffers, and in a desire to avoid having to change
the LSM hook the commit author simply passed the sockptr_t's
userspace buffer pointer.  Since the only sk_getsockopt() callers
at the time of conversion which used kernel sockptr_t buffers did
not allow SO_PEERSEC, and hence the
security_socket_getpeersec_stream() hook, this was acceptable but
also very fragile as future changes presented the possibility of
silently passing kernel space pointers to the LSM hook.

There are several ways to protect against this, including careful
code review of future commits, but since relying on code review to
catch bugs is a recipe for disaster and the upstream eBPF maintainer
is "strongly against defensive programming", this patch updates the
LSM hook, and all of the implementations to support sockptr_t and
safely handle both user and kernel space buffers.

Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Stable-dep-of: 5a287d3d2b9d ("lsm: fix default return value of the socket_getpeersec_*() hooks")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-18 23:19:51 +01:00
Martin KaFai Lau
df93e343ba bpf: net: Change sk_getsockopt() to take the sockptr_t argument
[ Upstream commit 4ff09db1b79b98b4a2a7511571c640b76cab3beb ]

This patch changes sk_getsockopt() to take the sockptr_t argument
such that it can be used by bpf_getsockopt(SOL_SOCKET) in a
latter patch.

security_socket_getpeersec_stream() is not changed.  It stays
with the __user ptr (optval.user and optlen.user) to avoid changes
to other security hooks.  bpf_getsockopt(SOL_SOCKET) also does not
support SO_PEERSEC.

Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220902002802.2888419-1-kafai@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 5a287d3d2b9d ("lsm: fix default return value of the socket_getpeersec_*() hooks")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-18 23:19:51 +01:00
Martin KaFai Lau
126751e8ed net: Change sock_getsockopt() to take the sk ptr instead of the sock ptr
[ Upstream commit ba74a7608dc12fbbd8ea36e660087f08a81ef26a ]

A latter patch refactors bpf_getsockopt(SOL_SOCKET) with the
sock_getsockopt() to avoid code duplication and code
drift between the two duplicates.

The current sock_getsockopt() takes sock ptr as the argument.
The very first thing of this function is to get back the sk ptr
by 'sk = sock->sk'.

bpf_getsockopt() could be called when the sk does not have
the sock ptr created.  Meaning sk->sk_socket is NULL.  For example,
when a passive tcp connection has just been established but has yet
been accept()-ed.  Thus, it cannot use the sock_getsockopt(sk->sk_socket)
or else it will pass a NULL ptr.

This patch moves all sock_getsockopt implementation to the newly
added sk_getsockopt().  The new sk_getsockopt() takes a sk ptr
and immediately gets the sock ptr by 'sock = sk->sk_socket'

The existing sock_getsockopt(sock) is changed to call
sk_getsockopt(sock->sk).  All existing callers have both sock->sk
and sk->sk_socket pointer.

The latter patch will make bpf_getsockopt(SOL_SOCKET) call
sk_getsockopt(sk) directly.  The bpf_getsockopt(SOL_SOCKET) does
not use the optnames that require sk->sk_socket, so it will
be safe.

Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220902002756.2887884-1-kafai@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 5a287d3d2b9d ("lsm: fix default return value of the socket_getpeersec_*() hooks")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-18 23:19:51 +01:00
Lin Ma
b0072ea79d rtnetlink: fix error logic of IFLA_BRIDGE_FLAGS writing back
[ Upstream commit 743ad091fb46e622f1b690385bb15e3cd3daf874 ]

In the commit d73ef2d69c0d ("rtnetlink: let rtnl_bridge_setlink checks
IFLA_BRIDGE_MODE length"), an adjustment was made to the old loop logic
in the function `rtnl_bridge_setlink` to enable the loop to also check
the length of the IFLA_BRIDGE_MODE attribute. However, this adjustment
removed the `break` statement and led to an error logic of the flags
writing back at the end of this function.

if (have_flags)
    memcpy(nla_data(attr), &flags, sizeof(flags));
    // attr should point to IFLA_BRIDGE_FLAGS NLA !!!

Before the mentioned commit, the `attr` is granted to be IFLA_BRIDGE_FLAGS.
However, this is not necessarily true fow now as the updated loop will let
the attr point to the last NLA, even an invalid NLA which could cause
overflow writes.

This patch introduces a new variable `br_flag` to save the NLA pointer
that points to IFLA_BRIDGE_FLAGS and uses it to resolve the mentioned
error logic.

Fixes: d73ef2d69c0d ("rtnetlink: let rtnl_bridge_setlink checks IFLA_BRIDGE_MODE length")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227121128.608110-1-linma@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-18 23:18:28 +01:00
Kees Cook
2882d844af net: dev: Convert sa_data to flexible array in struct sockaddr
[ Upstream commit b5f0de6df6dce8d641ef58ef7012f3304dffb9a1 ]

One of the worst offenders of "fake flexible arrays" is struct sockaddr,
as it is the classic example of why GCC and Clang have been traditionally
forced to treat all trailing arrays as fake flexible arrays: in the
distant misty past, sa_data became too small, and code started just
treating it as a flexible array, even though it was fixed-size. The
special case by the compiler is specifically that sizeof(sa->sa_data)
and FORTIFY_SOURCE (which uses __builtin_object_size(sa->sa_data, 1))
do not agree (14 and -1 respectively), which makes FORTIFY_SOURCE treat
it as a flexible array.

However, the coming -fstrict-flex-arrays compiler flag will remove
these special cases so that FORTIFY_SOURCE can gain coverage over all
the trailing arrays in the kernel that are _not_ supposed to be treated
as a flexible array. To deal with this change, convert sa_data to a true
flexible array. To keep the structure size the same, move sa_data into
a union with a newly introduced sa_data_min with the original size. The
result is that FORTIFY_SOURCE can continue to have no idea how large
sa_data may actually be, but anything using sizeof(sa->sa_data) must
switch to sizeof(sa->sa_data_min).

Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Cc: Dylan Yudaken <dylany@fb.com>
Cc: Yajun Deng <yajun.deng@linux.dev>
Cc: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Cc: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018095503.never.671-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: a7d6027790ac ("arp: Prevent overflow in arp_req_get().")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-18 22:25:41 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
bb36598398 net: prevent mss overflow in skb_segment()
commit 23d05d563b7e7b0314e65c8e882bc27eac2da8e7 upstream.

Once again syzbot is able to crash the kernel in skb_segment() [1]

GSO_BY_FRAGS is a forbidden value, but unfortunately the following
computation in skb_segment() can reach it quite easily :

	mss = mss * partial_segs;

65535 = 3 * 5 * 17 * 257, so many initial values of mss can lead to
a bad final result.

Make sure to limit segmentation so that the new mss value is smaller
than GSO_BY_FRAGS.

[1]

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000070-0x0000000000000077]
CPU: 1 PID: 5079 Comm: syz-executor993 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc4-syzkaller-00141-g1ae4cd3cbdd0 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/10/2023
RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0x181d/0x3f30 net/core/skbuff.c:4551
Code: 83 e3 02 e9 fb ed ff ff e8 90 68 1c f9 48 8b 84 24 f8 00 00 00 48 8d 78 70 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 8a 21 00 00 48 8b 84 24 f8 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc900043473d0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000010046 RCX: ffffffff886b1597
RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffffffff886b2520 RDI: 0000000000000070
RBP: ffffc90004347578 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 000000000000ffff
R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff888063202ac0
R13: 0000000000010000 R14: 000000000000ffff R15: 0000000000000046
FS: 0000555556e7e380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020010000 CR3: 0000000027ee2000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
udp6_ufo_fragment+0xa0e/0xd00 net/ipv6/udp_offload.c:109
ipv6_gso_segment+0x534/0x17e0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:120
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x290/0x610 net/core/gso.c:53
__skb_gso_segment+0x339/0x710 net/core/gso.c:124
skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline]
validate_xmit_skb+0x36c/0xeb0 net/core/dev.c:3626
__dev_queue_xmit+0x6f3/0x3d60 net/core/dev.c:4338
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x257/0x380 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3087 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x24c6/0x5220 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x180 net/socket.c:745
__sys_sendto+0x255/0x340 net/socket.c:2190
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2202 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2198 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2198
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
RIP: 0033:0x7f8692032aa9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 d1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fff8d685418 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f8692032aa9
RDX: 0000000000010048 RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000000f4240 R08: 0000000020000540 R09: 0000000000000014
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff8d685480
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007fff8d685480 R15: 0000000000000003
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0x181d/0x3f30 net/core/skbuff.c:4551
Code: 83 e3 02 e9 fb ed ff ff e8 90 68 1c f9 48 8b 84 24 f8 00 00 00 48 8d 78 70 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 8a 21 00 00 48 8b 84 24 f8 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc900043473d0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000010046 RCX: ffffffff886b1597
RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffffffff886b2520 RDI: 0000000000000070
RBP: ffffc90004347578 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 000000000000ffff
R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff888063202ac0
R13: 0000000000010000 R14: 000000000000ffff R15: 0000000000000046
FS: 0000555556e7e380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020010000 CR3: 0000000027ee2000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

Fixes: 3953c46c3ac7 ("sk_buff: allow segmenting based on frag sizes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231212164621.4131800-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-11-18 12:13:39 +01:00
Zhengchao Shao
1b784270a1 tcp: make sure init the accept_queue's spinlocks once
[ Upstream commit 198bc90e0e734e5f98c3d2833e8390cac3df61b2 ]

When I run syz's reproduction C program locally, it causes the following
issue:
pvqspinlock: lock 0xffff9d181cd5c660 has corrupted value 0x0!
WARNING: CPU: 19 PID: 21160 at __pv_queued_spin_unlock_slowpath (kernel/locking/qspinlock_paravirt.h:508)
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__pv_queued_spin_unlock_slowpath (kernel/locking/qspinlock_paravirt.h:508)
Code: 73 56 3a ff 90 c3 cc cc cc cc 8b 05 bb 1f 48 01 85 c0 74 05 c3 cc cc cc cc 8b 17 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7
30 20 ce 8f e8 ad 56 42 ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 0b 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 0018:ffffa8d200604cb8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff9d1ef60e0908
RDX: 00000000ffffffd8 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9d1ef60e0900
RBP: ffff9d181cd5c280 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffff7fff
R10: ffffa8d200604b68 R11: ffffffff907dcdc8 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff9d181cd5c660 R14: ffff9d1813a3f330 R15: 0000000000001000
FS:  00007fa110184640(0000) GS:ffff9d1ef60c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 000000011f65e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
  _raw_spin_unlock (kernel/locking/spinlock.c:186)
  inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1321)
  inet_csk_complete_hashdance (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1358)
  tcp_check_req (net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:868)
  tcp_v4_rcv (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2260)
  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205)
  ip_local_deliver_finish (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:234)
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:5529)
  process_backlog (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:779)
  __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6533)
  net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6604)
  __do_softirq (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27)
  do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:454 kernel/softirq.c:441)
</IRQ>
<TASK>
  __local_bh_enable_ip (kernel/softirq.c:381)
  __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4374)
  ip_finish_output2 (./include/net/neighbour.h:540 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235)
  __ip_queue_xmit (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:535)
  __tcp_transmit_skb (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1462)
  tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process (net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6469)
  tcp_rcv_state_process (net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6657)
  tcp_v4_do_rcv (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1929)
  __release_sock (./include/net/sock.h:1121 net/core/sock.c:2968)
  release_sock (net/core/sock.c:3536)
  inet_wait_for_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:609)
  __inet_stream_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:702)
  inet_stream_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:748)
  __sys_connect (./include/linux/file.h:45 net/socket.c:2064)
  __x64_sys_connect (net/socket.c:2073 net/socket.c:2070 net/socket.c:2070)
  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82)
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:129)
  RIP: 0033:0x7fa10ff05a3d
  Code: 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89
  c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ab a3 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
  RSP: 002b:00007fa110183de8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000054 RCX: 00007fa10ff05a3d
  RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000003
  RBP: 00007fa110183e20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fa110184640
  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fa10fe8b060 R15: 00007fff73e23b20
</TASK>

The issue triggering process is analyzed as follows:
Thread A                                       Thread B
tcp_v4_rcv	//receive ack TCP packet       inet_shutdown
  tcp_check_req                                  tcp_disconnect //disconnect sock
  ...                                              tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_CLOSE)
    inet_csk_complete_hashdance                ...
      inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add                 inet_listen  //start listen
        spin_lock(&queue->rskq_lock)             inet_csk_listen_start
        ...                                        reqsk_queue_alloc
        ...                                          spin_lock_init
        spin_unlock(&queue->rskq_lock)	//warning

When the socket receives the ACK packet during the three-way handshake,
it will hold spinlock. And then the user actively shutdowns the socket
and listens to the socket immediately, the spinlock will be initialized.
When the socket is going to release the spinlock, a warning is generated.
Also the same issue to fastopenq.lock.

Move init spinlock to inet_create and inet_accept to make sure init the
accept_queue's spinlocks once.

Fixes: fff1f3001cc5 ("tcp: add a spinlock to protect struct request_sock_queue")
Fixes: 168a8f58059a ("tcp: TCP Fast Open Server - main code path")
Reported-by: Ming Shu <sming56@aliyun.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240118012019.1751966-1-shaozhengchao@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-18 12:12:59 +01:00
Judy Hsiao
97325b35e6 neighbour: Don't let neigh_forced_gc() disable preemption for long
[ Upstream commit e5dc5afff62f3e97e86c3643ec9fcad23de4f2d3 ]

We are seeing cases where neigh_cleanup_and_release() is called by
neigh_forced_gc() many times in a row with preemption turned off.
When running on a low powered CPU at a low CPU frequency, this has
been measured to keep preemption off for ~10 ms. That's not great on a
system with HZ=1000 which expects tasks to be able to schedule in
with ~1ms latency.

Suggested-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Judy Hsiao <judyhsiao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-18 12:12:16 +01:00
Thomas Lange
afa45342b3 net: Implement missing SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW cmsg support
[ Upstream commit 382a32018b74f407008615e0e831d05ed28e81cd ]

Commit 9718475e6908 ("socket: Add SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW") added the new
socket option SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW. However, it was never implemented in
__sock_cmsg_send thus breaking SO_TIMESTAMPING cmsg for platforms using
SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW.

Fixes: 9718475e6908 ("socket: Add SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6a7281bf-bc4a-4f75-bb88-7011908ae471@app.fastmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lange <thomas@corelatus.se>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240104085744.49164-1-thomas@corelatus.se
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-18 12:12:07 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
cbb3100329 net: check dev->gso_max_size in gso_features_check()
[ Upstream commit 24ab059d2ebd62fdccc43794796f6ffbabe49ebc ]

Some drivers might misbehave if TSO packets get too big.

GVE for instance uses a 16bit field in its TX descriptor,
and will do bad things if a packet is bigger than 2^16 bytes.

Linux TCP stack honors dev->gso_max_size, but there are
other ways for too big packets to reach an ndo_start_xmit()
handler : virtio_net, af_packet, GRO...

Add a generic check in gso_features_check() and fallback
to GSO when needed.

gso_max_size was added in the blamed commit.

Fixes: 82cc1a7a5687 ("[NET]: Add per-connection option to set max TSO frame size")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231219125331.4127498-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-18 12:11:59 +01:00