x86/mmio: Disable KVM mitigation when X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is set

commit e95df4ec0c0c9791941f112db699fae794b9862a upstream.

Currently MMIO Stale Data mitigation for CPUs not affected by MDS/TAA is
to only deploy VERW at VMentry by enabling mmio_stale_data_clear static
branch. No mitigation is needed for kernel->user transitions. If such
CPUs are also affected by RFDS, its mitigation may set
X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF to deploy VERW at kernel->user and VMentry.
This could result in duplicate VERW at VMentry.

Fix this by disabling mmio_stale_data_clear static branch when
X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Pawan Gupta 2024-03-12 15:41:07 -07:00 committed by Ksawlii
parent 1ef6cf50fc
commit 9d2f7b9ac3

View file

@ -419,6 +419,13 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)))
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
/*
* X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF could be enabled by other VERW based
* mitigations, disable KVM-only mitigation in that case.
*/
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF))
static_branch_disable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
else
static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
@ -495,8 +502,11 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
taa_select_mitigation();
}
if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF &&
boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
/*
* MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF is not checked here so that mmio_stale_data_clear
* gets updated correctly as per X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF state.
*/
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
mmio_select_mitigation();
}