kernel_samsung_a53x/include/linux/skmsg.h

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2024-06-15 21:02:09 +02:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/* Copyright (c) 2017 - 2018 Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io */
#ifndef _LINUX_SKMSG_H
#define _LINUX_SKMSG_H
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
#include <net/strparser.h>
#define MAX_MSG_FRAGS MAX_SKB_FRAGS
#define NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS (MAX_MSG_FRAGS + 1)
enum __sk_action {
__SK_DROP = 0,
__SK_PASS,
__SK_REDIRECT,
__SK_NONE,
};
struct sk_msg_sg {
u32 start;
u32 curr;
u32 end;
u32 size;
u32 copybreak;
unsigned long copy;
/* The extra two elements:
* 1) used for chaining the front and sections when the list becomes
* partitioned (e.g. end < start). The crypto APIs require the
* chaining;
* 2) to chain tailer SG entries after the message.
*/
struct scatterlist data[MAX_MSG_FRAGS + 2];
};
static_assert(BITS_PER_LONG >= NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS);
/* UAPI in filter.c depends on struct sk_msg_sg being first element. */
struct sk_msg {
struct sk_msg_sg sg;
void *data;
void *data_end;
u32 apply_bytes;
u32 cork_bytes;
u32 flags;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sock *sk_redir;
struct sock *sk;
struct list_head list;
};
struct sk_psock_progs {
struct bpf_prog *msg_parser;
struct bpf_prog *skb_parser;
struct bpf_prog *skb_verdict;
};
enum sk_psock_state_bits {
SK_PSOCK_TX_ENABLED,
};
struct sk_psock_link {
struct list_head list;
struct bpf_map *map;
void *link_raw;
};
struct sk_psock_parser {
struct strparser strp;
bool enabled;
void (*saved_data_ready)(struct sock *sk);
};
struct sk_psock_work_state {
struct sk_buff *skb;
u32 len;
u32 off;
};
struct sk_psock {
struct sock *sk;
struct sock *sk_redir;
u32 apply_bytes;
u32 cork_bytes;
u32 eval;
struct sk_msg *cork;
struct sk_psock_progs progs;
struct sk_psock_parser parser;
struct sk_buff_head ingress_skb;
struct list_head ingress_msg;
unsigned long state;
struct list_head link;
spinlock_t link_lock;
refcount_t refcnt;
void (*saved_unhash)(struct sock *sk);
bpf, sockmap: Fix sk->sk_forward_alloc warn_on in sk_stream_kill_queues commit d8616ee2affcff37c5d315310da557a694a3303d upstream. During TCP sockmap redirect pressure test, the following warning is triggered: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2145 at net/core/stream.c:205 sk_stream_kill_queues+0xbc/0xd0 CPU: 3 PID: 2145 Comm: iperf Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 5.10.0+ #9 Call Trace: inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x55/0x110 inet_csk_listen_stop+0xbb/0x380 tcp_close+0x41b/0x480 inet_release+0x42/0x80 __sock_release+0x3d/0xa0 sock_close+0x11/0x20 __fput+0x9d/0x240 task_work_run+0x62/0x90 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x110/0x120 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x190 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 The reason we observed is that: When the listener is closing, a connection may have completed the three-way handshake but not accepted, and the client has sent some packets. The child sks in accept queue release by inet_child_forget()->inet_csk_destroy_sock(), but psocks of child sks have not released. To fix, add sock_map_destroy to release psocks. Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220524075311.649153-1-wangyufen@huawei.com [ Conflict in include/linux/bpf.h due to function declaration position and remove non-existed sk_psock_stop helper from sock_map_destroy. ] Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-24 09:53:11 +02:00
void (*saved_destroy)(struct sock *sk);
2024-06-15 21:02:09 +02:00
void (*saved_close)(struct sock *sk, long timeout);
void (*saved_write_space)(struct sock *sk);
struct proto *sk_proto;
struct sk_psock_work_state work_state;
struct work_struct work;
union {
struct rcu_head rcu;
struct work_struct gc;
};
};
int sk_msg_alloc(struct sock *sk, struct sk_msg *msg, int len,
int elem_first_coalesce);
int sk_msg_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sk_msg *dst, struct sk_msg *src,
u32 off, u32 len);
void sk_msg_trim(struct sock *sk, struct sk_msg *msg, int len);
int sk_msg_free(struct sock *sk, struct sk_msg *msg);
int sk_msg_free_nocharge(struct sock *sk, struct sk_msg *msg);
void sk_msg_free_partial(struct sock *sk, struct sk_msg *msg, u32 bytes);
void sk_msg_free_partial_nocharge(struct sock *sk, struct sk_msg *msg,
u32 bytes);
void sk_msg_return(struct sock *sk, struct sk_msg *msg, int bytes);
void sk_msg_return_zero(struct sock *sk, struct sk_msg *msg, int bytes);
int sk_msg_zerocopy_from_iter(struct sock *sk, struct iov_iter *from,
struct sk_msg *msg, u32 bytes);
int sk_msg_memcopy_from_iter(struct sock *sk, struct iov_iter *from,
struct sk_msg *msg, u32 bytes);
static inline void sk_msg_check_to_free(struct sk_msg *msg, u32 i, u32 bytes)
{
WARN_ON(i == msg->sg.end && bytes);
}
static inline void sk_msg_apply_bytes(struct sk_psock *psock, u32 bytes)
{
if (psock->apply_bytes) {
if (psock->apply_bytes < bytes)
psock->apply_bytes = 0;
else
psock->apply_bytes -= bytes;
}
}
static inline u32 sk_msg_iter_dist(u32 start, u32 end)
{
return end >= start ? end - start : end + (NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS - start);
}
#define sk_msg_iter_var_prev(var) \
do { \
if (var == 0) \
var = NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS - 1; \
else \
var--; \
} while (0)
#define sk_msg_iter_var_next(var) \
do { \
var++; \
if (var == NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS) \
var = 0; \
} while (0)
#define sk_msg_iter_prev(msg, which) \
sk_msg_iter_var_prev(msg->sg.which)
#define sk_msg_iter_next(msg, which) \
sk_msg_iter_var_next(msg->sg.which)
static inline void sk_msg_clear_meta(struct sk_msg *msg)
{
memset(&msg->sg, 0, offsetofend(struct sk_msg_sg, copy));
}
static inline void sk_msg_init(struct sk_msg *msg)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(msg->sg.data) - 1 != NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS);
memset(msg, 0, sizeof(*msg));
sg_init_marker(msg->sg.data, NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS);
}
static inline void sk_msg_xfer(struct sk_msg *dst, struct sk_msg *src,
int which, u32 size)
{
dst->sg.data[which] = src->sg.data[which];
dst->sg.data[which].length = size;
dst->sg.size += size;
src->sg.size -= size;
src->sg.data[which].length -= size;
src->sg.data[which].offset += size;
}
static inline void sk_msg_xfer_full(struct sk_msg *dst, struct sk_msg *src)
{
memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(*src));
sk_msg_init(src);
}
static inline bool sk_msg_full(const struct sk_msg *msg)
{
return sk_msg_iter_dist(msg->sg.start, msg->sg.end) == MAX_MSG_FRAGS;
}
static inline u32 sk_msg_elem_used(const struct sk_msg *msg)
{
return sk_msg_iter_dist(msg->sg.start, msg->sg.end);
}
static inline struct scatterlist *sk_msg_elem(struct sk_msg *msg, int which)
{
return &msg->sg.data[which];
}
static inline struct scatterlist sk_msg_elem_cpy(struct sk_msg *msg, int which)
{
return msg->sg.data[which];
}
static inline struct page *sk_msg_page(struct sk_msg *msg, int which)
{
return sg_page(sk_msg_elem(msg, which));
}
static inline bool sk_msg_to_ingress(const struct sk_msg *msg)
{
return msg->flags & BPF_F_INGRESS;
}
static inline void sk_msg_compute_data_pointers(struct sk_msg *msg)
{
struct scatterlist *sge = sk_msg_elem(msg, msg->sg.start);
if (test_bit(msg->sg.start, &msg->sg.copy)) {
msg->data = NULL;
msg->data_end = NULL;
} else {
msg->data = sg_virt(sge);
msg->data_end = msg->data + sge->length;
}
}
static inline void sk_msg_page_add(struct sk_msg *msg, struct page *page,
u32 len, u32 offset)
{
struct scatterlist *sge;
get_page(page);
sge = sk_msg_elem(msg, msg->sg.end);
sg_set_page(sge, page, len, offset);
sg_unmark_end(sge);
__set_bit(msg->sg.end, &msg->sg.copy);
msg->sg.size += len;
sk_msg_iter_next(msg, end);
}
static inline void sk_msg_sg_copy(struct sk_msg *msg, u32 i, bool copy_state)
{
do {
if (copy_state)
__set_bit(i, &msg->sg.copy);
else
__clear_bit(i, &msg->sg.copy);
sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
if (i == msg->sg.end)
break;
} while (1);
}
static inline void sk_msg_sg_copy_set(struct sk_msg *msg, u32 start)
{
sk_msg_sg_copy(msg, start, true);
}
static inline void sk_msg_sg_copy_clear(struct sk_msg *msg, u32 start)
{
sk_msg_sg_copy(msg, start, false);
}
static inline struct sk_psock *sk_psock(const struct sock *sk)
{
return __rcu_dereference_sk_user_data_with_flags(sk,
SK_USER_DATA_PSOCK);
}
static inline void sk_psock_queue_msg(struct sk_psock *psock,
struct sk_msg *msg)
{
list_add_tail(&msg->list, &psock->ingress_msg);
}
static inline bool sk_psock_queue_empty(const struct sk_psock *psock)
{
return psock ? list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg) : true;
}
static inline void sk_psock_report_error(struct sk_psock *psock, int err)
{
struct sock *sk = psock->sk;
sk->sk_err = err;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
}
struct sk_psock *sk_psock_init(struct sock *sk, int node);
int sk_psock_init_strp(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock);
void sk_psock_start_strp(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock);
void sk_psock_stop_strp(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock);
void sk_psock_start_verdict(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock);
void sk_psock_stop_verdict(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock);
int sk_psock_msg_verdict(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock,
struct sk_msg *msg);
static inline struct sk_psock_link *sk_psock_init_link(void)
{
return kzalloc(sizeof(struct sk_psock_link),
GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN);
}
static inline void sk_psock_free_link(struct sk_psock_link *link)
{
kfree(link);
}
struct sk_psock_link *sk_psock_link_pop(struct sk_psock *psock);
void __sk_psock_purge_ingress_msg(struct sk_psock *psock);
static inline void sk_psock_cork_free(struct sk_psock *psock)
{
if (psock->cork) {
sk_msg_free(psock->sk, psock->cork);
kfree(psock->cork);
psock->cork = NULL;
}
}
static inline void sk_psock_update_proto(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_psock *psock,
struct proto *ops)
{
/* Pairs with lockless read in sk_clone_lock() */
WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_prot, ops);
}
static inline void sk_psock_restore_proto(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_psock *psock)
{
if (inet_csk_has_ulp(sk)) {
/* TLS does not have an unhash proto in SW cases, but we need
* to ensure we stop using the sock_map unhash routine because
* the associated psock is being removed. So use the original
* unhash handler.
*/
WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_prot->unhash, psock->saved_unhash);
tcp_update_ulp(sk, psock->sk_proto, psock->saved_write_space);
} else {
sk->sk_write_space = psock->saved_write_space;
/* Pairs with lockless read in sk_clone_lock() */
WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_prot, psock->sk_proto);
}
}
static inline void sk_psock_set_state(struct sk_psock *psock,
enum sk_psock_state_bits bit)
{
set_bit(bit, &psock->state);
}
static inline void sk_psock_clear_state(struct sk_psock *psock,
enum sk_psock_state_bits bit)
{
clear_bit(bit, &psock->state);
}
static inline bool sk_psock_test_state(const struct sk_psock *psock,
enum sk_psock_state_bits bit)
{
return test_bit(bit, &psock->state);
}
static inline struct sk_psock *sk_psock_get(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_psock *psock;
rcu_read_lock();
psock = sk_psock(sk);
if (psock && !refcount_inc_not_zero(&psock->refcnt))
psock = NULL;
rcu_read_unlock();
return psock;
}
void sk_psock_stop(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock);
void sk_psock_drop(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock);
static inline void sk_psock_put(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&psock->refcnt))
sk_psock_drop(sk, psock);
}
static inline void sk_psock_data_ready(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock)
{
bpf, skmsg: Fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue commit 6648e613226e18897231ab5e42ffc29e63fa3365 upstream. Fix NULL pointer data-races in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue() which syzbot reported [1]. [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in sk_psock_drop / sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue write to 0xffff88814b3278b8 of 8 bytes by task 10724 on cpu 1: sk_psock_stop_verdict net/core/skmsg.c:1257 [inline] sk_psock_drop+0x13e/0x1f0 net/core/skmsg.c:843 sk_psock_put include/linux/skmsg.h:459 [inline] sock_map_close+0x1a7/0x260 net/core/sock_map.c:1648 unix_release+0x4b/0x80 net/unix/af_unix.c:1048 __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline] sock_close+0x68/0x150 net/socket.c:1421 __fput+0x2c1/0x660 fs/file_table.c:422 __fput_sync+0x44/0x60 fs/file_table.c:507 __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1556 [inline] __se_sys_close+0x101/0x1b0 fs/open.c:1541 __x64_sys_close+0x1f/0x30 fs/open.c:1541 do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 read to 0xffff88814b3278b8 of 8 bytes by task 10713 on cpu 0: sk_psock_data_ready include/linux/skmsg.h:464 [inline] sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue+0x32d/0x390 net/core/skmsg.c:555 sk_psock_skb_ingress_self+0x185/0x1e0 net/core/skmsg.c:606 sk_psock_verdict_apply net/core/skmsg.c:1008 [inline] sk_psock_verdict_recv+0x3e4/0x4a0 net/core/skmsg.c:1202 unix_read_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:2546 [inline] unix_stream_read_skb+0x9e/0xf0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2682 sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0x77/0x220 net/core/skmsg.c:1223 unix_stream_sendmsg+0x527/0x860 net/unix/af_unix.c:2339 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x140/0x180 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x312/0x410 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x1e9/0x280 net/socket.c:2667 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x46/0x50 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 value changed: 0xffffffff83d7feb0 -> 0x0000000000000000 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 10713 Comm: syz-executor.4 Tainted: G W 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024 Prior to this, commit 4cd12c6065df ("bpf, sockmap: Fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready()") fixed one NULL pointer similarly due to no protection of saved_data_ready. Here is another different caller causing the same issue because of the same reason. So we should protect it with sk_callback_lock read lock because the writer side in the sk_psock_drop() uses "write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);". To avoid errors that could happen in future, I move those two pairs of lock into the sk_psock_data_ready(), which is suggested by John Fastabend. Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Reported-by: syzbot+aa8c8ec2538929f18f2d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=aa8c8ec2538929f18f2d Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240329134037.92124-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240404021001.94815-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ashwin Dayanand Kamat <ashwin.kamat@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-04-04 04:10:01 +02:00
read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
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if (psock->parser.enabled)
psock->parser.saved_data_ready(sk);
else
sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
bpf, skmsg: Fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue commit 6648e613226e18897231ab5e42ffc29e63fa3365 upstream. Fix NULL pointer data-races in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue() which syzbot reported [1]. [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in sk_psock_drop / sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue write to 0xffff88814b3278b8 of 8 bytes by task 10724 on cpu 1: sk_psock_stop_verdict net/core/skmsg.c:1257 [inline] sk_psock_drop+0x13e/0x1f0 net/core/skmsg.c:843 sk_psock_put include/linux/skmsg.h:459 [inline] sock_map_close+0x1a7/0x260 net/core/sock_map.c:1648 unix_release+0x4b/0x80 net/unix/af_unix.c:1048 __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline] sock_close+0x68/0x150 net/socket.c:1421 __fput+0x2c1/0x660 fs/file_table.c:422 __fput_sync+0x44/0x60 fs/file_table.c:507 __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1556 [inline] __se_sys_close+0x101/0x1b0 fs/open.c:1541 __x64_sys_close+0x1f/0x30 fs/open.c:1541 do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 read to 0xffff88814b3278b8 of 8 bytes by task 10713 on cpu 0: sk_psock_data_ready include/linux/skmsg.h:464 [inline] sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue+0x32d/0x390 net/core/skmsg.c:555 sk_psock_skb_ingress_self+0x185/0x1e0 net/core/skmsg.c:606 sk_psock_verdict_apply net/core/skmsg.c:1008 [inline] sk_psock_verdict_recv+0x3e4/0x4a0 net/core/skmsg.c:1202 unix_read_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:2546 [inline] unix_stream_read_skb+0x9e/0xf0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2682 sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0x77/0x220 net/core/skmsg.c:1223 unix_stream_sendmsg+0x527/0x860 net/unix/af_unix.c:2339 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x140/0x180 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x312/0x410 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x1e9/0x280 net/socket.c:2667 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x46/0x50 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 value changed: 0xffffffff83d7feb0 -> 0x0000000000000000 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 10713 Comm: syz-executor.4 Tainted: G W 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024 Prior to this, commit 4cd12c6065df ("bpf, sockmap: Fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready()") fixed one NULL pointer similarly due to no protection of saved_data_ready. Here is another different caller causing the same issue because of the same reason. So we should protect it with sk_callback_lock read lock because the writer side in the sk_psock_drop() uses "write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);". To avoid errors that could happen in future, I move those two pairs of lock into the sk_psock_data_ready(), which is suggested by John Fastabend. Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Reported-by: syzbot+aa8c8ec2538929f18f2d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=aa8c8ec2538929f18f2d Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240329134037.92124-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240404021001.94815-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ashwin Dayanand Kamat <ashwin.kamat@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-04-04 04:10:01 +02:00
read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2024-06-15 21:02:09 +02:00
}
static inline void psock_set_prog(struct bpf_prog **pprog,
struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
prog = xchg(pprog, prog);
if (prog)
bpf_prog_put(prog);
}
static inline int psock_replace_prog(struct bpf_prog **pprog,
struct bpf_prog *prog,
struct bpf_prog *old)
{
if (cmpxchg(pprog, old, prog) != old)
return -ENOENT;
if (old)
bpf_prog_put(old);
return 0;
}
static inline void psock_progs_drop(struct sk_psock_progs *progs)
{
psock_set_prog(&progs->msg_parser, NULL);
psock_set_prog(&progs->skb_parser, NULL);
psock_set_prog(&progs->skb_verdict, NULL);
}
int sk_psock_tls_strp_read(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb);
static inline bool sk_psock_strp_enabled(struct sk_psock *psock)
{
if (!psock)
return false;
return psock->parser.enabled;
}
#endif /* _LINUX_SKMSG_H */