604 lines
18 KiB
C
604 lines
18 KiB
C
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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* Copyright 2021 Google LLC
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* Author: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@google.com>
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*
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* This file is the core of fips140.ko, which contains various crypto algorithms
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* that are also built into vmlinux. At load time, this module overrides the
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* built-in implementations of these algorithms with its implementations. It
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* also runs self-tests on these algorithms and verifies the integrity of its
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* code and data. If either of these steps fails, the kernel will panic.
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*
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* This module is intended to be loaded at early boot time in order to meet
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* FIPS 140 and NIAP FPT_TST_EXT.1 requirements. It shouldn't be used if you
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* don't need to meet these requirements.
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*/
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#undef __DISABLE_EXPORTS
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#include <linux/ctype.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <crypto/aead.h>
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#include <crypto/aes.h>
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#include <crypto/hash.h>
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#include <crypto/sha.h>
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#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
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#include <crypto/rng.h>
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#include <trace/hooks/fips140.h>
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#include "fips140-module.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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/*
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* FIPS 140-2 prefers the use of HMAC with a public key over a plain hash.
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*/
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u8 __initdata fips140_integ_hmac_key[] = "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog";
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/* this is populated by the build tool */
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u8 __initdata fips140_integ_hmac_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
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const u32 __initcall_start_marker __section(".initcalls._start");
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const u32 __initcall_end_marker __section(".initcalls._end");
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const u8 __fips140_text_start __section(".text.._start");
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const u8 __fips140_text_end __section(".text.._end");
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const u8 __fips140_rodata_start __section(".rodata.._start");
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const u8 __fips140_rodata_end __section(".rodata.._end");
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/*
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* We need this little detour to prevent Clang from detecting out of bounds
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* accesses to __fips140_text_start and __fips140_rodata_start, which only exist
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* to delineate the section, and so their sizes are not relevant to us.
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*/
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const u32 *__initcall_start = &__initcall_start_marker;
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const u8 *__text_start = &__fips140_text_start;
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const u8 *__rodata_start = &__fips140_rodata_start;
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/*
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* The list of the crypto API algorithms (by cra_name) that will be unregistered
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* by this module, in preparation for the module registering its own
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* implementation(s) of them.
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*
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* All algorithms that will be declared as FIPS-approved in the module
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* certification must be listed here, to ensure that the non-FIPS-approved
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* implementations of these algorithms in the kernel image aren't used.
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*
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* For every algorithm in this list, the module should contain all the "same"
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* implementations that the kernel image does, including the C implementation as
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* well as any architecture-specific implementations. This is needed to avoid
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* performance regressions as well as the possibility of an algorithm being
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* unavailable on some CPUs. E.g., "xcbc(aes)" isn't in this list, as the
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* module doesn't have a C implementation of it (and it won't be FIPS-approved).
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*
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* Due to a quirk in the FIPS requirements, "gcm(aes)" isn't actually able to be
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* FIPS-approved. However, we otherwise treat it the same as the algorithms
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* that will be FIPS-approved, and therefore it's included in this list.
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*
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* When adding a new algorithm here, make sure to consider whether it needs a
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* self-test added to fips140_selftests[] as well.
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*/
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static const struct {
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const char *name;
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bool approved;
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} fips140_algs_to_replace[] = {
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{"aes", true},
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{"cmac(aes)", true},
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{"ecb(aes)", true},
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{"cbc(aes)", true},
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{"cts(cbc(aes))", true},
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{"ctr(aes)", true},
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{"xts(aes)", true},
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{"gcm(aes)", false},
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{"hmac(sha1)", true},
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{"hmac(sha224)", true},
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{"hmac(sha256)", true},
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{"hmac(sha384)", true},
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{"hmac(sha512)", true},
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{"sha1", true},
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{"sha224", true},
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{"sha256", true},
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{"sha384", true},
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{"sha512", true},
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{"stdrng", true},
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{"jitterentropy_rng", false},
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};
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static bool __init fips140_should_unregister_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
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{
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int i;
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/*
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* All software algorithms are synchronous, hardware algorithms must
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* be covered by their own FIPS 140 certification.
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*/
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if (alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC)
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return false;
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fips140_algs_to_replace); i++) {
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if (!strcmp(alg->cra_name, fips140_algs_to_replace[i].name))
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return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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/*
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* FIPS 140-3 service indicators. FIPS 140-3 requires that all services
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* "provide an indicator when the service utilises an approved cryptographic
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* algorithm, security function or process in an approved manner". What this
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* means is very debatable, even with the help of the FIPS 140-3 Implementation
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* Guidance document. However, it was decided that a function that takes in an
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* algorithm name and returns whether that algorithm is approved or not will
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* meet this requirement. Note, this relies on some properties of the module:
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*
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* - The module doesn't distinguish between "services" and "algorithms"; its
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* services are simply its algorithms.
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*
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* - The status of an approved algorithm is never non-approved, since (a) the
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* module doesn't support operating in a non-approved mode, such as a mode
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* where the self-tests are skipped; (b) there are no cases where the module
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* supports non-approved settings for approved algorithms, e.g.
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* non-approved key sizes; and (c) this function isn't available to be
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* called until the module_init function has completed, so it's guaranteed
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* that the self-tests and integrity check have already passed.
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*
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* - The module does support some non-approved algorithms, so a single static
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* indicator ("return true;") would not be acceptable.
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*/
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bool fips140_is_approved_service(const char *name)
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{
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size_t i;
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fips140_algs_to_replace); i++) {
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if (!strcmp(name, fips140_algs_to_replace[i].name))
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return fips140_algs_to_replace[i].approved;
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}
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return false;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fips140_is_approved_service);
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/*
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* FIPS 140-3 requires that modules provide a "service" that outputs "the name
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* or module identifier and the versioning information that can be correlated
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* with a validation record". This function meets that requirement.
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*
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* Note: the module also prints this same information to the kernel log when it
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* is loaded. That might meet the requirement by itself. However, given the
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* vagueness of what counts as a "service", we provide this function too, just
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* in case the certification lab or CMVP is happier with an explicit function.
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*
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* Note: /sys/modules/fips140/scmversion also provides versioning information
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* about the module. However that file just shows the bare git commit ID, so it
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* probably isn't sufficient to meet the FIPS requirement, which seems to want
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* the "official" module name and version number used in the FIPS certificate.
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*/
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const char *fips140_module_version(void)
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{
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return FIPS140_MODULE_NAME " " FIPS140_MODULE_VERSION;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fips140_module_version);
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static LIST_HEAD(existing_live_algos);
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/*
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* Release a list of algorithms which have been removed from crypto_alg_list.
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*
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* Note that even though the list is a private list, we have to hold
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* crypto_alg_sem while iterating through it because crypto_unregister_alg() may
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* run concurrently (as we haven't taken a reference to the algorithms on the
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* list), and crypto_unregister_alg() will remove the algorithm from whichever
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* list it happens to be on, while holding crypto_alg_sem. That's okay, since
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* in that case crypto_unregister_alg() will handle the crypto_alg_put().
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*/
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static void fips140_remove_final(struct list_head *list)
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{
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struct crypto_alg *alg;
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struct crypto_alg *n;
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/*
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* We need to take crypto_alg_sem to safely traverse the list (see
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* comment above), but we have to drop it when doing each
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* crypto_alg_put() as that may take crypto_alg_sem again.
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*/
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down_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
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list_for_each_entry_safe(alg, n, list, cra_list) {
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list_del_init(&alg->cra_list);
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up_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
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crypto_alg_put(alg);
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down_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
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}
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up_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
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}
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static void __init unregister_existing_fips140_algos(void)
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{
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struct crypto_alg *alg, *tmp;
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LIST_HEAD(remove_list);
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LIST_HEAD(spawns);
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down_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
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/*
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* Find all registered algorithms that we care about, and move them to a
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* private list so that they are no longer exposed via the algo lookup
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* API. Subsequently, we will unregister them if they are not in active
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* use. If they are, we can't fully unregister them but we can ensure
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* that new users won't use them.
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*/
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list_for_each_entry_safe(alg, tmp, &crypto_alg_list, cra_list) {
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if (!fips140_should_unregister_alg(alg))
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continue;
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if (refcount_read(&alg->cra_refcnt) == 1) {
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/*
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* This algorithm is not currently in use, but there may
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* be template instances holding references to it via
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* spawns. So let's tear it down like
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* crypto_unregister_alg() would, but without releasing
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* the lock, to prevent races with concurrent TFM
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* allocations.
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*/
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alg->cra_flags |= CRYPTO_ALG_DEAD;
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list_move(&alg->cra_list, &remove_list);
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crypto_remove_spawns(alg, &spawns, NULL);
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} else {
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/*
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* This algorithm is live, i.e. it has TFMs allocated,
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* so we can't fully unregister it. It's not necessary
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* to dynamically redirect existing users to the FIPS
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* code, given that they can't be relying on FIPS
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* certified crypto in the first place. However, we do
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* need to ensure that new users will get the FIPS code.
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*
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* In most cases, setting alg->cra_priority to 0
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* achieves this. However, that isn't enough for
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* algorithms like "hmac(sha256)" that need to be
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* instantiated from a template, since existing
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* algorithms always take priority over a template being
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* instantiated. Therefore, we move the algorithm to
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* a private list so that algorithm lookups won't find
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* it anymore. To further distinguish it from the FIPS
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* algorithms, we also append "+orig" to its name.
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*/
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pr_info("found already-live algorithm '%s' ('%s')\n",
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alg->cra_name, alg->cra_driver_name);
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alg->cra_priority = 0;
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strlcat(alg->cra_name, "+orig", CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
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strlcat(alg->cra_driver_name, "+orig",
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CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
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list_move(&alg->cra_list, &existing_live_algos);
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}
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}
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up_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
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fips140_remove_final(&remove_list);
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fips140_remove_final(&spawns);
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}
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static void __init unapply_text_relocations(void *section, int section_size,
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const Elf64_Rela *rela, int numrels)
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{
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while (numrels--) {
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u32 *place = (u32 *)(section + rela->r_offset);
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BUG_ON(rela->r_offset >= section_size);
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switch (ELF64_R_TYPE(rela->r_info)) {
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#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64
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case R_AARCH64_JUMP26:
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case R_AARCH64_CALL26:
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*place &= ~GENMASK(25, 0);
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break;
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case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_LO21:
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case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21:
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case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21_NC:
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*place &= ~(GENMASK(30, 29) | GENMASK(23, 5));
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break;
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case R_AARCH64_ADD_ABS_LO12_NC:
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case R_AARCH64_LDST8_ABS_LO12_NC:
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case R_AARCH64_LDST16_ABS_LO12_NC:
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case R_AARCH64_LDST32_ABS_LO12_NC:
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case R_AARCH64_LDST64_ABS_LO12_NC:
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case R_AARCH64_LDST128_ABS_LO12_NC:
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*place &= ~GENMASK(21, 10);
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break;
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default:
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pr_err("unhandled relocation type %llu\n",
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ELF64_R_TYPE(rela->r_info));
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BUG();
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#else
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#error
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#endif
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}
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rela++;
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}
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}
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static void __init unapply_rodata_relocations(void *section, int section_size,
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const Elf64_Rela *rela, int numrels)
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{
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while (numrels--) {
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void *place = section + rela->r_offset;
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BUG_ON(rela->r_offset >= section_size);
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switch (ELF64_R_TYPE(rela->r_info)) {
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#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64
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case R_AARCH64_ABS64:
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*(u64 *)place = 0;
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break;
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default:
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pr_err("unhandled relocation type %llu\n",
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ELF64_R_TYPE(rela->r_info));
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BUG();
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#else
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#error
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#endif
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}
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rela++;
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}
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}
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extern struct {
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u32 offset;
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u32 count;
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} fips140_rela_text, fips140_rela_rodata;
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static bool __init check_fips140_module_hmac(void)
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{
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struct crypto_shash *tfm = NULL;
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SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, dontcare);
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u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
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void *textcopy, *rodatacopy;
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int textsize, rodatasize;
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bool ok = false;
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int err;
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textsize = &__fips140_text_end - &__fips140_text_start;
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rodatasize = &__fips140_rodata_end - &__fips140_rodata_start;
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pr_info("text size : 0x%x\n", textsize);
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pr_info("rodata size: 0x%x\n", rodatasize);
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textcopy = kmalloc(textsize + rodatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!textcopy) {
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pr_err("Failed to allocate memory for copy of .text\n");
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goto out;
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}
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rodatacopy = textcopy + textsize;
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memcpy(textcopy, __text_start, textsize);
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memcpy(rodatacopy, __rodata_start, rodatasize);
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// apply the relocations in reverse on the copies of .text and .rodata
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unapply_text_relocations(textcopy, textsize,
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offset_to_ptr(&fips140_rela_text.offset),
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fips140_rela_text.count);
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unapply_rodata_relocations(rodatacopy, rodatasize,
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offset_to_ptr(&fips140_rela_rodata.offset),
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fips140_rela_rodata.count);
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fips140_inject_integrity_failure(textcopy);
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tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(sha256)", 0, 0);
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if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
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pr_err("failed to allocate hmac tfm (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(tfm));
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tfm = NULL;
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goto out;
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}
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desc->tfm = tfm;
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pr_info("using '%s' for integrity check\n",
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crypto_shash_driver_name(tfm));
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|
err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, fips140_integ_hmac_key,
|
||
|
strlen(fips140_integ_hmac_key)) ?:
|
||
|
crypto_shash_init(desc) ?:
|
||
|
crypto_shash_update(desc, textcopy, textsize) ?:
|
||
|
crypto_shash_finup(desc, rodatacopy, rodatasize, digest);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Zeroizing this is important; see the comment below. */
|
||
|
shash_desc_zero(desc);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (err) {
|
||
|
pr_err("failed to calculate hmac shash (%d)\n", err);
|
||
|
goto out;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (memcmp(digest, fips140_integ_hmac_digest, sizeof(digest))) {
|
||
|
pr_err("provided_digest : %*phN\n", (int)sizeof(digest),
|
||
|
fips140_integ_hmac_digest);
|
||
|
|
||
|
pr_err("calculated digest: %*phN\n", (int)sizeof(digest),
|
||
|
digest);
|
||
|
goto out;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
ok = true;
|
||
|
out:
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* FIPS 140-3 requires that all "temporary value(s) generated during the
|
||
|
* integrity test" be zeroized (ref: FIPS 140-3 IG 9.7.B). There is no
|
||
|
* technical reason to do this given that these values are public
|
||
|
* information, but this is the requirement so we follow it.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
|
||
|
memzero_explicit(digest, sizeof(digest));
|
||
|
kfree_sensitive(textcopy);
|
||
|
return ok;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static void fips140_sha256(void *p, const u8 *data, unsigned int len, u8 *out,
|
||
|
int *hook_inuse)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
sha256(data, len, out);
|
||
|
*hook_inuse = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static void fips140_aes_expandkey(void *p, struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx,
|
||
|
const u8 *in_key, unsigned int key_len,
|
||
|
int *err)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
*err = aes_expandkey(ctx, in_key, key_len);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static void fips140_aes_encrypt(void *priv, const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx,
|
||
|
u8 *out, const u8 *in, int *hook_inuse)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
aes_encrypt(ctx, out, in);
|
||
|
*hook_inuse = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static void fips140_aes_decrypt(void *priv, const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx,
|
||
|
u8 *out, const u8 *in, int *hook_inuse)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
aes_decrypt(ctx, out, in);
|
||
|
*hook_inuse = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static bool update_fips140_library_routines(void)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int ret;
|
||
|
|
||
|
ret = register_trace_android_vh_sha256(fips140_sha256, NULL) ?:
|
||
|
register_trace_android_vh_aes_expandkey(fips140_aes_expandkey, NULL) ?:
|
||
|
register_trace_android_vh_aes_encrypt(fips140_aes_encrypt, NULL) ?:
|
||
|
register_trace_android_vh_aes_decrypt(fips140_aes_decrypt, NULL);
|
||
|
|
||
|
return ret == 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* Initialize the FIPS 140 module.
|
||
|
*
|
||
|
* Note: this routine iterates over the contents of the initcall section, which
|
||
|
* consists of an array of function pointers that was emitted by the linker
|
||
|
* rather than the compiler. This means that these function pointers lack the
|
||
|
* usual CFI stubs that the compiler emits when CFI codegen is enabled. So
|
||
|
* let's disable CFI locally when handling the initcall array, to avoid
|
||
|
* surpises.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
static int __init __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("cfi")))
|
||
|
fips140_init(void)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
const u32 *initcall;
|
||
|
|
||
|
pr_info("loading " FIPS140_MODULE_NAME " " FIPS140_MODULE_VERSION "\n");
|
||
|
fips140_init_thread = current;
|
||
|
|
||
|
unregister_existing_fips140_algos();
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* iterate over all init routines present in this module and call them */
|
||
|
for (initcall = __initcall_start + 1;
|
||
|
initcall < &__initcall_end_marker;
|
||
|
initcall++) {
|
||
|
int (*init)(void) = offset_to_ptr(initcall);
|
||
|
int err = init();
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* ENODEV is expected from initcalls that only register
|
||
|
* algorithms that depend on non-present CPU features. Besides
|
||
|
* that, errors aren't expected here.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (err && err != -ENODEV) {
|
||
|
pr_err("initcall %ps() failed: %d\n", init, err);
|
||
|
goto panic;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!fips140_run_selftests())
|
||
|
goto panic;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* It may seem backward to perform the integrity check last, but this
|
||
|
* is intentional: the check itself uses hmac(sha256) which is one of
|
||
|
* the algorithms that are replaced with versions from this module, and
|
||
|
* the integrity check must use the replacement version. Also, to be
|
||
|
* ready for FIPS 140-3, the integrity check algorithm must have already
|
||
|
* been self-tested.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!check_fips140_module_hmac()) {
|
||
|
pr_crit("integrity check failed -- giving up!\n");
|
||
|
goto panic;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
pr_info("integrity check passed\n");
|
||
|
|
||
|
complete_all(&fips140_tests_done);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!update_fips140_library_routines())
|
||
|
goto panic;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!fips140_eval_testing_init())
|
||
|
goto panic;
|
||
|
|
||
|
pr_info("module successfully loaded\n");
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
panic:
|
||
|
panic("FIPS 140 module load failure");
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
module_init(fips140_init);
|
||
|
|
||
|
MODULE_IMPORT_NS(CRYPTO_INTERNAL);
|
||
|
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* Crypto-related helper functions, reproduced here so that they will be
|
||
|
* covered by the FIPS 140 integrity check.
|
||
|
*
|
||
|
* Non-cryptographic helper functions such as memcpy() can be excluded from the
|
||
|
* FIPS module, but there is ambiguity about other helper functions like
|
||
|
* __crypto_xor() and crypto_inc() which aren't cryptographic by themselves,
|
||
|
* but are more closely associated with cryptography than e.g. memcpy(). To
|
||
|
* err on the side of caution, we include copies of these in the FIPS module.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
void __crypto_xor(u8 *dst, const u8 *src1, const u8 *src2, unsigned int len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
while (len >= 8) {
|
||
|
*(u64 *)dst = *(u64 *)src1 ^ *(u64 *)src2;
|
||
|
dst += 8;
|
||
|
src1 += 8;
|
||
|
src2 += 8;
|
||
|
len -= 8;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
while (len >= 4) {
|
||
|
*(u32 *)dst = *(u32 *)src1 ^ *(u32 *)src2;
|
||
|
dst += 4;
|
||
|
src1 += 4;
|
||
|
src2 += 4;
|
||
|
len -= 4;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
while (len >= 2) {
|
||
|
*(u16 *)dst = *(u16 *)src1 ^ *(u16 *)src2;
|
||
|
dst += 2;
|
||
|
src1 += 2;
|
||
|
src2 += 2;
|
||
|
len -= 2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
while (len--)
|
||
|
*dst++ = *src1++ ^ *src2++;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
void crypto_inc(u8 *a, unsigned int size)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
a += size;
|
||
|
|
||
|
while (size--)
|
||
|
if (++*--a)
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
}
|