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kernel_samsung_a53x/patches/Implement-SUSFS-v1.5.4-for-KernelSU-Next.patch

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2025-01-28 12:06:07 +01:00
From 2dfb17ff9e59395b2914d6d4dc4749b6b4ed3e9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: sidex15 <24408329+sidex15@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2025 16:38:46 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] Kernel: Implement SUSFS v1.5.4 Universal
---
.gitignore | 3 +
kernel/Kconfig | 144 ++++++++++++
kernel/Makefile | 62 +++++
kernel/allowlist.c | 10 +-
kernel/apk_sign.c | 2 +-
kernel/apk_sign.h | 2 +-
kernel/core_hook.c | 495 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
kernel/kernel_compat.c | 10 +
kernel/kernel_compat.h | 1 +
kernel/ksu.c | 16 +-
kernel/ksud.c | 23 +-
kernel/ksud.h | 2 +-
kernel/manager.h | 2 +-
kernel/selinux/rules.c | 16 +-
kernel/selinux/selinux.c | 95 +++++++-
kernel/selinux/selinux.h | 24 +-
kernel/sucompat.c | 52 +++-
kernel/throne_tracker.c | 4 +-
kernel/throne_tracker.h | 2 +-
19 files changed, 905 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 706fd07f..e38b0406 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -1,2 +1,5 @@
.idea
.vscode
+*.patch
+*.rej
+*.orig
diff --git a/kernel/Kconfig b/kernel/Kconfig
index 1f3802f6..c16b2e30 100644
--- a/kernel/Kconfig
+++ b/kernel/Kconfig
@@ -24,4 +24,148 @@ config KSU_ALLOWLIST_WORKAROUND
Enable session keyring init workaround for problematic devices.
Useful for situations where the SU allowlist is not kept after a reboot.
+menu "KernelSU - SUSFS"
+config KSU_SUSFS
+ bool "KernelSU addon - SUSFS"
+ depends on KSU
+ default y
+ help
+ Patch and Enable SUSFS to kernel with KernelSU.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_HAS_MAGIC_MOUNT
+ bool "Say yes if the current KernelSU repo has magic mount implemented (default n)"
+ depends on KSU
+ default y
+ help
+ - Enable to indicate that the current SUSFS kernel supports the auto hide features for 5ec1cff's Magic Mount KernelSU
+ - Every mounts from /debug_ramdisk/workdir will be treated as magic mount and processed differently by susfs
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_SUS_PATH
+ bool "Enable to hide suspicious path (NOT recommended)"
+ depends on KSU_SUSFS
+ default y
+ help
+ - Allow hiding the user-defined path and all its sub-paths from various system calls.
+ - tmpfs filesystem is not allowed to be added.
+ - Effective only on zygote spawned user app process.
+ - Use with cautious as it may cause performance loss and will be vulnerable to side channel attacks,
+ just disable this feature if it doesn't work for you or you don't need it at all.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+ bool "Enable to hide suspicious mounts"
+ depends on KSU_SUSFS
+ default y
+ help
+ - Allow hiding the user-defined mount paths from /proc/self/[mounts|mountinfo|mountstat].
+ - Effective on all processes for hiding mount entries.
+ - Mounts mounted by process with ksu domain will be forced to be assigned the dev name "KSU".
+ - mnt_id and mnt_group_id of the sus mount will be assigned to a much bigger number to solve the issue of id not being contiguous.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_KSU_DEFAULT_MOUNT
+ bool "Enable to hide KSU's default mounts automatically (experimental)"
+ depends on KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+ default y
+ help
+ - Automatically add KSU's default mounts to sus_mount.
+ - No susfs command is needed in userspace.
+ - Only mount operation from process with ksu domain will be checked.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_BIND_MOUNT
+ bool "Enable to hide suspicious bind mounts automatically (experimental)"
+ depends on KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+ default y
+ help
+ - Automatically add binded mounts to sus_mount.
+ - No susfs command is needed in userspace.
+ - Only mount operation from process with ksu domain will be checked.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_SUS_KSTAT
+ bool "Enable to spoof suspicious kstat"
+ depends on KSU_SUSFS
+ default y
+ help
+ - Allow spoofing the kstat of user-defined file/directory.
+ - Effective only on zygote spawned user app process.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_SUS_OVERLAYFS
+ bool "Enable to automatically spoof kstat and kstatfs for overlayed files/directories"
+ depends on KSU_SUSFS
+ default n
+ help
+ - Automatically spoof the kstat and kstatfs for overlayed files/directories.
+ - Enable it if you are using legacy KernelSU and dont have auto hide features enabled.
+ - No susfs command is needed in userspace.
+ - Effective on all processes.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
+ bool "Enable to use ksu's ksu_try_umount"
+ depends on KSU_SUSFS
+ default y
+ help
+ - Allow using ksu_try_umount to umount other user-defined mount paths prior to ksu's default umount paths.
+ - Effective on all NO-root-access-granted processes.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT_FOR_BIND_MOUNT
+ bool "Enable to add bind mounts to ksu's ksu_try_umount automatically (experimental)"
+ depends on KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
+ default y
+ help
+ - Automatically add binded mounts to ksu's ksu_try_umount.
+ - No susfs command is needed in userspace.
+ - Only mount operation from process with ksu domain will be checked.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_UNAME
+ bool "Enable to spoof uname"
+ depends on KSU_SUSFS
+ default y
+ help
+ - Allow spoofing the string returned by uname syscall to user-defined string.
+ - Effective on all processes.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_ENABLE_LOG
+ bool "Enable logging susfs log to kernel"
+ depends on KSU_SUSFS
+ default y
+ help
+ - Allow logging susfs log to kernel, uncheck it to completely disable all susfs log.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_HIDE_KSU_SUSFS_SYMBOLS
+ bool "Enable to automatically hide ksu and susfs symbols from /proc/kallsyms"
+ depends on KSU_SUSFS
+ default y
+ help
+ - Automatically hide ksu and susfs symbols from '/proc/kallsyms'.
+ - Effective on all processes.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_CMDLINE_OR_BOOTCONFIG
+ bool "Enable to spoof /proc/bootconfig (gki) or /proc/cmdline (non-gki)"
+ depends on KSU_SUSFS
+ default y
+ help
+ - Spoof the output of /proc/bootconfig (gki) or /proc/cmdline (non-gki) with a user-defined file.
+ - Effective on all processes.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_OPEN_REDIRECT
+ bool "Enable to redirect a path to be opened with another path (experimental)"
+ depends on KSU_SUSFS
+ default y
+ help
+ - Allow redirecting a target path to be opened with another user-defined path.
+ - Effective only on processes with uid < 2000.
+ - Please be reminded that process with open access to the target and redirected path can be detected.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+ bool "Enable SUS-SU in runtime temporarily"
+ depends on KSU_SUSFS && KPROBES && HAVE_KPROBES && KPROBE_EVENTS
+ default y
+ help
+ - Allow user to enable or disable core ksu kprobes hooks temporarily in runtime. There are 2 working modes for sus_su.
+ - Mode 0 (default): Disable sus_su, and enable ksu kprobe hooks for su instead.
+ - Mode 1 (deprecated):
+ - Mode 2: Enable sus_su, and disable ksu kprobe hooks for su, which means the kernel inline hooks are enabled,
+ the same as the su implementaion of non-gki kernel without kprobe supported.
+ - Only apps with root access granted by ksu manager are allowed to get root.
+
+endmenu
+
endmenu
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 9a35b3bf..d147c447 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -138,4 +138,66 @@ endif
ccflags-y += -Wno-implicit-function-declaration -Wno-strict-prototypes -Wno-int-conversion -Wno-gcc-compat
ccflags-y += -Wno-declaration-after-statement -Wno-unused-function
+## For non-gki compatiblity ##
+ifeq ($(shell grep -q " current_sid(void)" $(srctree)/security/selinux/include/objsec.h; echo $$?),0)
+ccflags-y += -DKSU_COMPAT_HAS_CURRENT_SID
+endif
+
+ifeq ($(shell grep -q "struct selinux_state " $(srctree)/security/selinux/include/security.h; echo $$?),0)
+ccflags-y += -DKSU_COMPAT_HAS_SELINUX_STATE
+endif
+
+ccflags-y += -DKSU_UMOUNT
+ifneq ($(shell grep -Eq "^static int can_umount" $(srctree)/fs/namespace.c; echo $$?),0)
+$(info -- KSU_SUSFS: adding function 'static int can_umount(const struct path *path, int flags);' to $(srctree)/fs/namespace.c)
+CAN_UMOUNT = static int can_umount(const struct path *path, int flags)\n\
+{\n\t\
+ struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);\n\t\
+ if (flags & ~(MNT_FORCE | MNT_DETACH | MNT_EXPIRE | UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW))\n\t\t\
+ return -EINVAL;\n\t\
+ if (!may_mount())\n\t\t\
+ return -EPERM;\n\t\
+ if (path->dentry != path->mnt->mnt_root)\n\t\t\
+ return -EINVAL;\n\t\
+ if (!check_mnt(mnt))\n\t\t\
+ return -EINVAL;\n\t\
+ if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)\n\t\t\
+ return -EINVAL;\n\t\
+ if (flags & MNT_FORCE && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))\n\t\t\
+ return -EPERM;\n\t\
+ return 0;\n\
+}\n
+$(shell sed -i '/^static bool is_mnt_ns_file/i $(CAN_UMOUNT)' $(srctree)/fs/namespace.c;)
+endif
+
+ifneq ($(shell grep -Eq "^int path_umount" $(srctree)/fs/namespace.c; echo $$?),0)
+$(info -- KSU_SUSFS: adding function 'int path_umount(struct path *path, int flags);' to $(srctree)/fs/namespace.c)
+PATH_UMOUNT = int path_umount(struct path *path, int flags)\n\
+{\n\t\
+ struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);\n\t\
+ int ret;\n\t\
+ ret = can_umount(path, flags);\n\t\
+ if (!ret)\n\t\t\
+ ret = do_umount(mnt, flags);\n\t\
+ dput(path->dentry);\n\t\
+ mntput_no_expire(mnt);\n\t\
+ return ret;\n\
+}\n
+$(shell sed -i '/^static bool is_mnt_ns_file/i $(PATH_UMOUNT)' $(srctree)/fs/namespace.c;)
+endif
+
+ifneq ($(shell grep -Eq "^int path_umount" $(srctree)/fs/internal.h; echo $$?),0)
+$(shell sed -i '/^extern void __init mnt_init/a int path_umount(struct path *path, int flags);' $(srctree)/fs/internal.h;)
+$(info -- KSU_SUSFS: adding 'int path_umount(struct path *path, int flags);' to $(srctree)/fs/internal.h)
+endif
+
+## For susfs stuff ##
+ifeq ($(shell test -e $(srctree)/fs/susfs.c; echo $$?),0)
+$(eval SUSFS_VERSION=$(shell cat $(srctree)/include/linux/susfs.h | grep -E '^#define SUSFS_VERSION' | cut -d' ' -f3 | sed 's/"//g'))
+$(info )
+$(info -- SUSFS_VERSION: $(SUSFS_VERSION))
+else
+$(info -- You have not integrate susfs in your kernel.)
+$(info -- Read: https://gitlab.com/simonpunk/susfs4ksu)
+endif
# Keep a new line here!! Because someone may append config
diff --git a/kernel/allowlist.c b/kernel/allowlist.c
index 443ce430..42c44f64 100644
--- a/kernel/allowlist.c
+++ b/kernel/allowlist.c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static uint8_t allow_list_bitmap[PAGE_SIZE] __read_mostly __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
static struct work_struct ksu_save_work;
static struct work_struct ksu_load_work;
-bool persistent_allow_list(void);
+static bool persistent_allow_list(void);
void ksu_show_allow_list(void)
{
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ bool __ksu_is_allow_uid(uid_t uid)
if (unlikely(uid == 0)) {
// already root, but only allow our domain.
- return is_ksu_domain();
+ return ksu_is_ksu_domain();
}
if (forbid_system_uid(uid)) {
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ bool ksu_get_allow_list(int *array, int *length, bool allow)
return true;
}
-void do_save_allow_list(struct work_struct *work)
+static void do_save_allow_list(struct work_struct *work)
{
u32 magic = FILE_MAGIC;
u32 version = FILE_FORMAT_VERSION;
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ exit:
filp_close(fp, 0);
}
-void do_load_allow_list(struct work_struct *work)
+static void do_load_allow_list(struct work_struct *work)
{
loff_t off = 0;
ssize_t ret = 0;
@@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ void ksu_prune_allowlist(bool (*is_uid_valid)(uid_t, char *, void *), void *data
}
// make sure allow list works cross boot
-bool persistent_allow_list(void)
+static bool persistent_allow_list(void)
{
return ksu_queue_work(&ksu_save_work);
}
diff --git a/kernel/apk_sign.c b/kernel/apk_sign.c
index 384bb1c5..87401814 100644
--- a/kernel/apk_sign.c
+++ b/kernel/apk_sign.c
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ module_param_cb(ksu_debug_manager_uid, &expected_size_ops,
#endif
-bool is_manager_apk(char *path)
+bool ksu_is_manager_apk(char *path)
{
return check_v2_signature(path, EXPECTED_NEXT_SIZE, EXPECTED_NEXT_HASH);
}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/kernel/apk_sign.h b/kernel/apk_sign.h
index bed501c4..e02aa514 100644
--- a/kernel/apk_sign.h
+++ b/kernel/apk_sign.h
@@ -3,6 +3,6 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
-bool is_manager_apk(char *path);
+bool ksu_is_manager_apk(char *path);
#endif
diff --git a/kernel/core_hook.c b/kernel/core_hook.c
index 8694838d..b3fa3dcb 100644
--- a/kernel/core_hook.c
+++ b/kernel/core_hook.c
@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+#include <linux/susfs.h>
+#endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+
#include "allowlist.h"
#include "arch.h"
#include "core_hook.h"
@@ -49,13 +53,79 @@
#define KSU_GET_CRED_RCU
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+bool susfs_is_allow_su(void)
+{
+ if (ksu_is_manager()) {
+ // we are manager, allow!
+ return true;
+ }
+ return ksu_is_allow_uid(current_uid().val);
+}
+
+extern u32 susfs_zygote_sid;
+extern bool susfs_is_mnt_devname_ksu(struct path *path);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
+extern void susfs_run_try_umount_for_current_mnt_ns(void);
+#endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+static bool susfs_is_umount_for_zygote_system_process_enabled = false;
+#endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_BIND_MOUNT
+extern bool susfs_is_auto_add_sus_bind_mount_enabled;
+#endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_BIND_MOUNT
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_KSU_DEFAULT_MOUNT
+extern bool susfs_is_auto_add_sus_ksu_default_mount_enabled;
+#endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_KSU_DEFAULT_MOUNT
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT_FOR_BIND_MOUNT
+extern bool susfs_is_auto_add_try_umount_for_bind_mount_enabled;
+#endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT_FOR_BIND_MOUNT
+
+static inline void susfs_on_post_fs_data(void) {
+ struct path path;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+ if (!kern_path(DATA_ADB_UMOUNT_FOR_ZYGOTE_SYSTEM_PROCESS, 0, &path)) {
+ susfs_is_umount_for_zygote_system_process_enabled = true;
+ path_put(&path);
+ }
+ pr_info("susfs_is_umount_for_zygote_system_process_enabled: %d\n", susfs_is_umount_for_zygote_system_process_enabled);
+#endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_BIND_MOUNT
+ if (!kern_path(DATA_ADB_NO_AUTO_ADD_SUS_BIND_MOUNT, 0, &path)) {
+ susfs_is_auto_add_sus_bind_mount_enabled = false;
+ path_put(&path);
+ }
+ pr_info("susfs_is_auto_add_sus_bind_mount_enabled: %d\n", susfs_is_auto_add_sus_bind_mount_enabled);
+#endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_BIND_MOUNT
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_KSU_DEFAULT_MOUNT
+ if (!kern_path(DATA_ADB_NO_AUTO_ADD_SUS_KSU_DEFAULT_MOUNT, 0, &path)) {
+ susfs_is_auto_add_sus_ksu_default_mount_enabled = false;
+ path_put(&path);
+ }
+ pr_info("susfs_is_auto_add_sus_ksu_default_mount_enabled: %d\n", susfs_is_auto_add_sus_ksu_default_mount_enabled);
+#endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_KSU_DEFAULT_MOUNT
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT_FOR_BIND_MOUNT
+ if (!kern_path(DATA_ADB_NO_AUTO_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT_FOR_BIND_MOUNT, 0, &path)) {
+ susfs_is_auto_add_try_umount_for_bind_mount_enabled = false;
+ path_put(&path);
+ }
+ pr_info("susfs_is_auto_add_try_umount_for_bind_mount_enabled: %d\n", susfs_is_auto_add_try_umount_for_bind_mount_enabled);
+#endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT_FOR_BIND_MOUNT
+}
+#endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+extern bool susfs_is_sus_su_ready;
+#endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+
static bool ksu_module_mounted = false;
-extern int handle_sepolicy(unsigned long arg3, void __user *arg4);
+extern int ksu_handle_sepolicy(unsigned long arg3, void __user *arg4);
static inline bool is_allow_su()
{
- if (is_manager()) {
+ if (ksu_is_manager()) {
// we are manager, allow!
return true;
}
@@ -132,7 +202,7 @@ static void disable_seccomp(void)
#endif
}
-void escape_to_root(void)
+void ksu_escape_to_root(void)
{
struct cred *cred;
@@ -201,7 +271,7 @@ void escape_to_root(void)
disable_seccomp();
spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
- setup_selinux(profile->selinux_domain);
+ ksu_setup_selinux(profile->selinux_domain);
}
int ksu_handle_rename(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct dentry *new_dentry)
@@ -238,7 +308,7 @@ int ksu_handle_rename(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct dentry *new_dentry)
pr_info("renameat: %s -> %s, new path: %s\n", old_dentry->d_iname,
new_dentry->d_iname, buf);
- track_throne();
+ ksu_track_throne();
return 0;
}
@@ -263,7 +333,7 @@ int ksu_handle_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
}
bool from_root = 0 == current_uid().val;
- bool from_manager = is_manager();
+ bool from_manager = ksu_is_manager();
if (!from_root && !from_manager) {
// only root or manager can access this interface
@@ -287,7 +357,7 @@ int ksu_handle_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
if (arg2 == CMD_GRANT_ROOT) {
if (is_allow_su()) {
pr_info("allow root for: %d\n", current_uid().val);
- escape_to_root();
+ ksu_escape_to_root();
if (copy_to_user(result, &reply_ok, sizeof(reply_ok))) {
pr_err("grant_root: prctl reply error\n");
}
@@ -319,10 +389,13 @@ int ksu_handle_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
switch (arg3) {
case EVENT_POST_FS_DATA: {
static bool post_fs_data_lock = false;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+ susfs_on_post_fs_data();
+#endif
if (!post_fs_data_lock) {
post_fs_data_lock = true;
pr_info("post-fs-data triggered\n");
- on_post_fs_data();
+ ksu_on_post_fs_data();
}
break;
}
@@ -349,7 +422,7 @@ int ksu_handle_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
if (!from_root) {
return 0;
}
- if (!handle_sepolicy(arg3, arg4)) {
+ if (!ksu_handle_sepolicy(arg3, arg4)) {
if (copy_to_user(result, &reply_ok, sizeof(reply_ok))) {
pr_err("sepolicy: prctl reply error\n");
}
@@ -410,6 +483,338 @@ int ksu_handle_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
return 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+ if (current_uid_val == 0) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_PATH
+ if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_PATH) {
+ int error = 0;
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(struct st_susfs_sus_path))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_PATH -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_PATH -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ error = susfs_add_sus_path((struct st_susfs_sus_path __user*)arg3);
+ pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_PATH -> ret: %d\n", error);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+ pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_PATH
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+ if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_MOUNT) {
+ int error = 0;
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(struct st_susfs_sus_mount))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_MOUNT -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_MOUNT -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ error = susfs_add_sus_mount((struct st_susfs_sus_mount __user*)arg3);
+ pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_MOUNT -> ret: %d\n", error);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+ pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_KSTAT
+ if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_KSTAT) {
+ int error = 0;
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(struct st_susfs_sus_kstat))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_KSTAT -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_KSTAT -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ error = susfs_add_sus_kstat((struct st_susfs_sus_kstat __user*)arg3);
+ pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_KSTAT -> ret: %d\n", error);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+ pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_UPDATE_SUS_KSTAT) {
+ int error = 0;
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(struct st_susfs_sus_kstat))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_UPDATE_SUS_KSTAT -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_UPDATE_SUS_KSTAT -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ error = susfs_update_sus_kstat((struct st_susfs_sus_kstat __user*)arg3);
+ pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_UPDATE_SUS_KSTAT -> ret: %d\n", error);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+ pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_KSTAT_STATICALLY) {
+ int error = 0;
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(struct st_susfs_sus_kstat))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_KSTAT_STATICALLY -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_KSTAT_STATICALLY -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ error = susfs_add_sus_kstat((struct st_susfs_sus_kstat __user*)arg3);
+ pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_KSTAT_STATICALLY -> ret: %d\n", error);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+ pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_KSTAT
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
+ if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT) {
+ int error = 0;
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(struct st_susfs_try_umount))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ error = susfs_add_try_umount((struct st_susfs_try_umount __user*)arg3);
+ pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT -> ret: %d\n", error);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+ pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_RUN_UMOUNT_FOR_CURRENT_MNT_NS) {
+ int error = 0;
+ susfs_run_try_umount_for_current_mnt_ns();
+ pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_RUN_UMOUNT_FOR_CURRENT_MNT_NS -> ret: %d\n", error);
+ }
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_UNAME
+ if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_SET_UNAME) {
+ int error = 0;
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(struct st_susfs_uname))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SET_UNAME -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SET_UNAME -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ error = susfs_set_uname((struct st_susfs_uname __user*)arg3);
+ pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SET_UNAME -> ret: %d\n", error);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+ pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_UNAME
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_ENABLE_LOG
+ if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_ENABLE_LOG) {
+ int error = 0;
+ if (arg3 != 0 && arg3 != 1) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ENABLE_LOG -> arg3 can only be 0 or 1\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ susfs_set_log(arg3);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+ pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_ENABLE_LOG
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_CMDLINE_OR_BOOTCONFIG
+ if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_SET_CMDLINE_OR_BOOTCONFIG) {
+ int error = 0;
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, SUSFS_FAKE_CMDLINE_OR_BOOTCONFIG_SIZE)) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SET_CMDLINE_OR_BOOTCONFIG -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SET_CMDLINE_OR_BOOTCONFIG -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ error = susfs_set_cmdline_or_bootconfig((char __user*)arg3);
+ pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SET_CMDLINE_OR_BOOTCONFIG -> ret: %d\n", error);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+ pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_CMDLINE_OR_BOOTCONFIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_OPEN_REDIRECT
+ if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_ADD_OPEN_REDIRECT) {
+ int error = 0;
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(struct st_susfs_open_redirect))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_OPEN_REDIRECT -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_OPEN_REDIRECT -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ error = susfs_add_open_redirect((struct st_susfs_open_redirect __user*)arg3);
+ pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_OPEN_REDIRECT -> ret: %d\n", error);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+ pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_OPEN_REDIRECT
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+ if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_SUS_SU) {
+ int error = 0;
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(struct st_sus_su))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SUS_SU -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SUS_SU -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ error = susfs_sus_su((struct st_sus_su __user*)arg3);
+ pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SUS_SU -> ret: %d\n", error);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+ pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+ if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_VERSION) {
+ int error = 0;
+ int len_of_susfs_version = strlen(SUSFS_VERSION);
+ char *susfs_version = SUSFS_VERSION;
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, len_of_susfs_version+1)) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_VERSION -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_VERSION -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ error = copy_to_user((void __user*)arg3, (void*)susfs_version, len_of_susfs_version+1);
+ pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_VERSION -> ret: %d\n", error);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+ pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_ENABLED_FEATURES) {
+ int error = 0;
+ u64 enabled_features = 0;
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(u64))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_ENABLED_FEATURES -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_ENABLED_FEATURES -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_PATH
+ enabled_features |= (1 << 0);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+ enabled_features |= (1 << 1);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_KSU_DEFAULT_MOUNT
+ enabled_features |= (1 << 2);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_BIND_MOUNT
+ enabled_features |= (1 << 3);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_KSTAT
+ enabled_features |= (1 << 4);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_OVERLAYFS
+ enabled_features |= (1 << 5);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
+ enabled_features |= (1 << 6);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT_FOR_BIND_MOUNT
+ enabled_features |= (1 << 7);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_UNAME
+ enabled_features |= (1 << 8);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_ENABLE_LOG
+ enabled_features |= (1 << 9);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_HIDE_KSU_SUSFS_SYMBOLS
+ enabled_features |= (1 << 10);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_CMDLINE_OR_BOOTCONFIG
+ enabled_features |= (1 << 11);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_OPEN_REDIRECT
+ enabled_features |= (1 << 12);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+ enabled_features |= (1 << 13);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_HAS_MAGIC_MOUNT
+ enabled_features |= (1 << 14);
+#endif
+ error = copy_to_user((void __user*)arg3, (void*)&enabled_features, sizeof(enabled_features));
+ pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_ENABLED_FEATURES -> ret: %d\n", error);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+ pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_VARIANT) {
+ int error = 0;
+ int len_of_variant = strlen(SUSFS_VARIANT);
+ char *susfs_variant = SUSFS_VARIANT;
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, len_of_variant+1)) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_VARIANT -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_VARIANT -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ error = copy_to_user((void __user*)arg3, (void*)susfs_variant, len_of_variant+1);
+ pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_VARIANT -> ret: %d\n", error);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+ pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+ if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_IS_SUS_SU_READY) {
+ int error = 0;
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(susfs_is_sus_su_ready))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_IS_SUS_SU_READY -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_IS_SUS_SU_READY -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ error = copy_to_user((void __user*)arg3, (void*)&susfs_is_sus_su_ready, sizeof(susfs_is_sus_su_ready));
+ pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_IS_SUS_SU_READY -> ret: %d\n", error);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+ pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_SUS_SU_WORKING_MODE) {
+ int error = 0;
+ int working_mode = susfs_get_sus_su_working_mode();
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(working_mode))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_SUS_SU_WORKING_MODE -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+ pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_SUS_SU_WORKING_MODE -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ error = copy_to_user((void __user*)arg3, (void*)&working_mode, sizeof(working_mode));
+ pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_SUS_SU_WORKING_MODE -> ret: %d\n", error);
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+ pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+ }
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+
// all other cmds are for 'root manager'
if (!from_manager) {
return 0;
@@ -477,11 +882,15 @@ static bool should_umount(struct path *path)
return false;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+ return susfs_is_mnt_devname_ksu(path);
+#else
if (path->mnt && path->mnt->mnt_sb && path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_type) {
const char *fstype = path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_type->name;
return strcmp(fstype, "overlay") == 0;
}
return false;
+#endif
}
static int ksu_umount_mnt(struct path *path, int flags)
@@ -494,7 +903,7 @@ static int ksu_umount_mnt(struct path *path, int flags)
#endif
}
-static void try_umount(const char *mnt, bool check_mnt, int flags)
+void ksu_try_umount(const char *mnt, bool check_mnt, int flags)
{
struct path path;
int err = kern_path(mnt, 0, &path);
@@ -518,6 +927,23 @@ static void try_umount(const char *mnt, bool check_mnt, int flags)
}
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
+void susfs_try_umount_all(uid_t uid) {
+ susfs_try_umount(uid);
+ /* For Legacy KSU only */
+ ksu_try_umount("/system", true, 0);
+ ksu_try_umount("/system_ext", true, 0);
+ ksu_try_umount("/vendor", true, 0);
+ ksu_try_umount("/product", true, 0);
+ ksu_try_umount("/odm", true, 0);
+ // - For '/data/adb/modules' we pass 'false' here because it is a loop device that we can't determine whether
+ // its dev_name is KSU or not, and it is safe to just umount it if it is really a mountpoint
+ ksu_try_umount("/data/adb/modules", false, MNT_DETACH);
+ /* For both Legacy KSU and Magic Mount KSU */
+ ksu_try_umount("/debug_ramdisk", true, MNT_DETACH);
+}
+#endif
+
int ksu_handle_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
// this hook is used for umounting overlayfs for some uid, if there isn't any module mounted, just ignore it!
@@ -537,6 +963,20 @@ int ksu_handle_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
return 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+ // check if current process is zygote
+ bool is_zygote_child = susfs_is_sid_equal(old->security, susfs_zygote_sid);
+ if (likely(is_zygote_child)) {
+ // if spawned process is non user app process
+ if (unlikely(new_uid.val < 10000 && new_uid.val >= 1000)) {
+ // umount for the system process if path DATA_ADB_UMOUNT_FOR_ZYGOTE_SYSTEM_PROCESS exists
+ if (susfs_is_umount_for_zygote_system_process_enabled) {
+ goto out_ksu_try_umount;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
if (!is_appuid(new_uid) || is_unsupported_uid(new_uid.val)) {
// pr_info("handle setuid ignore non application or isolated uid: %d\n", new_uid.val);
return 0;
@@ -546,7 +986,17 @@ int ksu_handle_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
// pr_info("handle setuid ignore allowed application: %d\n", new_uid.val);
return 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+ else {
+ task_lock(current);
+ current->susfs_task_state |= TASK_STRUCT_NON_ROOT_USER_APP_PROC;
+ task_unlock(current);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+out_ksu_try_umount:
+#endif
if (!ksu_uid_should_umount(new_uid.val)) {
return 0;
} else {
@@ -555,10 +1005,12 @@ int ksu_handle_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
#endif
}
+#ifndef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
// check old process's selinux context, if it is not zygote, ignore it!
// because some su apps may setuid to untrusted_app but they are in global mount namespace
// when we umount for such process, that is a disaster!
- bool is_zygote_child = is_zygote(old->security);
+ bool is_zygote_child = ksu_is_zygote(old->security);
+#endif
if (!is_zygote_child) {
pr_info("handle umount ignore non zygote child: %d\n",
current->pid);
@@ -570,20 +1022,25 @@ int ksu_handle_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
current->pid);
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
+ // susfs come first, and lastly umount by ksu, make sure umount in reversed order
+ susfs_try_umount_all(new_uid.val);
+#else
// fixme: use `collect_mounts` and `iterate_mount` to iterate all mountpoint and
// filter the mountpoint whose target is `/data/adb`
- try_umount("/system", true, 0);
- try_umount("/system_ext", true, 0);
- try_umount("/vendor", true, 0);
- try_umount("/product", true, 0);
- try_umount("/data/adb/modules", false, MNT_DETACH);
+ ksu_try_umount("/system", true, 0);
+ ksu_try_umount("/system_ext", true, 0);
+ ksu_try_umount("/vendor", true, 0);
+ ksu_try_umount("/product", true, 0);
+ ksu_try_umount("/data/adb/modules", false, MNT_DETACH);
// try umount ksu temp path
- try_umount("/debug_ramdisk", false, MNT_DETACH);
- try_umount("/sbin", false, MNT_DETACH);
+ ksu_try_umount("/debug_ramdisk", false, MNT_DETACH);
+ ksu_try_umount("/sbin", false, MNT_DETACH);
// try umount hosts file
- try_umount("/system/etc/hosts", false, MNT_DETACH);
+ ksu_try_umount("/system/etc/hosts", false, MNT_DETACH);
+#endif
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/kernel_compat.c b/kernel/kernel_compat.c
index a1886433..f898707e 100644
--- a/kernel/kernel_compat.c
+++ b/kernel/kernel_compat.c
@@ -76,6 +76,16 @@ void ksu_android_ns_fs_check()
task_unlock(current);
}
+int ksu_access_ok(const void *addr, unsigned long size) {
+#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE < KERNEL_VERSION(5,0,0)
+ /* For kernels before 5.0.0, pass the type argument to access_ok. */
+ return access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, size);
+#else
+ /* For kernels 5.0.0 and later, ignore the type argument. */
+ return access_ok(addr, size);
+#endif
+}
+
struct file *ksu_filp_open_compat(const char *filename, int flags, umode_t mode)
{
#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE < KERNEL_VERSION(4, 10, 0) || defined(CONFIG_IS_HW_HISI) || defined(CONFIG_KSU_ALLOWLIST_WORKAROUND)
diff --git a/kernel/kernel_compat.h b/kernel/kernel_compat.h
index 6d79f7ed..b0d664a9 100644
--- a/kernel/kernel_compat.h
+++ b/kernel/kernel_compat.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ extern struct key *init_session_keyring;
#endif
extern void ksu_android_ns_fs_check();
+extern int ksu_access_ok(const void *addr, unsigned long size);
extern struct file *ksu_filp_open_compat(const char *filename, int flags,
umode_t mode);
extern ssize_t ksu_kernel_read_compat(struct file *p, void *buf, size_t count,
diff --git a/kernel/ksu.c b/kernel/ksu.c
index 3639edc2..b6dc8681 100644
--- a/kernel/ksu.c
+++ b/kernel/ksu.c
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
#include "ksu.h"
#include "throne_tracker.h"
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+#include <linux/susfs.h>
+#endif
+
static struct workqueue_struct *ksu_workqueue;
bool ksu_queue_work(struct work_struct *work)
@@ -37,7 +41,7 @@ extern void ksu_sucompat_exit();
extern void ksu_ksud_init();
extern void ksu_ksud_exit();
-int __init kernelsu_init(void)
+int __init ksu_kernelsu_init(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_DEBUG
pr_alert("*************************************************************");
@@ -49,6 +53,10 @@ int __init kernelsu_init(void)
pr_alert("*************************************************************");
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+ susfs_init();
+#endif
+
ksu_core_init();
ksu_workqueue = alloc_ordered_workqueue("kernelsu_work_queue", 0);
@@ -72,7 +80,7 @@ int __init kernelsu_init(void)
return 0;
}
-void kernelsu_exit(void)
+void ksu_kernelsu_exit(void)
{
ksu_allowlist_exit();
@@ -88,8 +96,8 @@ void kernelsu_exit(void)
ksu_core_exit();
}
-module_init(kernelsu_init);
-module_exit(kernelsu_exit);
+module_init(ksu_kernelsu_init);
+module_exit(ksu_kernelsu_exit);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("weishu");
diff --git a/kernel/ksud.c b/kernel/ksud.c
index 68e47352..16040f3f 100644
--- a/kernel/ksud.c
+++ b/kernel/ksud.c
@@ -64,17 +64,22 @@ bool ksu_execveat_hook __read_mostly = true;
bool ksu_input_hook __read_mostly = true;
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+bool ksu_devpts_hook = false;
+bool susfs_is_sus_su_ready = false;
+#endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+
u32 ksu_devpts_sid;
-void on_post_fs_data(void)
+void ksu_on_post_fs_data(void)
{
static bool done = false;
if (done) {
- pr_info("on_post_fs_data already done\n");
+ pr_info("ksu_on_post_fs_data already done\n");
return;
}
done = true;
- pr_info("on_post_fs_data!\n");
+ pr_info("ksu_on_post_fs_data!\n");
ksu_load_allow_list();
// sanity check, this may influence the performance
stop_input_hook();
@@ -197,7 +202,7 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_ksud(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
first_arg);
if (!strcmp(first_arg, "second_stage")) {
pr_info("/system/bin/init second_stage executed\n");
- apply_kernelsu_rules();
+ ksu_apply_kernelsu_rules();
init_second_stage_executed = true;
ksu_android_ns_fs_check();
}
@@ -221,7 +226,7 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_ksud(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
pr_info("/init first arg: %s\n", first_arg);
if (!strcmp(first_arg, "--second-stage")) {
pr_info("/init second_stage executed\n");
- apply_kernelsu_rules();
+ ksu_apply_kernelsu_rules();
init_second_stage_executed = true;
ksu_android_ns_fs_check();
}
@@ -258,7 +263,7 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_ksud(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
(!strcmp(env_value, "1") ||
!strcmp(env_value, "true"))) {
pr_info("/init second_stage executed\n");
- apply_kernelsu_rules();
+ ksu_apply_kernelsu_rules();
init_second_stage_executed =
true;
ksu_android_ns_fs_check();
@@ -273,7 +278,7 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_ksud(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
first_app_process = false;
pr_info("exec app_process, /data prepared, second_stage: %d\n",
init_second_stage_executed);
- on_post_fs_data(); // we keep this for old ksud
+ ksu_on_post_fs_data(); // we keep this for old ksud
stop_execve_hook();
}
@@ -616,6 +621,10 @@ static void stop_execve_hook()
ksu_execveat_hook = false;
pr_info("stop execve_hook\n");
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+ susfs_is_sus_su_ready = true;
+ pr_info("susfs: sus_su is ready\n");
+#endif
}
static void stop_input_hook()
diff --git a/kernel/ksud.h b/kernel/ksud.h
index cc2df243..26974c9c 100644
--- a/kernel/ksud.h
+++ b/kernel/ksud.h
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
#define KSUD_PATH "/data/adb/ksud"
-void on_post_fs_data(void);
+void ksu_on_post_fs_data(void);
bool ksu_is_safe_mode(void);
diff --git a/kernel/manager.h b/kernel/manager.h
index be5bbced..93fa2678 100644
--- a/kernel/manager.h
+++ b/kernel/manager.h
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ static inline bool ksu_is_manager_uid_valid()
return ksu_manager_uid != KSU_INVALID_UID;
}
-static inline bool is_manager()
+static inline bool ksu_is_manager()
{
return unlikely(ksu_manager_uid == current_uid().val);
}
diff --git a/kernel/selinux/rules.c b/kernel/selinux/rules.c
index 1ba6d853..e4c65106 100644
--- a/kernel/selinux/rules.c
+++ b/kernel/selinux/rules.c
@@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ static struct policydb *get_policydb(void)
return db;
}
-void apply_kernelsu_rules()
+void ksu_apply_kernelsu_rules()
{
- if (!getenforce()) {
+ if (!ksu_getenforce()) {
pr_info("SELinux permissive or disabled, apply rules!\n");
}
@@ -134,6 +134,14 @@ void apply_kernelsu_rules()
ksu_allow(db, "system_server", KERNEL_SU_DOMAIN, "process", "getpgid");
ksu_allow(db, "system_server", KERNEL_SU_DOMAIN, "process", "sigkill");
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+ // Allow umount in zygote process without installing zygisk
+ ksu_allow(db, "zygote", "labeledfs", "filesystem", "unmount");
+ susfs_set_init_sid();
+ susfs_set_ksu_sid();
+ susfs_set_zygote_sid();
+#endif
+
rcu_read_unlock();
}
@@ -195,13 +203,13 @@ static void reset_avc_cache()
selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
}
-int handle_sepolicy(unsigned long arg3, void __user *arg4)
+int ksu_handle_sepolicy(unsigned long arg3, void __user *arg4)
{
if (!arg4) {
return -1;
}
- if (!getenforce()) {
+ if (!ksu_getenforce()) {
pr_info("SELinux permissive or disabled when handle policy!\n");
}
diff --git a/kernel/selinux/selinux.c b/kernel/selinux/selinux.c
index 4ba20b04..e171e010 100644
--- a/kernel/selinux/selinux.c
+++ b/kernel/selinux/selinux.c
@@ -8,6 +8,14 @@
#define KERNEL_SU_DOMAIN "u:r:su:s0"
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+#define KERNEL_INIT_DOMAIN "u:r:init:s0"
+#define KERNEL_ZYGOTE_DOMAIN "u:r:zygote:s0"
+u32 susfs_ksu_sid = 0;
+u32 susfs_init_sid = 0;
+u32 susfs_zygote_sid = 0;
+#endif
+
static int transive_to_domain(const char *domain)
{
struct cred *cred;
@@ -37,7 +45,7 @@ static int transive_to_domain(const char *domain)
return error;
}
-void setup_selinux(const char *domain)
+void ksu_setup_selinux(const char *domain)
{
if (transive_to_domain(domain)) {
pr_err("transive domain failed.\n");
@@ -52,7 +60,7 @@ if (!is_domain_permissive) {
}*/
}
-void setenforce(bool enforce)
+void ksu_setenforce(bool enforce)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
#ifdef KSU_COMPAT_USE_SELINUX_STATE
@@ -63,7 +71,7 @@ void setenforce(bool enforce)
#endif
}
-bool getenforce()
+bool ksu_getenforce()
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
#ifdef KSU_COMPAT_USE_SELINUX_STATE
@@ -99,7 +107,7 @@ static inline u32 current_sid(void)
}
#endif
-bool is_ksu_domain()
+bool ksu_is_ksu_domain()
{
char *domain;
u32 seclen;
@@ -113,7 +121,7 @@ bool is_ksu_domain()
return result;
}
-bool is_zygote(void *sec)
+bool ksu_is_zygote(void *sec)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = (struct task_security_struct *)sec;
if (!tsec) {
@@ -131,6 +139,83 @@ bool is_zygote(void *sec)
return result;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+static inline void susfs_set_sid(const char *secctx_name, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ if (!secctx_name || !out_sid) {
+ pr_err("secctx_name || out_sid is NULL\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx_name, strlen(secctx_name),
+ out_sid);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("failed setting sid for '%s', err: %d\n", secctx_name, err);
+ return;
+ }
+ pr_info("sid '%u' is set for secctx_name '%s'\n", *out_sid, secctx_name);
+}
+
+bool susfs_is_sid_equal(void *sec, u32 sid2) {
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = (struct task_security_struct *)sec;
+ if (!tsec) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ return tsec->sid == sid2;
+}
+
+u32 susfs_get_sid_from_name(const char *secctx_name)
+{
+ u32 out_sid = 0;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!secctx_name) {
+ pr_err("secctx_name is NULL\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx_name, strlen(secctx_name),
+ &out_sid);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("failed getting sid from secctx_name: %s, err: %d\n", secctx_name, err);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return out_sid;
+}
+
+u32 susfs_get_current_sid(void) {
+ return current_sid();
+}
+
+void susfs_set_zygote_sid(void)
+{
+ susfs_set_sid(KERNEL_ZYGOTE_DOMAIN, &susfs_zygote_sid);
+}
+
+bool susfs_is_current_zygote_domain(void) {
+ return unlikely(current_sid() == susfs_zygote_sid);
+}
+
+void susfs_set_ksu_sid(void)
+{
+ susfs_set_sid(KERNEL_SU_DOMAIN, &susfs_ksu_sid);
+}
+
+bool susfs_is_current_ksu_domain(void) {
+ return unlikely(current_sid() == susfs_ksu_sid);
+}
+
+void susfs_set_init_sid(void)
+{
+ susfs_set_sid(KERNEL_INIT_DOMAIN, &susfs_init_sid);
+}
+
+bool susfs_is_current_init_domain(void) {
+ return unlikely(current_sid() == susfs_init_sid);
+}
+#endif
+
#define DEVPTS_DOMAIN "u:object_r:ksu_file:s0"
u32 ksu_get_devpts_sid()
diff --git a/kernel/selinux/selinux.h b/kernel/selinux/selinux.h
index 07120c25..d0dfdf9c 100644
--- a/kernel/selinux/selinux.h
+++ b/kernel/selinux/selinux.h
@@ -8,17 +8,29 @@
#define KSU_COMPAT_USE_SELINUX_STATE
#endif
-void setup_selinux(const char *);
+void ksu_setup_selinux(const char *);
-void setenforce(bool);
+void ksu_setenforce(bool);
-bool getenforce();
+bool ksu_getenforce();
-bool is_ksu_domain();
+bool ksu_is_ksu_domain();
-bool is_zygote(void *cred);
+bool ksu_is_zygote(void *cred);
-void apply_kernelsu_rules();
+void ksu_apply_kernelsu_rules();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+bool susfs_is_sid_equal(void *sec, u32 sid2);
+u32 susfs_get_sid_from_name(const char *secctx_name);
+u32 susfs_get_current_sid(void);
+void susfs_set_zygote_sid(void);
+bool susfs_is_current_zygote_domain(void);
+void susfs_set_ksu_sid(void);
+bool susfs_is_current_ksu_domain(void);
+void susfs_set_init_sid(void);
+bool susfs_is_current_init_domain(void);
+#endif
u32 ksu_get_devpts_sid();
diff --git a/kernel/sucompat.c b/kernel/sucompat.c
index 9b45cd0d..71924c8a 100644
--- a/kernel/sucompat.c
+++ b/kernel/sucompat.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
#define SU_PATH "/system/bin/su"
#define SH_PATH "/system/bin/sh"
-extern void escape_to_root();
+extern void ksu_escape_to_root();
static void __user *userspace_stack_buffer(const void *d, size_t len)
{
@@ -70,6 +70,31 @@ int ksu_handle_faccessat(int *dfd, const char __user **filename_user, int *mode,
return 0;
}
+#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(6, 1, 0) && defined(CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU)
+struct filename* susfs_ksu_handle_stat(int *dfd, const char __user **filename_user, int *flags) {
+ // const char sh[] = SH_PATH;
+ const char su[] = SU_PATH;
+ struct filename *name = getname_flags(*filename_user, getname_statx_lookup_flags(*flags), NULL);
+
+ if (unlikely(IS_ERR(name) || name->name == NULL)) {
+ return name;
+ }
+
+ if (!ksu_is_allow_uid(current_uid().val)) {
+ return name;
+ }
+
+ if (likely(memcmp(name->name, su, sizeof(su)))) {
+ return name;
+ }
+
+ const char sh[] = SH_PATH;
+ pr_info("vfs_fstatat su->sh!\n");
+ memcpy((void *)name->name, sh, sizeof(sh));
+ return name;
+}
+#endif
+
int ksu_handle_stat(int *dfd, const char __user **filename_user, int *flags)
{
// const char sh[] = SH_PATH;
@@ -136,7 +161,7 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_sucompat(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
pr_info("do_execveat_common su found\n");
memcpy((void *)filename->name, sh, sizeof(sh));
- escape_to_root();
+ ksu_escape_to_root();
return 0;
}
@@ -163,7 +188,7 @@ int ksu_handle_execve_sucompat(int *fd, const char __user **filename_user,
pr_info("sys_execve su found\n");
*filename_user = ksud_user_path();
- escape_to_root();
+ ksu_escape_to_root();
return 0;
}
@@ -365,3 +390,24 @@ void ksu_sucompat_exit()
unregister_kprobe(&pts_unix98_lookup_kp);
#endif
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+extern bool ksu_devpts_hook;
+
+void ksu_susfs_disable_sus_su(void) {
+ enable_kprobe(&execve_kp);
+ enable_kprobe(&newfstatat_kp);
+ enable_kprobe(&faccessat_kp);
+ enable_kprobe(&pts_unix98_lookup_kp);
+ ksu_devpts_hook = false;
+}
+
+void ksu_susfs_enable_sus_su(void) {
+ disable_kprobe(&execve_kp);
+ disable_kprobe(&newfstatat_kp);
+ disable_kprobe(&faccessat_kp);
+ disable_kprobe(&pts_unix98_lookup_kp);
+ ksu_devpts_hook = true;
+}
+#endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+
diff --git a/kernel/throne_tracker.c b/kernel/throne_tracker.c
index 725c9103..e7ae295e 100644
--- a/kernel/throne_tracker.c
+++ b/kernel/throne_tracker.c
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ FILLDIR_RETURN_TYPE my_actor(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name,
}
}
- bool is_manager = is_manager_apk(dirpath);
+ bool is_manager = ksu_is_manager_apk(dirpath);
pr_info("Found new base.apk at path: %s, is_manager: %d\n",
dirpath, is_manager);
if (is_manager) {
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ static bool is_uid_exist(uid_t uid, char *package, void *data)
return exist;
}
-void track_throne()
+void ksu_track_throne()
{
struct file *fp =
ksu_filp_open_compat(SYSTEM_PACKAGES_LIST_PATH, O_RDONLY, 0);
diff --git a/kernel/throne_tracker.h b/kernel/throne_tracker.h
index 5d7f4770..428c737d 100644
--- a/kernel/throne_tracker.h
+++ b/kernel/throne_tracker.h
@@ -5,6 +5,6 @@ void ksu_throne_tracker_init();
void ksu_throne_tracker_exit();
-void track_throne();
+void ksu_track_throne();
#endif
--
2.43.0
Reference in a new issue Copy permalink